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Abstract 
 
 Prejudice towards gay men has almost exclusively been characterised as hostility. However, 
myriad other groups have been found to be targets hostile and benevolent (i.e., ambivalent) 
prejudice. Scholars have attempted to conceptualise ambivalent prejudice towards sexual 
minorities, but they are based on uncertain theoretical foundations. The aims of the current 
programme of research were, therefore, to develop a novel theory of ambivalent prejudice towards 
gay men in light of emerging literature, to further develop and nuance the nascent constructs of 
adversarial, repellent, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice using qualitative methods, to 
develop a scale with which to measure the endorsement of such prejudice in the United Kingdom, 
and to provide evidence outlining the measure’s psychometric utility. A series of three empirical 
studies consisting of a focus group study on heterosexuals (n = 12) and gay men (n = 10), a large-
scale survey study (n = 801), and a study of test-retest reliability (n = 131) were undertaken in order 
to address these aims. The qualitative findings corroborated and elaborated upon the initial theory 
development, suggesting that it offers a valid theoretical alternative to other theories. The 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and construct validation produced a 
multidimensional measure comprising the constructs identified in the earlier theory development 
and qualitative study. The proposed factor structure demonstrated good model fit and each 
subscale demonstrated good convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity as well as good 
internal consistency and temporal stability. Altogether, these findings challenged competing 
theories’ accounts of attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men, offered a novel reconceptualization 
of these attitudes that was well-grounded in both data and theory, and produced a measurement 
tool with promising psychometric utility. Directions for future research such as further scale 
validation and behavioural studies are proposed and the implications of these findings on theory 
in this area is outlined. 
Key words: Ambivalence, Prejudice, Gay Men, Attitudes, Scale Development 
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1. Chapter One 
General Overview 
 
 The primary aims of this program of research are to develop a theory of ambivalent 
prejudice towards gay men – incorporating both primary data and extant psychological theories – 
and to create and validate a new measure of these attitudes. Other scholars (i.e., Walls, 2008; 
Massey, 2009) have sought to investigate the multifaceted nature of heterosexuals’ attitudes 
towards gay men, however, neither theory is based on primary data and, therefore, the respective 
scales emanating from these theories have questionable content validity. These and other issues 
will be addressed in the present research by: 1) Synthesising a bespoke theory rather than a theory 
which is an extrapolation of other tangential theories of ambivalent prejudice; 2) Validating the 
theory and its underlying assumptions using qualitative methods; and 3) Using this theory and 
empirical findings to develop a psychometric measure of these constructs. In so doing, this thesis 
will offer a necessary reconceptualization of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, which will 
illuminate the under-studied positive attitudes towards gay men and their possible negative 
connotations, liberate academic understanding and investigation of attitudes towards gay men, and 
make way for new avenues of scholarly inquiry in the field of LGBTQ psychology. 
 To orient the reader, the structure of the thesis will be briefly outlined. Chapter Two 
provides a detailed coverage of the structure, content, and functions of attitudes and introduces 
the concept of attitudinal ambivalence – the coexistence of positive and negative attitudes towards 
an attitude target – as well as its antecedents, consequences, and functions that have been 
discovered in social cognition literature. Chapter Three focuses on the social-cognitive construct 
of prejudice and delineates old-fashioned and modern conceptualisations of prejudice before 
exploring how other scholars have conceptualised ambivalent prejudice towards other oppressed 
groups. The ontological similarities and differences between these groups and gay men is critically 
examined and it is noted that gay men – moreso than other people under the LGBTQ umbrella – 
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are targets of a range of benevolent evaluations that other oppressed groups (i.e., women, elderly 
people, and disabled people) also experience, necessitating further theorising in this area. 
‘Homoprejudice’ was advanced as a suitable term that captured the diversity of affect inherent to 
ambivalence (over other terms that emphasise homonegativity/positivity) while also upholding the 
social psychological hypothesis that such ambivalent prejudice places the target at some disadvantage 
– despite its potential to be expressed in superficially positive ways. Ambivalent homoprejudice is 
theorised to have four components: 1) an envious and begrudgingly tolerant aspect termed 
adversarial homoprejudice; 2) a contemptuous and disgusted aspect termed repellent 
homoprejudice; 3) an admiring and aggrandising aspects termed romanticised homoprejudice, and; 
4) a sympathetic – yet demeaning – aspect termed paternalistic homoprejudice. This framework is 
argued to be a nuanced alternative to other theoretical accounts, which do not account for 
benevolent prejudice and the aforementioned ontological diversity among different oppressed 
groups. The broader literature concerning heterosexism is also integrated here, incorporating some 
of the more discursive findings on microaggressions in order to better understand the seeming 
inconsistency between the expression and the experience of benevolent prejudice and open up 
additional research avenues from both social-cognitive and social constructionist frameworks.  
 Chapter Four details a series of homogenous focus groups comprising heterosexuals and 
gay men, which aimed to corroborate and further refine the concepts identified in the previous 
chapter. Thematic analysis of these discussions supported the four aspects of homoprejudice 
identified in the previous chapter and provided further insight into the sociocultural and 
ontological factors that were argued to motivate them. Findings of particular note include the link 
between adversarial homoprejudice and the belief that gay men enjoyed undue advantages over 
heterosexuals; the penalisation of gay men who failed to live up to romanticised ideals by 
heterosexuals (i.e., the ‘failed gay’); and heterosexuals’ imposing facilitative behaviours towards gay 
men – particularly in the context of sexuality disclosure. This study addressed the content validity 
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issues in extant accounts of multidimensional homoprejudice and provided a conceptual base for 
the ambivalent homoprejudice scale to be formed upon. 
 Chapter Five details the first of two quantitative investigations into the ambivalent 
homoprejudice scale. This chapter covers the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of two 
large samples of British adults and details the latent factor structure of a pool of items derived 
from the prior theorising and qualitative analysis. These analyses lent further support to the central 
thesis that homoprejudice comprises four qualitatively different attitudinal tendencies and ruled 
out other possibly competing theoretical interpretations of these attitudes. Chapter Six further 
explores the psychometric properties of the ambivalent homoprejudice scale and demonstrates the 
scale’s promising convergent and discriminant validity relative to other measures of prejudice, 
ideologies associated with prejudice, and potentially confounding variables such as social 
desirability. Known-groups validity is also explored, with scale score comparisons made between 
genders, different levels of formal educational attainment, and sexual identities. Finally, test-retest 
reliability was measured to explore this scale’s temporal consistency.  
 Finally, Chapter Seven delineates the key findings, and theoretical and methodological 
implications of the thesis. Principally, this program of research offers a substantive and novel 
account of prejudice towards gay men, with a level of empirical support that is not present in other 
alternative theories and measures of multidimensional homoprejudice. Limitations are discussed, 
which frame some recommendations for further research such as the use of more ethnically diverse 
samples. Finally, other directions for future research are discussed, including the continual 
validation of the ambivalent homoprejudice scale, behavioural research to explore the links 
between ambivalent homoprejudice and current concepts in the attitudinal ambivalence literature, 
and further qualitative inquiry from alternative epistemic stances. 
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2. Chapter Two 
Attitudes and Ambivalence 
 
This chapter will offer an overview of the definitions, content, structure, and functions of 
attitudes and will introduce attitudinal ambivalence theory as a necessary critique of the 
assumptions that underpin attitudes. Later, the development of attitudinal ambivalence 
measurement will be discussed and its use in the research exploring the antecedents and 
characteristics of attitudinal ambivalence will be presented. The latter sections of this chapter will 
explore the proposed models of attitudinal ambivalence and consider the potential functions of 
ambivalence. 
2.1 Attitudes and Related Constructs 
 Over eighty years ago, Allport (1935) notably described attitudes as “the most distinctive 
and indispensable concept in contemporary social psychology” (p. 798). However, different 
scholars have offered subtly different descriptions of attitudes, which, in some instances has led 
to conceptual overlap between ‘attitudes’ and the related constructs of ‘beliefs’, ‘values’, and 
‘ideologies’. This can be observed in Rokeach’s (1968) definition of an attitude as “a relatively 
enduring organisation of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some 
preferential manner” (p. 112). Within the context of this definition, it is difficult to disentangle the 
constructs of ‘attitude’ and ‘belief’ beyond suggesting that the former is simply a plural of the latter. 
To address this, this thesis refers to Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) widely-cited definition of an 
attitude as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
degree of favour or disfavour” (p. 1). In other words, an attitude is an evaluative appraisal of a 
particular target (e.g., is it good or bad?), unlike a belief, which is concerned with what one accepts 
to be true, valid, and credible about a target (Harvey, 1986). This theoretical distinction offers 
clarity when considering related concepts such as stereotypes, defined by Ashmore and Del Boca 
(1981) as “a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people” (p. 16). To illustrate, 
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one may subscribe to the stereotype that gay men are promiscuous (i.e., a belief), but this is 
relatively independent of whether one (dis)approves of promiscuity (i.e., an attitude). 
 Stereotypes are discernible from values - “beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of 
behaving or about the desirability or otherwise of general goals” (Feather, 1996, p. 222) – because 
stereotypes pertain to concrete target groups. However, the definitions of attitudes discussed so 
far make vague reference to an evaluated ‘object’ or ‘entity’, which readily encompasses codes of 
conduct and shared goals. How, then, are values discernible from attitudes? As will be discussed 
in more detail later, values have similar content to attitudes; they comprise cognitive contents that 
recognise a ‘correct’ way of life, affective contents that are positive and negative feelings towards 
certain ways of life, and behavioural contents whereby individuals act in accordance with their 
values (Limthanakom, Lauffer, Mujtaba, & Murphy, 2011). Based on the aforementioned 
definition of a value (and those provided elsewhere), it is also generally agreed upon that a value 
involves a similar evaluative process to attitudes inasmuch as behaviours and end-states are 
evaluated positively (e.g., equality) and negatively (e.g., oppression). 
 However, as compared to an attitude, the ‘entity’ pertaining to a particular value appears 
to be relatively more nebulous. Whereas values are appraisals of the abstract – prescribed codes of 
conduct and end-states such as egalitarianism –  attitudes are appraisals of the concrete such as 
people (e.g., individuals and groups), objects (e.g., products), and social realities (e.g., political 
issues). As will be covered in more detail in the next chapter, positive and negative values prime 
varying social attitudes (and vice versa), which can potentially lead to attitudinal and value conflict 
known as ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988; Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004).  
2.2 Attitude Content 
 Attitudes are commonly argued to have multiple components contributing to an overall 
evaluative judgement of a particular target (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993): 1) affective information (how 
one feels about the target); 2) behavioural information (how one has previously behaved towards 
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the target) and; 3) cognitive information (how one thinks about the target). Altogether, this 
tripartite (also known as the ‘ABC’) model assumes that affective, behaviour, and cognition 
collectively produce a consistent summary judgement about a particular target. 
Although these three components are suggested to interact substantially when evaluating 
a target, research has demonstrated that they are empirically distinct attitude components. Breckler 
(1984) presented 138 undergraduate participants with a live snake (i.e., a physical attitude object) 
and had them respond to statements tapping affective (e.g., “I feel tense”), behavioural (e.g., “I 
scream whenever I see snakes”), and cognitive (e.g., “Snakes are soft and smooth”) responses to 
snakes. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the three-factor model (i.e., ABC) 
demonstrated a superior goodness of fit than did the one-factor model (i.e., attitude as a global 
construct) and that the three factors were only moderately correlated, suggesting that affective, 
behavioural, and cognitive attitude components are qualitatively different yet related constructs. 
More recent research has sought to elaborate and amend the ABC model of attitudes. 
Dalege et al. (2016) propose the causal attitude network (CAN) model, which posits that attitudes 
are networks of interacting evaluative reactions, including affect, behaviours, and cognitions. 
Individual reactions are graphically represented as nodes which interact with each other in two 
ways. Firstly, nodes can interact with each other in a causal manner between content categories; 
an individual may feel anxious around snakes because they believe that snakes are dangerous. 
Secondly, nodes interact with each other within content categories by clustering in ways that 
maintain evaluative consistency between related reactions; an individual who believes that snakes 
are dangerous may also believe, relatedly, that snakes look scary. This preference for attitudinal 
consistency is argued by Dalege et al. (2016) to be at odds with the preference for accuracy because 
entirely consistent attitudes are rarely accurate and vice versa. This is theorised to be dealt with 
through the strategic energy-conserving clustering of evaluatively (in)consistent reactions. 
Although an individual may believe that snakes are dangerous, they may also believe that snakes 
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are an important part of their ecosystems; in this instance, they form separate clusters of evaluative 
reactions but few connections are instantiated between the two (i.e., they activate independently), 
allowing for a network of evaluative reactions that is both consistent and accurate. 
This assertion challenges the assumption transmitted in common definitions of attitudes 
that they are an overall favourable or unfavourable evaluation because there are many occasions 
where there can be evaluative conflict between components as well as within them. Contentious 
societal issues, enjoyable yet harmful behaviours, and polarising individuals are all examples of 
attitude targets that may elicit competing negative and positive evaluations. Lavine, Thomsen, 
Zanna and Borgida (1998) analysed the affective and cognitive evaluations of voters towards a 
number of American presidential candidates running between 1980 and 1992, as well as reported 
voting behaviour. Almost 17% of the 9,261 participants felt positively and thought negatively 
about a candidate (A+/C-) or vice versa (A-/C+). In both cases, affect was significantly more 
predictive of self-reported attitudes than was cognition and accounted for an average of 52% of 
the variance in overall attitudes as compared to cognition, which explained 19%. Affect was also 
significantly more predictive of voting behaviour than was cognition and accounted for 26% of 
the variance in voting behaviour as compared to cognition, which explained 4%. Thus, 
respondents in the former group held more positive views towards their respective candidates than 
those in the latter group, due to the relatively stronger influence of affective information. 
Comparatively, for those respondents who demonstrated no such attitude conflict (i.e., A+/C+ 
and A-/C-), affective and cognitive information exerted a roughly similar influence on overall 
candidate attitude and voting behaviour. Similar findings have been documented throughout the 
literature (Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Norton, Bogart, Cecil, & Pinkerton, 2005; Shiv 
& Fedorikhin, 1999) suggesting that the evaluative reactions in the affective content category are 
prioritised or weighted more heavily than those in the cognitive content category (i.e., the primacy 
of affect hypothesis; Zajonc, 1984). 
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Intra-component (e.g., affective-affective) conflict also challenges the assertion that 
attitudes are either positive or negative. Exposure to cultural diversity elicits such affective turmoil, 
prompting disconnection, fear, and anxiety as well as wonder, curiosity, and fascination (Van 
Leeuwen, 2008). Individuals also tend to endorse multiple core values that – because of their 
deeply entrenched importance and breadth (Sampson, 1999) – often result in polarised attitudes 
towards a range of attitude objects such as gay rights (Craig, Martinez, Kane & Gainous, 2005), 
ethnic minorities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988), and political parties (Keele & 
Wolak, 2006). Given the complexity of attitude content, the assertion that attitudes are a bipolar 
positive or negative evaluation is unsustainable in light of the research evidence exposing the many 
areas where individuals simultaneously evaluate an object in positive and negative ways. 
2.3 Attitude Structure 
 Conceptualising attitude structure as bipolar (or not) is of particular relevance to how 
attitudes are measured. Typically, attitudes are measured using unidimensional scales that assess – 
at one extreme – absolute subscription to the construct or – at the other extreme – absolute 
rejection of the construct. Unidimensionality is, thus, commonly seen as the gold standard in 
psychometrics (Segars, 1997). However, if attitude measurement tools seek to emulate a bipolar 
attitude structure then it is not immediately clear what attitude exists at a scale midpoint. In 
practice, scale midpoints are typically used to represent neutrality (i.e., ‘neither agree nor disagree’) 
but there are numerous other interpretations of this attitudinal position: uncertainty (i.e., inability 
to identify feelings about the object; Klopfer & Madden, 1980), indifference (i.e., minimal concern 
for the attitude object; DuBois & Burns, 1975), ignorance (i.e., unable to come to a determination 
due to lack of competence; DuBois & Burns, 1975), and ambivalence (i.e., oppositional positive 
and negative evaluations; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995). 
 One study seeking to demarcate these concepts was conducted by Armstrong (1987) who 
distributed one of two versions of a survey assessing attitudes towards the school board to 579 
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students. Attitudes were measured on 5-point Likert scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree, however, the scale midpoint was expressed either as ‘undecided’ or ‘neutral’. No 
significant differences were found between the attitudes in the undecided group and the neutral 
group, either suggesting that both terms are equally preferable expressions of the same concept or 
that the terms are not semantically different enough (from a lay perspective) to elicit significantly 
different attitudinal responses.  
Semantic differential scales, which ask participants to rate a stimulus at a single point 
between two opposing adjectives (e.g., positive – negative), have also been criticised for being 
insensitive to nuances at the scale midpoint. Kaplan (1972) found that splitting this measure at the 
midpoint and having participants make separate positive and negative evaluations allowed for a 
formula to differentiate indifference and ambivalence. Generally, ambivalence increased as a 
function of the magnitude of difference between positive and negative evaluations whereas 
indifference was characterised by minimal valence in any direction. Ignorance may also not be an 
adequate interpretation of attitude scale midpoints because, as discussed earlier, the accuracy of 
attitudes (that is, how well-grounded they are in objective fact) often comes at the cost of 
attitudinal consistency and vice versa (Dalege et al., 2016). In this instance, individuals who are not 
very knowledgeable about an object they are forming an attitude towards may simply engage in 
biased information processing so as not to disrupt the consistency of that attitude (Jonas, Diehl, 
& Brömer). Rather, ignorance may be tapped more effectively by non-response, ‘not applicable’ 
or ‘rather not answer’ response options, or participant feedback. 
Finally, Klopfer and Madden (1980) provided definitions of ambivalence1, neutrality, or 
uncertainty, or no definition at all to participants before having them respond to two attitude scales 
with a midpoint. It was found that those participants supplied with the definition for ambivalence 
                                                          
1 Ambivalence was defined to the participants as “sometimes you feel one way and sometimes you feel another”. An 
alternative definition will be offered later in this chapter. 
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made the most use of the scale midpoints whereas the uncertainty definition resulted in the least 
use of the scale midpoints, suggesting that ambivalence may be the most preferable interpretation 
of ostensibly ‘neutral’ responses and that ambivalent attitudes may be far more prevalent than 
neutral ones. 
 In attempting to reduce attitudes to a single evaluative point ranging from extremely 
positive to extremely negative, researchers have overlooked middlemost responses embodying 
multiple attitudinal positions. This oversight is illustrated particularly well when analysing 
evaluative space grids (ESG), which measures the intensity of people’s positive and negative 
attitudes on separate bipolar axes ranging from 1 (not at all positive/negative) to 4 (extremely 
positive/negative). Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, and Cacioppo (2009) asked participants to 
list ten things they felt ambivalent about (e.g., Bill Clinton, capital punishment, and exercise) and 
had them respond to eight of these attitude objects in the ESG. Participants also responded to 
attitude objects deemed by the researchers to be universally positive (e.g., sunshine), universally 
negative (e.g., terrorism), and universally neutral (e.g., wallpaper). Although the neutral and 
ambivalent attitude object ratings were both close to 0 (0.67 and -0.06, respectively), implying that 
they may both constitute middlemost responses on traditional attitude measures, ambivalent 
attitude objects were rated more positively and more negatively than neutral attitude objects. As 
such, neutrality is an innocuous (tending towards slightly positive) attitude position, whereas 
ambivalence is a conflicted attitude position that, as will be explored later, can also be an aversive 
affective state. 
 In summary, typical measures of attitudes have allowed ambivalence to masquerade as 
neutrality and other related concepts because of the enforced bipolarity inherent in their scale 
construction. The evidence presented here suggests that researchers seeking to tap ambivalence 
using measurement scales can do so in one of two ways: 1) Using statistical methods, as has been 
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done with split semantic-differential scales and the ESG; or 2) Operationalising ambivalence by 
incorporating it into the content of scale items themselves. 
2.4 Attitude Function 
 Attitudes have been argued to serve a number of important functions. Smith, Bruner, and 
White (1956) propose a tripartite model consisting of object-appraisal, social-adjustment, and 
externalisation. Attitudes’ object appraisal functions are important because they allow attitude 
objects to be appraised in positive and negative ways. This is advantageous because it predisposes 
individuals to seek out beneficial and pleasant attitude objects, while avoiding those that cause 
harm and discomfort. This is typically borne out in politics whenever self-interest informs political 
attitudes and voting behaviours (Sears & Funk, 1991). 
Attitudes also fulfil social adjustment needs insofar that we identify with people that we 
have formed positive attitudes towards and disassociate with people that we have formed negative 
attitudes towards. This implicates both top-down and bottom-up processes; individuals form and 
join groups based on shared beliefs and attitudes – termed homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & 
Cook, 2001) – yet, equally, arbitrary group membership breeds positive in-group attitudes and 
negative out-group attitudes (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Finally, externalisation serves to defend 
oneself against internal conflict; Maio and Haddock (2009) refer to an example of an inept golfer 
developing a dislike of the game because their poor performance threatens their self-esteem. In so 
doing, the individual externalises their negative attitudes, resulting in more positive evaluations of 
the self.  
Katz (1960) also proposed four functions of attitudes. The utilitarian function is similar to 
that of Smith et al.’s (1956) object appraisal function insofar that both emphasise how attitudes 
serve to classify ‘good’ attitudes objects that are pleasant and rewarding and ‘bad’ attitude objects 
that are unpleasant and detracting. Like Smith et al (1956), Katz (1960) proposes an ego-defensive 
function, similar to the externalisation function discussed earlier. Katz (1960) also proposed that 
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attitudes serve a knowledge function because they represent cogent and structured volumes of 
information about one’s surroundings. Finally, Katz (1960) argues that attitudes perform an 
important value-expressive function that allows individuals to express their core values and self-
concept.  
Fundamentally, these proposed attitudinal functions are all underpinned by the same 
assumption discussed in the previous section – that attitudes are positive or negative – because 
they are all undermined by attitudinal ambivalence. An ambivalent object appraisal of a potentially 
beneficial product, for instance, can elicit an approach-avoidance conflict that results in inaction 
rather than purchase (Penz & Hogg, 2011). Likewise, approach-avoidance conflicts prompted by 
ambivalence can also become a barrier to closeness (i.e., social adjustment) in intimate relationships 
(Mikulincer, Shaver, Bar-On, & Ein-Dor, 2010). Because ambivalent attitudes are not especially 
cogent, this also limits opportunities to engage in effective value expression (Petty, 2006). Finally, 
ambivalence can produce feelings of discomfort if it is made salient (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & 
Zanna, 2002), which is at odds with the externalising and ego-defensive functions that ostensibly 
work to mitigate against such internal conflict. 
To summarise, the functions of attitudes proposed by the aforementioned scholars appear 
to be – more specifically – functions of univalent attitudes. Following a fuller discussion of the 
maladaptive effects of ambivalence in the next section, this thesis will consider the potential 
functions of attitudinal ambivalence with regards to empirical research findings.  
2.5 The Hallmarks of Ambivalence 
2.5.1 Discomfort 
As previously alluded to, attitudinal ambivalence can be an uncomfortable and aversive 
experience. The discomfort brought about by ambivalent attitudes is known as subjective 
ambivalence (Newy-Clark et al., 2002). By comparison, potential ambivalence – ambivalence 
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derived mathematically from separate positive and negative univalent attitude measures (Newby-
Clark et al., 2002) – often goes unnoticed. Although these constructs are measured in different 
ways (as will be discussed later) and correlations between the two suggest that they are relatively 
independent, potential ambivalence can develop into subjective ambivalence when one’s positive 
and negative attitudes are made equally salient. In one of a series of studies conducted by Newby-
Clark et al (2002), they demonstrated that potential and subjective ambivalence towards abortion 
initially correlated fairly weakly (r = .39). However, when the participants’ juxtapositional positive 
and negative attitudes were made simultaneously accessible, their scores on potential and 
subjective ambivalence indices became more strongly correlated (r = .55). 
Because of this discomfort, ambivalent individuals are motivated to resolve their conflicted 
attitudinal positions. This may take the form of biased information processing. In one experimental 
study, Nordgren, van Harreveld, and van der Pligt (2006) induced ambivalence by presenting 
participants with an article detailing the pros and cons of genetically modified food and recorded 
the attitudes using a measure of attitudes towards genetically modified food. After this, the 
participants were assigned randomly to either: 1) A thought listing condition whereby the 
participants listed their thoughts on genetically modified food, offering ample opportunity to 
engage in biased information processing and reduce their ambivalence; 2) The waiting condition 
whereby the participants waited 3 minutes for the next part of the study, offering moderate 
opportunity to engage in biased information processing; or 3) The cognitive load condition 
whereby the participants completed a series of difficult anagrams, offering no opportunity to 
engage in biased information processing. Following this experimental manipulation, the 
participants completed the attitudes towards genetically modified food questionnaire again. The 
results showed that the participants in the thought listing condition showed a significant decrease 
in self-reported ambivalence between initial and subsequent measurement. By comparison, those 
participants in the waiting condition reported marginally less ambivalence between initial and 
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subsequent measurement, and those participants in the cognitive load condition showed no 
significant difference. 
Ambivalence reduction could also take the form of response amplification, whereby either 
the positive or negative evaluation of the attitude object is exaggerated in order to mask 
ambivalence. Carver, Gibbons, Stephan, Glass, and Katz (1979) demonstrate this phenomenon in 
a study where participants are exposed to conflicting opinions about Mexican-Americans and then, 
subsequently, given a transcript of an interview with a member of that group portraying them 
either positively or negatively. When ambivalence was induced, the participants gave significantly 
more polarised ratings of the interviewee as compared to those participants who were not exposed 
to the ambivalence-inducing stimulus. Subsequent studies have replicated these findings with 
regards to Native Canadians (Bell & Esses, 2002), disabled people (Gibbons, Stephan, Stephenson, 
& Petty, 1980), and gay men (Bromgard & Stephan, 2006). This latter study involved inviting 
heterosexual men2 to interact with a confederate who was either presented as gay (stigmatised 
condition) or presumably heterosexual (non-stigmatised condition) in a short personality profile 
provided to the participants before meeting the discussion partner. The experimenter explained 
that the interaction would involve either a discussion about dating (high-threat) or about favourite 
movies (low-threat) and informally asked the participants to “grab an extra chair” to take a seat 
near the confederate. Before the discussion could begin, the experimenter then asked the 
participant to return to a private cubicle to complete a measure of subjective ambivalence, 
ostensibly because they forgot to do this earlier. In actuality, the distance between the confederate’s 
and the participants’ chair was measured, serving as a measure of latent (dis)comfort towards the 
confederate. The results showed that the participants felt significantly more ambivalent when 
anticipating an interaction with the gay confederate than with the heterosexual confederate. 
                                                          
2 Because asking the sexuality of participants may have revealed the covert aims of the study, this information was 
not sought from the participants. The authors acknowledge that a small proportion of the participants may have 
been gay men, though they contend that this would not have drastically affected the results given the size of this 
demographic. 
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However, in the low-threat condition, participants placed their chair significantly closer to the gay 
confederate than to the heterosexual confederate. Inversely, in the high-threat condition, 
participants placed their chair significantly further away from the gay confederate than from the 
heterosexual confederate. By comparison, there was no significant difference between seating 
distance in the low- and high-threat interactions with the heterosexual confederate. In other words, 
subjective ambivalence towards gay men was allayed by way of response amplification; comfort 
was amplified in the low-threat condition and discomfort was amplified in the high-threat 
condition whereas no such amplification occurred when the target did not induce ambivalence. 
van Harreveld, van der Pligt, and de Liver (2009) elaborate on these strategies further in 
their model of ambivalence-induced discomfort (MAID). Subjective ambivalence is argued to be 
prompted by dichotomous decision-making, which makes salient one’s underlying potential 
ambivalence. This tension is augmented by the outcomes of such a decision being ambiguous or 
uncertain – but typically anticipated to be negative (i.e., the personal fear of invalidity; Kruglanski, 
1990). When the choice is not required imminently, ambivalence can be reduced quickly and 
relatively effortlessly via procrastination (Day, Mensink, & O’Sullivan, 2000). If the choice is time-
limited, another strategy to reduce ambivalence is to deny responsibility (e.g., emphasise external 
pressures), making the outcomes of a potentially wrong decision less attributable to the self (i.e., 
externalising; Smith et al., 1956). However, if one’s responsibility for the decision cannot be refuted 
then an ambivalent individual must engage in more cognitively-effortful strategies in order to 
reduce their discomfort. Ideally, one will make the most ideal choice by carefully and systematically 
evaluating the available information because this reduces the risk of invalidation. However, if these 
cognitive resources are not available – either through strict time limitations or cognitive deficit – 
then less effortful strategies such as biased information processing (Nordgren et al, 2006) and 
heuristics, such as stereotyping, will be utilised instead.  
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Overall, there are two broad strategies used to reduce the unpleasant feeling of 
ambivalence: either distancing oneself from the ambivalence-inducing object or resolving it with 
varying degrees of thoroughness (Penz & Hogg, 2011). The former distancing strategy has been – 
rather literally – demonstrated to be associated with ambivalence towards contact with a gay man 
in the aforementioned study conducted by (Bromgard & Stephan, 2006). However, the latter 
strategy has not yet been associated with ambivalence towards gay men. 
2.5.2 Temporal Instability 
As compared to univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are thought to be less stable over 
time, because they are highly context-dependent (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). For example, if one has 
a friend who is witty, fun, unreliable, and feckless, that person’s attitude towards their friend may 
change depending on the context in which the evaluation is occurring; at a party, that friend’s 
positive qualities will be made salient whereas, at work, that friends negative qualities will be made 
salient.  
There have been conflicting findings in support of ambivalent attitudes being less stable 
over time. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto (1992) found a negative correlation between a 
measure of potential ambivalence and response consistency across two time points, suggesting that 
less ambivalent attitudes demonstrate greater temporal stability. Also using a measure of potential 
ambivalence, Lavine (2001) found ambivalent attitudes towards presidential candidates were 
unstable over time as compared to univalent attitudes. Yet, Armitage and Conner (2000) found no 
such instability among ambivalent participants (as indicated by a measure of potential ambivalence) 
despite measuring over an eight-month time period. Such inconsistent findings may be because 
potential ambivalence does not evoke discomfort and, thus, does not reliably motivate attitudinal 
change. 
The temporal stability of ambivalent attitudes may be better investigated using a measure 
of subjective ambivalence (i.e., a meta-attitudinal measure). However, Basilli (1996) criticises such 
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measures on the basis of their poor predictive validity and dependence upon the respondent being 
consciously aware of their own ambivalent attitudes. This is not an unresolvable problem assuming 
that potential ambivalence leads to subjective ambivalence; in which case, making a respondent’s 
potential ambivalence accessible would make subjective ambivalence more salient and, perhaps, a 
better predictor of temporal instability. However, to date, no such research has been conducted 
and the relationship between attitudinal ambivalence and temporal inconsistency remains unclear. 
2.5.3 Attitude Pliability 
Ambivalent attitudes are also argued to be more pliable in the face of persuasive 
communication, because the integration of such communication grounds pre-existing attitude 
structures in further knowledge. Armitage and Conner (2000) demonstrate such attitudinal pliancy 
with regards to ambivalence towards healthy eating. Participants’ ambivalence towards healthy 
food was measured at baseline and the participants were then randomly assigned to an intervention 
or control group five months later. While the low-ambivalence participants in the intervention 
condition did not change their attitudes towards healthy eating as compared to the low-
ambivalence participants in the control group, the high-ambivalence participants endorsed 
significantly more positive attitudes towards healthy eating post-intervention. Furthermore, highly 
ambivalent individuals are more likely to be influenced by an unreliable communicative source 
than are univalent individuals (Zemborain & Johar, 2007). 
Such pliability has also been demonstrated using priming studies. In a study exploring 
White Americans’ attitudes towards Black people, Katz and Hass (1988) constructed four scales; 
two scales tapped positive and negative attitudes towards Black people, and the other two tapped 
core American values associated with positive and negative racial attitudes, respectively: 1) 
Egalitarianism, emphasising equality, social justice, and altruism; and 2) The Protestant ethic, 
emphasising devotion to work, meritocracy, and discipline. The authors found that the 
participants’ attitudes could be manipulated by having them fill out one of the core value 
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questionnaires beforehand; those participants who filled out the egalitarianism questionnaire first 
evidenced more positive attitudes towards Black people, whereas those who filled out the 
Protestant work ethic questionnaire first evidenced more negative attitudes towards Black people. 
Likewise, the inverse was also true and exposure to pro- and anti-black attitude scales resulted in 
increased endorsement of egalitarianism and the Protestant work ethic, respectively. By 
strategically presenting the attitude scales in a particular order, Katz and Hass (1988) were able to 
subtly present persuasive communication to the participants and manipulate their attitudes – for 
better and for worse. 
The pliability of ambivalent attitudes has also been found to be moderated by culture. In 
a cross-cultural study of attitudinal ambivalence, Ng, Hynie, and MacDonald (2012) were able to 
manipulate European Canadians’ ambivalent attitudes in both positive and negative directions. 
However, the persuasive messages exposed to the East Asian Canadians were ineffective in 
changing their ambivalent positions. The authors concluded that East Asian cultures may not 
engender such an aversion to attitude inconsistency in its citizens as do Western cultures and, as a 
result of this, Westerners may be more inclined to resolve evaluative inconsistencies whereas East 
Asians will be more likely to demonstrate chronic attitudinal ambivalence. Ng et al. (2012) propose 
that this is linked to cultural differences in peoples’ preference for consistency; this and other 
personality traits that predict ambivalence will be discussed later in this chapter. 
2.5.4 Attitude-Intention-Behaviour Relationships 
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) posits that three factors lead to 
behavioural intention and, ultimately, behaviour: 1) Perceived behavioural control, concerning the 
feasibility of the behaviour; 2) Subjective norms, concerning how the behaviour would be judged 
by significant others, such as friends and family; and 3) Attitudes, the extent to which one evaluates 
the behaviour in a positive or negative way. Of principle interest is the latter facet, attitudes, which 
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are typically found to have a strong link to subsequent attitude-relevant behaviour (Glasman & 
Albarracín, 2006).  
However, attitudinal ambivalence has been found to be less predictive of behaviour than 
are univalent attitudes. In their first of a series of studies, Armitage and Conner (2000) distributed 
questionnaires at three time points. At time one, participants filled out a questionnaire measuring 
their attitudes towards eating a low-fat diet. At time two – five months later – the same participants 
filled out a questionnaire measuring their behavioural intention to eat a low-fat diet. Finally, at time 
three – a further three months later – participants filled out a questionnaire measuring their 
healthy-eating behaviours in the last three months. Structural equation modelling and separate 
groups analysis was used to compare the relationship between attitude, intention, and subsequent 
behaviour between ambivalent and non-ambivalent participants. Among those participants who 
were less ambivalent, actioned healthy eating was only partially mediated by intention to eat healthy 
food. However, among highly ambivalent participants, behavioural intention fully mediated the 
relationship between attitude and behaviour. Furthermore, the relationship between attitude and 
behavioural intention was weaker among ambivalent participants than among univalent 
participants. These findings were also replicated by Conner et al. (2002), altogether suggesting that 
attitudinal ambivalence is less predictive of behaviour. 
Lavine et al (1998) explore the diminished relationship between ambivalence and 
behaviour further by separately examining conflicting affective and cognitive attitude contents. 
Using data from national election surveys, the authors identified voters who displayed ambivalent 
attitudes inasmuch as their affective and cognitive evaluations of a presidential candidate differed 
in valence. Whereas univalent respondents’ affective and cognitive evaluations correlated equally 
strongly with their overall attitudes to, for instance, Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential election 
(affective r = .81, cognitive r = .79), affect was more strongly related to overall attitudes towards 
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Bill Clinton among ambivalent respondents, as compared to cognition (affective r = .47, cognitive 
r = .08). 
In light of these findings, Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, and Shepherd (2003) proposed 
that attitudinal ambivalence moderated the relationship among the TPB facets. They measured 
participants’ subjective norms about, perceived behavioural control over, and attitudes towards 
healthy eating and calculated potential ambivalence from the latter measure. The correlational 
findings indicated that high levels of attitudinal ambivalence weakened the relationship between 
attitude and behaviour and between perceived behavioural control and behaviour. The authors 
concluded that stronger attitudes (i.e., less ambivalent attitudes) would lead to a greater perception 
of behavioural control and, as a result, a stronger relationship between attitude and behaviour. On 
the other hand, ambivalent attitudes undermine the congruency between perceived and actual 
behavioural control, resulting in a weaker relationship between attitudes and behaviour. 
Overall, attitudinal ambivalence appears to undermine many of the presumed functions of 
attitudes and seems to be, on the face of it, rather maladaptive and inefficient. If ambivalence 
manifests on an intergroup level between two groups with asymmetric power (e.g., between 
heterosexuals and gay men), then empirical evidence points towards a number of potential 
symptoms of this ambivalence. Such individuals may exhibit exaggerated and amplified attitudes 
towards gay men in line with the ambivalence-amplification hypothesis (i.e., response 
amplification) or engage in evaluations that vacillate over time. These attitudes would also be less 
predictive of behaviours towards gay men; ambivalent individuals may be less inclined to cause 
harm to gay men, but also less inclined to advocate for them. The next section will consider the 
possible functions of ambivalence and will further explore how they relate to intergroup relations 
between heterosexuals and gay men. 
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2.6 Functions of Ambivalence 
 Despite the many disadvantages to attitudinal ambivalence, some academics have explored 
the possible utility in endorsing ambivalent attitudes. In a series of experiments, Pillaud, Cavazza, 
and Butera (2013) demonstrated that attitudinal ambivalence towards controversial attitude objects 
may serve protective self-presentational functions. Participants were instructed to respond to a 
questionnaire on their attitudes towards genetically modified organisms (GMOs). After this, they 
were instructed to answer the questionnaire in a way that would make them be judged in a more 
positive way by a teacher (the self-enhancement condition) and then answer the questionnaire in 
a way that would make them be judged in a more negative way by a teacher (the self-depreciation 
condition). In the first study, scores on a measure of subjective ambivalence were compared 
between these three groups, and the analysis found that subjective ambivalence was higher in the 
standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition. This trend was 
also replicated when comparing potential cognitive and affective ambivalence between the two 
conditions. 
 Inverse results were found when participants responded to a questionnaire measuring 
attitudes towards tooth-brushing – a truism that most people agree upon as being a positive thing. 
When comparing subjective ambivalence across the three conditions, the self-depreciation 
condition showed significantly higher levels of subjective ambivalence than did the standard and 
self-enhancement conditions. Just like attitudinal ambivalence towards contentious attitude object 
facilitates more positive evaluations by others, less ambivalent attitudes towards unambiguously 
positive attitude objects also facilitate such positive evaluations by others. This was further 
demonstrated in their final study, where the perceived controversial nature of GMOs was 
manipulated by the researchers. In the uncontroversial condition, participants were shown a graph 
suggesting that 89% of the Swiss population were against GMOs and 11% were for them whereas, 
in the controversial condition, participants were shown a graph suggesting that the Swiss 
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population were divided on the issue with 51% being against GMOs and 49% being for it. Using 
the same procedure, the results showed that when the issue of GMOs was rendered 
uncontroversial, lower levels of potential ambivalence were present in the standard and self-
enhancement conditions as compared to the self-depreciation condition. Inversely, when GMOs 
were presented as a controversial attitude object, higher levels of potential ambivalence were 
exhibited in the standard and self-enhancement conditions as compared to the self-depreciation 
condition. Thus, when judging controversial situations, ambivalent individuals may be more readily 
perceived by others as impartial and knowledgeable on the issue (Maio & Haddock, 2004). 
Similarly, Cavazza and Butera (2008) argue that attitudinal ambivalence may also serve 
adaptive functions that allow ambivalent individuals to resist some forms of persuasive 
communication when it is important for self-presentation to in-group members. The researchers 
separately measured direct (e.g., ‘Traffic-restrictive policies are useful to reduce pollution levels in 
cities’) and indirect (e.g., ‘Using diesel oil should be forbidden because of its polluting effects’) 
attitudes, and potential ambivalence towards traffic restrictions as a means of reducing pollution 
and then exposed participants to fictitious survey data suggesting that the in-group majority agreed 
that traffic restrictions were unrelated to pollution. Participants then indicated their direct and 
indirect attitudes towards traffic restrictions once more. In line with much of the research findings 
presented in this chapter, those high in attitudinal ambivalence changed their direct attitudes 
towards traffic restrictions more than did the participants evidencing low levels of ambivalence. 
However, ambivalent individuals exhibited significantly less attitude change on the indirect 
measures than did the non-ambivalent participants. This was theorised to be because of normative 
conflict (Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995); when non-ambivalent individuals 
disagree with an in-group majority, direct attitude change is not observed because of the desire for 
attitudinal consistency – by comparison, ambivalent individuals readily adapt to such a scenario. 
However, desire to maintain similarity with the in-group motivates non-ambivalent individuals to 
change their attitudes at the indirect level, whereas ambivalent individuals have already adapted at 
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the direct level and, therefore, have no need to adjust their attitude at the indirect level to attain 
consistency with the in-group. 
 In the second of Cavazza and Butera’s (2008) studies, they also measured self-monitoring 
orientation – the “individual difference in the extent to which individuals can and do monitor their 
self-presentation, expressive behaviour, and nonverbal affective displays’ (Snyder, 1974, pp. 526-
527) – and found the same pattern of results among those high in self-monitoring orientation but 
not for those low in self-monitoring evaluation, suggesting that the observed attitude changes did 
serve strategic self-presentational purposes. 
 Finally, Reich and Wheeler (2016) argue that attitudinal ambivalence can be desirable 
because it allows individuals to hedge their emotional reactions when they are unable to obtain a 
desired outcome. The first of the researchers’ series of studies asked graduands to rate the most 
desired job that they had recently been interviewed for on a split semantic-differential scale and 
indicate how likely they thought it was that they would get the job. Once the graduands found out 
whether or not they had gotten the job, they indicated on a survey how good they felt about 
themselves, given the outcome of the job application. The results showed that as goal-uncertainty 
increased (i.e., when the probability of getting the job was closest to 50%), potential ambivalence 
towards the job also increased, whereas ambivalence decreased as goal-uncertainty decreased (i.e., 
when the probability of getting the job was closest to 0% or 100%). Furthermore, when the 
graduand was not accepted for the job, those who were highly ambivalent about the position 
evaluated themselves more positively than those who were not ambivalent towards the job. 
However, the authors showed that such a strategy is a double-edged sword because, of the 
graduands who did obtain their ideal job, those who were highly-ambivalent about the position 
evaluated themselves less positively than did those who were less ambivalent about their ideal job. 
These findings were also replicated in their second study where goal-certainty was experimentally 
manipulated by the researchers. 
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 Reich and Wheeler’s (2016) fourth study also demonstrated that individuals actively seek 
ambivalent options when self-threat is high. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as 
a hard-working employee at a company announcing that they would be sending one employee on 
a subsidised holiday. In the high-threat condition, the participants were told that it was between 
them and another hard-working employee and that it was a roughly 50% chance they would receive 
the holiday. In the low-threat condition, the participants were told that the prize draw would be 
random but that only two people worked at the company, meaning that the desired outcome was 
equally uncertain but less threatening. After this exercise, participants were invited to read one of 
three reviews of the resort they could be staying at; two univalent reviews (positive or negative) 
and one ambivalent review (positive and negative). Analysis revealed that the participants were 
significantly more likely to choose the ambivalent review when self-threat was high, suggesting 
that attitudinal ambivalence is indeed a buffer against negative self-evaluations and that such a 
buffer is actively sought out when goal-uncertainty and self-threat is high. 
 Extrapolating the aforementioned research findings to ambivalence towards gay men 
highlights a possible advantage to such an attitudinal position. Ambivalence toward gay men (or, 
at least, presenting oneself as ambivalent towards gay men) may serve to protect individuals from 
censure by others. This utility is outlined in the justification-suppression model (JSM; Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003) – because of external pressures that sanction prejudice (e.g., the United 
Kingdom’s hate speech legislation, which threatens those who disseminate hate speech with fines), 
individuals who are anti-gay are compelled to misrepresent their attitudes as more positive than 
they actually are (i.e., suppression ambivalence). By presenting one’s attitudes as ambivalent, an 
individual evades censure from others while retaining vestiges of their genuine prejudice, which 
can be strategically expressed using various non-prejudicial justifications (i.e., equilibrium 
ambivalence). 
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2.7 Antecedents of Ambivalence 
Attitudinal ambivalence has also been linked to a number of related psychological 
constructs. One such construct is the need for cognition (NFC), defined by Cohen, Stotland, and 
Wolfe (1955) as the “need to understand and make reasonable the experiential world” (p. 291). 
Those with a high NFC tend to be more tentative rather than dogmatic (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), 
engage in more careful information processing (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morrison, 1983), be less 
susceptible to heuristics such as the halo effect (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992), and seek 
out cognitively-effortful tasks (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Research evidence 
suggests that a greater NFC is related to less ambivalent attitudes. Thompson & Zanna (1995) 
measured participants’ NFC and their attitudes towards a range of contentious, ambivalence-
inducing issues such as the legalisation of euthanasia. It was found that, as compared to high-NFC 
participants, those with a low NFC held more ambivalent attitudes. This relationship was argued 
to exist because those with a high NFC dislike ambiguity and incoherence and, thus, seek out 
information in order to resolve the ambiguity associated with attitudinal ambivalence. As such, a 
low NFC does not necessarily cause greater levels of ambivalence but, rather, it inhibits the ability 
and motivation to engage in the information processing necessary to reduce ambivalence. 
A second personality construct related to attitudinal ambivalence is the personal fear of 
invalidity (PFI) – the desire to avoid mistakes that would have negative consequences or result in 
negative judgements being made about oneself (Kruglanski, 1990). In the context of lay epistemic 
theory, PFI represents the ‘unfreezing’ of previously fixed inferences because it motivates 
individuals to consider alternative lay hypotheses (Kruglanski, 1990). Those demonstrating a 
greater PFI are less likely to engage in ethnic stereotyping (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), feel less 
confident about their judgements (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987), and are more comfortable with 
ambiguity than those with a low PFI (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). In contrast to NFC, Thompson 
and Zanna (1995) found that those participants with a high PFI demonstrated greater attitudinal 
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ambivalence towards the contentious political issues presented to them than did those with a low 
PFI. This is because individuals who demonstrate a high PFI associate cognitive closure with a 
greater risk of making erroneous judgements and attempt to maintain ambiguous and, therefore, 
versatile attitudinal positions in order to reduce this risk. 
Both of these personality traits are potentiated by one’s personal involvement with the 
attitude object – that is, the extent to which an individual “care[s] about that entity or perceive[s] 
it as being important” (Hänze, 2001). Thompson and Zanna (1995) found that those with low 
NFC and high personal involvement were most ambivalent towards the political issues they were 
presented with. Likewise, they found that those with a high PFI and high personal involvement 
also demonstrated high levels of attitudinal ambivalence. Importantly, this highlights the 
conceptual distinction between ambivalence and indifference and a greater need to delineate these 
concepts as they manifest at measurement scale midpoints (Kaplan, 1972). 
Preference for consistency (PFC) – the desire to respond consistently to stimuli, to appear 
consistent to others, and that others be consistent in their responses (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 
1995) – has also been linked to attitudinal ambivalence. Using a scale specifically designed to 
measure PFC, Cialdini et al (1995) found that those high in PFC made more attempts to reduce 
attitudinal ambivalence, likely because these individuals find attitudinal ambivalence especially 
uncomfortable – particularly when it is made salient (Newby-Clark et al., 2002). 
Research has shown that these constructs mediate the relationship between religious 
fundamentalism and homophobia, modern racism, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism (E. Hill, 
Terrell, Cohen, & Nagoshi, 2010), but the limitations of this research are threefold. Firstly, the 
measure of anti-gay prejudice used, the homophobia scale (Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999), 
measures a brand of prejudice that appears to be falling out of favour in the West (Twenge, 
Sherman, & Wells, 2016) and, thus, may not reflect the diversity of heterosexuals’ modern attitudes 
towards nonheterosexuals. Secondly, no measure of positive attitudes towards gay men was 
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included, limiting the researchers’ ability to explore how these constructs relate to ambivalence 
towards gay men. Finally, the research focussed on how religious fundamentalism relates to 
particular cognitive styles and was not principally concerned with how these cognitive styles relate 
to ambivalent prejudice or, indeed, attitudes as a whole. The utility of research such as this would 
be improved if there was a measure capable of tapping attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men, 
as researchers would be more able to explore how such ambivalence relates to particular cognitive 
styles. 
2.8 Models of Ambivalence 
Various models aiming to elucidate attitudinal ambivalence have been proposed. The 
earliest substantial attempt was made by Priester and Petty (1996), who proposed the gradual 
threshold model (GTM) of ambivalence. This model is operationalised using split semantic-
differential scales and attempts to demonstrate how potential ambivalence transitions into 
subjective ambivalence. Priester and Petty (1996) argue that dominant (i.e., the stronger of the two 
evaluative tendencies) and conflicting (i.e., the weaker of the two evaluative tendencies) attitudes 
differentially predict subjective ambivalence depending on whether one’s conflicting attitudes are 
above the given threshold of 1. For instance, when an individual rates their positive attitudes as 4 
(dominant) and their negative attitudes as 1 (conflicting), high levels of subjective ambivalence are 
equally well-predicted by greater numbers of conflicting attitudes and fewer numbers of dominant 
attitudes. However, when an individual’s conflicting attitudes are rated higher than 1, fewer 
numbers of dominant attitudes no longer reliably predict subjective ambivalence. Higher numbers 
of conflicting evaluations remain indicative of greater feelings of subjective ambivalence because 
their additivity in relation to dominant evaluations makes one’s attitude conflict increasingly salient. 
A number of problems with the ambivalence index proposed by the GTM exist. Firstly, it 
is highly sensitive to the number of category options available. For instance, Priester and Petty 
(1996) used 11-point scales ranging from 0 (no negative/positive thoughts or feelings) to 10 
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(maximum negative/positive thoughts or feelings) and, on this basis, settles upon a threshold of 
1. However, the predictive validity of this threshold would most certainly be diminished if, for 
example, a 100-point scale was used because conflicting evaluations would more easily cross that 
threshold. Use of the GTM is also limited to split semantic-differential scales, which have steadily 
fallen out of vogue in the study of ambivalence in favour of Likert scales. 
 More recently, Petty, Tormala, Briñol, and Jarvis (2006) proposed the past attitudes are still 
there (PAST) model, which argues that attitudinal change can prompt implicit attitudinal 
ambivalence whereby a previously-held attitude continues to exert an unconscious evaluative force, 
despite being consciously rejected. To test this, Petty et al. (2006) induced either a positive or 
negative attitude towards two characters, Eddie and Phil, by using a classical conditioning paradigm 
whereby images of the men were paired with either positive images (e.g., puppies) or negative 
images (e.g., mutilated bodies). Later, (dis)similarity with the two characters were induced by 
presenting survey responses to a range of social issues alongside pictures of Eddie and Phil that 
were either congruent or incongruent with the participants’ beliefs. Finally, participants explicit 
(i.e., self-report) and implicit (i.e., latency between exposure to (in)congruent combinations of 
stimuli and response) attitudes towards the actors were measured.  
The findings from the explicit attitude measures suggested that the participants’ attitudes 
changed in response to the information most recently presented to them. Similar actors were rated 
more positively and the magnitude of this change was biggest when a negative attitude was initially 
conditioned. Inversely, dissimilar actors were rated more negatively and the magnitude of this 
change was biggest when a positive attitude was initially conditioned. However, results from the 
implicit attitudinal measure showed that those participants who received congruent information 
about the actors (i.e., the no attitude change condition) held either positive or negative attitudes 
towards the actors, whereas those who received incongruent information about the actors (i.e., the 
attitude change condition) exhibited attitudes close to the midpoint, suggesting that the previously 
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challenged attitude was implicitly exerting influence over the participants’ subsequent attitudes, 
but not exerting such a force explicitly. In later studies, Petty and colleagues (2006) also 
demonstrated that induced attitude change led the participants to feel less confident about their 
evaluations on an implicit attitude measure (which has been further demonstrated to be embodied 
as greater mouse cursor ‘pull’ towards unchosen evaluative options; Schneider et al., 2015) and led 
to greater attitude-relevant information processing (which has also been implicated in ambivalence 
in Nordgren et al., 2006). 
Finally, Song and Ewoldson (2015) proposed the metacognitive model of ambivalence, 
building on the metacognitive model of attitudes (Petty, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). 
Together, these models outline the process of attitude endorsement; attitude objects have various 
evaluative facets – in other words, they are information-rich – and this information can be 
evaluated in either positive or negative ways. Healthy eating, for example, can be evaluated 
positively because of its health benefits but also negatively because of the perceived bland taste of 
healthy foods. Metacognition (i.e., thinking about one’s thought processes) then allows validity 
tags (e.g., ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘uncertain’) to be attached to these various evaluative components to assess 
the strength of their representation in the overall attitudinal evaluation. Thus, when individuals are 
certain of both positive and negative evaluations of the attitude object, a state of ambivalence is 
experienced. 
Song and Ewoldson (2015) elaborate on this, integrating much of the aforementioned 
experimental findings into their theory. They propose that evaluative facets of an object each have 
varying degrees of accessibility and this accessibility is highly context-dependent. Accessibility of 
certain facets can be moderated by the validity tags attached to other facets; if both a positive and 
negative facet are tagged as ‘true’ (e.g., an individual being certain that eating healthily is both good 
for them and that healthy food is bland) then this necessitates the individual accessing additional 
evaluative facets (e.g., that eating healthily is expensive) in order to provide a clearer evaluation of 
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the object. Likewise, other evaluative facets can be primed unconsciously, as has been done in 
many of the aforementioned studies that have induced attitudinal ambivalence in its participants. 
Conversely, metacognitions are conscious and deliberative and require careful processing in order 
to be retrieved. As such, by sowing doubt in an individual’s metacognitions about the evaluative 
facets of an attitude object through exposure to high- and low-credibility arguments, ambivalence 
can be induced by presenting equally credible positive and negative evaluations, and decreased by 
discrediting either the positive or the negative evaluation (DeMarree, Briñol, & Petty, 2015). 
2.9 Measuring Ambivalence 
Because of the prevailing assumption that attitudes adhere to evaluative unidimensionality, 
attitude measurement has typically enforced this by way of bipolar rating scales such as Likert 
scales, which require respondents to situate their attitude with one descriptor ranging from strongly 
positive to strongly negative (Likert, 1932). Similarly, semantic differential scales also impose 
similar restrictions because they also require respondents to situate their attitude at one point 
between juxtaposing adjectives (e.g., grumpy-cheerful; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). 
Thurstone scales are also constructed in such a way that each item is ‘tuned’ to tap a particular 
attitude valence and intensity (Thurstone & Chave, 1929), but such items are typically tuned to 
measure either positive or negative attitudes. 
Kaplan (1972), noting the complexities of unidimensional scale midpoints, offered a 
correction to the semantic differential technique that facilitated the measurement of ambivalence, 
as well as additional otherwise neutral-presenting attitudinal positions, such as indifference. By 
splitting the semantic differential rather than treating them as oppositional and, thus, mutually 
exclusive, Kaplan (1972) demonstrates how one is able to measure both positive (e.g., cheerful) 
and negative (e.g., grumpy) evaluations separately and how these interact to form overall 
ambivalent, neutral, and indifferent evaluations. 
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Multiple formulaic representations of attitudinal ambivalence have also been proposed. 
Kaplan (1972) suggests that ambivalence is the difference between total affect (i.e., both the 
stronger and weaker valences added together) and attitude polarity (i.e., the difference between the 
stronger and weaker valences). However, Breckler (1994) demonstrates that this index can be 
simplified as twice the weaker attitude intensity, or 2 x Aw, which is undesirable because this means 
that the index is insensitive to changes in the stronger attitudinal position (As). Scott (1969) also 
proposes an ambivalence index equal to 2 x Aw + 1 divided by Aw + As + 2, and Hass, Katz, Rizzo, 
Bailey, and Eisenstadt (1991) propose, more simply, that ambivalence is equal to Aw x As. However, 
Breckler (1994) highlights problems with both of these in that the former is insensitive to varying 
intensities of ambivalence and the latter misrepresents univalence as ambivalence. Breckler (1994) 
argues that two indices fulfil the three requirements that: 1) Ambivalence should increase when As 
is held constant and Aw is increased and be at its strongest when As = Aw; 2) Ambivalence should 
decrease when Aw is held constant and As is increased, and be at its lowest when As reaches its 
highest value; and 3) When Aw = As, ambivalence should increase as these ratings increase. The 
first ambivalence index that meets these three requirements is proposed by Scott (1966) who 
conceptualise ambivalence as the ratio of Aw
2 to As. The second is proposed by Thomspon, Zanna, 
& Griffin (2014) who conceptualise it similarly to Kaplan (1972) but rather than computing total 
affect as As + Aw, they compute it as the mean of As and Aw instead. Both formulae are also 
desirable because one can discern between indifference (which result in lower index scores) and 
ambivalent attitudes (which result in higher index scores).  
These indices are used as measures of potential ambivalence, which individuals are not 
consciously aware of (McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999). Armitage and Conner (2002), for 
example, asked participants “Considering only the positive things about eating a low-fat diet in the 
future and ignoring the negative things, how positive are those things?” (p. 1423) and an equivalent 
question substituting “negative” where appropriate. Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (2014) 
anecdotally report that participants do not find this task particularly challenging, and Kaplan’s 
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(1972) findings suggest that the algebraic difference between these separate evaluations correlates 
strongly with ratings on standard semantic differential scales (between rs = .89 and .97). The 
drawback to questioning such as this, however, is that they give us limited access to the content of 
such attitudes. If similar questions pertaining to gay men were asked to participants, the scores 
would give no insight into how the participant is evaluating gay men in positive and negative ways 
because they only provide an indication of how intense those evaluations are. One potential way 
to address this would be to construct a Likert measure of positive and negative attitudes towards 
gay men to be used in tandem and then computing the chosen ambivalence index from mean 
scores on those measures. In so doing, we gain a summative measure of attitude intensity that can 
be used to compute ambivalence while also gaining access to the qualitative content of those 
attitudes. 
Other approaches to measuring ambivalence have involved, simply, asking respondents 
the extent to which they feel ambivalent, tapping into the construct of subjective ambivalence. 
This is measured with items such as ‘How conflicted do you feel about X?’ with response scales 
ranging from ‘Not conflicted at all’ to ‘Completely torn’. Research findings suggest that potential 
and subjective ambivalence are relatively independent constructs since they demonstrate weak 
(Priester, & Petty, 1996) to moderate positive correlations (Costarelli & Colloca, 2004). However, 
as before, these measures only provide insight into the intensity of ambivalence and provide no 
insight into its content. As also mentioned earlier in this chapter, subjective ambivalence can only 
be accessed in this way if a respondent is aware of their ambivalent attitudes (Basilli, 1996). As 
such, the suggested Likert measure of potential ambivalence may be the most preferable way of 
accessing attitudinal ambivalence, with its principal drawback being the great deal of work that 
would need to go into its development and psychometric validation. 
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2.10 Conclusion 
 This chapter has established that attitudes are traditionally thought to comprise – largely 
independent – affective, behavioural, and cognitive contents, that attitudes are generally presumed 
to be either positive or negative, and that attitudes serve important intra- and inter-personal 
functions. However, attitudinal ambivalence complicates this theorising because there are a range 
of attitude objects that individuals endorse both positive and negative attitudes towards. 
Ambivalent attitudes also appear to undermine the proposed functions of attitudes, which may be 
an artefact of scholars conceptualising the functions of attitudes with univalence – and not 
ambivalence – in mind.  Recent research attempting to explicate the adaptive advantages of 
attitudinal ambivalence has demonstrated a range of functional advantages of ambivalence over 
univalence, documenting that it is a desirable attitudinal position when attempting to present 
oneself in a favourable way to others, when trying to resist persuasive communication, and when 
trying to protect one’s positive self-evaluation when goal-uncertainty and self-threat is high. The 
standard measurement of attitudes also appears to be insensitive to ambivalent attitudes, 
necessitating the development of new and innovative measures. The next chapter will continue 
these lines of inquiry and further explore the role attitudinal ambivalence plays in prejudice. 
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3. Chapter Three 
Prejudice and Ambivalence 
 The previous chapter asserted that ambivalence can be useful inasmuch as it preserves 
positive self-presentation and self-evaluation, and briefly explored how these are particularly useful 
to individuals who endorse prejudicial attitudes within the context of the JSM (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). This chapter will explore this further and begins with an examination of Allport’s 
(1954) influential conceptualisation of prejudice and an overview of the main critiques of this 
definition since its publication, with particular focus on prejudice being defined in terms of 
negatively-valenced attitudes. Attitudinal ambivalence is integrated into this critique and the 
concept of ambivalent prejudice is introduced. This is supplemented with a detailed account of 
research examining racial ambivalence, ambivalent sexism, ambivalence towards disabled people, 
and ambivalent ageism. The latter section will critique two conceptualisations of ambivalence 
towards gay men and lesbian women and will propose a new theory of ambivalent homoprejudice 
as a necessary reformulation of academic thinking in this area. 
3.1 Prejudice: An overview 
 The study of prejudice is deeply embedded in the history of social psychology and became 
crystallised in Gordon Allport’s (1954) seminal text, The Nature of Prejudice, where prejudice was 
defined as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation” (p. 9). However, this 
definition was especially criticised for its suggestion that prejudices arise from inaccurate 
generalisations (i.e., ‘stereotypes’). How can one adequately adjudicate an (in)accurate stereotype? 
Jussim, Cain, Crawford, Harber, and Cohen (2009) mount a similar criticism, explaining that such 
a proviso is logically untenable because delegitimising such generalisations by virtue of their 
inaccuracy logically leads to an impossible conclusion whereby all beliefs about groups are 
inaccurate. On the contrary, stereotypes about different groups appear to be rather accurate at the 
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group-level (Koenig & Eagly, 2014), which is logical because stereotypes must have some 
informative value in order to persist. 
Allport (1954) alludes to such a “kernel of truth” (p. 190) in some stereotypes, referring to 
an example of an anthropologist studying a Native American tribe and prohibiting his children 
from mingling with the Natives because many of them suffered from tuberculousis. However, he 
suggests that, because the anthropologist’s stereotype was based on “rational and realistic grounds” 
(p. 4), his actions do not amount to prejudice. Subscription to inaccurate stereotypes is argued to 
be a problematic indicator of prejudice because – at its logical extreme – prejudice could be 
defensible by virtue of it being evidence-based. This point is illustrated well by the continued ban 
on sexually-active men who have sex with men (MSM) donating blood in the UK for fear of an 
increased risk of HIV-infectious donations. Soldan and Sinka (2003) estimated that abolishing 
lifetime exclusion in favour of the current 12-month deferral model3 would increase the risk of 
HIV-infectious donations entering circulation by approximately 60% (though more recent 
research suggests a much smaller risk increase of up to 5% resulting in one more HIV-infectious 
donation every 455 years; Davison, Conti, & Brailsford, 2013). Based on such research evidence, 
deferred donations are upheld for gay men despite relatively few control measures being in place 
for sexually-active heterosexual men and women. If Allport’s (1954) definition is to be fully 
subscribed to, evidence-based stereotypes such as this would allow prejudicial behaviours to 
masquerade as public interest. 
 A second broad area of criticism of Allport’s (1954) definition of prejudice is concerned 
with prejudice being depicted as antipathy – a feeling of disliking towards target groups. However, 
this critique has only more recently been made, because this facet of Allport’s (1954) definition 
has been “the bedrock on which virtually all prejudice theories are built” (Glick et al., 2000, p. 
                                                          
3 As of writing, MSM blood donations are prohibited in the UK if the donor has had oral or anal intercourse with 
another man in the 12 months leading up to donation. Women who have had sex with an MSM in the preceding 12 
months are also prohibited from donating blood. 
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763). Traditionally, prejudicial attitudes towards myriad out-groups have been characterised by 
academics as hostile. Notably, ‘old-fashioned’ sexual prejudice towards gay men and lesbian 
women is couched in the belief that they are sexual deviants, mentally ill, and are a corrupting 
influence on children and the wider society (Herek, 1984). Traditional racial prejudice towards 
Black people is denoted by stereotypes pertaining to ineptitude and fecklessness, and behavioural 
responses such as segregation (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993) and bears many similarities to old-
fashioned sexist attitudes towards women, whom would be regarded with less respect and excluded 
from employment because of their presumed lack of intellect and ambition (Smith & Stewart, 
1983). 
 This focus on hostility also permeates ‘modern’ conceptualisations of prejudice, which 
emerged in response to the decline in self-reported overt prejudice over time. Aversive racism 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) posits that improving self-reported attitudes towards ethnic minorities 
conceal enduring implicit biases and prejudices. One such study investigating this compared self-
reported racial prejudice and racially-biased hiring decisions between 1989 and 1999 (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000). The authors found that, although self-reported racial prejudice was lower in 1999 
than in 1989, the participants in both time points discriminated in their hiring decisions in favour 
of white candidates over black candidates when an interview excerpt was ambiguous in its 
indication of how strong the candidate was. This has been further demonstrated by implicit 
association tests (IAT), which are implicit measures of participants’ automatic associations 
between attitude targets and evaluative concepts (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In their 
third experiment, Greenwald et al. (1998) had white participants categorise names (e.g., ‘Latonya’) 
representing black and white attitude targets as either ‘black’ (by pressing the left key) or ‘white’ 
(by pressing the right key). Then, participants were instructed to categorise evaluative concepts 
(e.g., ‘lucky’) as either pleasant or unpleasant with the left and right keys, respectively. The attitude 
targets were then paired with the evaluative concepts; in one set of trials participants had to 
respond with the left key when the stimulus was a black target or a pleasant evaluative concept or 
 
 
37 
 
respond with the right key when the stimuli was a white target or an unpleasant evaluative concept. 
These pairings were then reversed in the second set of trials, which were performed in a 
randomised order. Within this paradigm, shorter response latencies between stimulus exposure 
and participant response are indicative of a stronger association between the two categorisation 
criteria. The IAT results showed that there was greater response latency in the black or pleasant 
condition than in the black or unpleasant condition, suggesting that the participants more readily 
associated black targets with negative evaluative concepts than with positive evaluative concepts 
(and vice versa for white targets). Furthermore, these results occurred in spite of the explicit 
measures of racial prejudice indicating no such racial bias, suggesting that the IAT was able to 
penetrate a veneer of egalitarianism and expose underlying biases. 
 Modern-symbolic racism (McConahay & Hough Jr., 1976) similarly emphasises negatively-
valenced attitudes toward Black people. However, rather than overtly derogating Black people, 
such prejudiced individuals tend to hold four common objections: 1) that racial discrimination no 
longer impacts Black people’s prospects; 2) that Black people are disadvantaged due to their 
unwillingness to work as hard as White people; 3) that Black people’s continued demands for 
change are illegitimate, and; 4) that Black people have received unwarranted advantages (Tarman 
& Sears, 2005). Similarly, modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003) is argued to be 
characterised by the belief that: 1) gay men and lesbian women make illegitimate demands for 
change; 2) discrimination against gay men and lesbian women is a thing of the past, and; 3) that 
gay men and lesbian women exaggerate the significance of their sexual orientation and ostracise 
themselves from mainstream culture as a result. Both are considered to be symptomatic of modern 
prejudice because objections focus on indirect symbolic issues related to the target group rather 
than to the group itself. 
 Neo-sexism, defined by Tougas, R. Brown, Beaton, and Joly (1995) as a “manifestation of 
a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings toward women” (p. 843) also 
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bears similarities to aversive racism, inasmuch as both propose that egalitarianism can belie 
prejudice. Despite it being claimed that there is conflict between hostility towards women and 
egalitarianism, neo-sexism is still patently expressed as antipathy (though more ambiguously than 
traditional sexism) as seen in items such as “It is difficult to work for a woman boss” and “Women 
shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted” (Tougas, R. Brown, Beaton, & St-Pierre, 
1999, p. 1491). The related theory of modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) echoes 
the sentiments of symbolic racism and foreshadowed those of modern homonegativity; such 
prejudice is characterised by the denial of continued discrimination against women, delegitimising 
the demands women make in the name of equality, and opposing policies aiming to help women 
such as positive discrimination. 
Multitudinous scholars have espoused old-fashioned and modern distinctions to account 
for Western societies’ seeming liberalisation over time. However, while the extremity of these 
attitudes appears to have abated over time and their expression appears to have become more 
clandestine, the valence of these attitudes are enduringly negative. As such, both old-fashioned 
and modern prejudice are widely known by academics to share many antecedents; social 
dominance orientation, “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be 
superior to out-groups” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742) correlates positively 
with old-fashioned prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women and Black people (Whitley Jr., 
1999), and their modern equivalents (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). Similarly, 
higher levels of religious fundamentalism is also predictive of old-fashioned and modern prejudice 
towards gay men (Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005), as is right-wing authoritarianism 
(Altmeyer, 1981), the extent to which individuals demonstrate a willingness to submit to norm-
abiding authority and aggress against those who transgress such norms (Basow & Johnson, 2000; 
Cramer, Miller, Amacker, & Burks, 2013).  
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Hostile prejudice and discrimination – as they have been conceptualised thus far – have 
myriad well-documented deleterious consequences for sexual minorities including wage inequality 
(Drydakis, 2015), homelessness due to running away from home or being ejected from the family 
home by parents (Rosario, Schrimshaw, & Hunter, 2012), higher rates of suicide ideation, suicide 
attempts, and self-harm (Balsam, Beauchaine, Mickey, & Rothblum, 2005), being victims of 
bullying (Patrick, Bell, Huang, Lazarakis, & Edwards, 2013), harassment and physical violence 
(Huebner, Rebchook, & Kegeles, 2004), and lower self-reported quality of life (King et al., 2003). 
However, none of these consequences are particularly congruent with the concept of ‘positive’ 
prejudice that will be advanced later in this chapter. This is arguably because of the restricted ways 
in which prejudice has been operationalised in the literature. Early challenges to the assumption 
that prejudice is solely negative focused on attitudes towards disabled people (i.e., Katz, Glass, 
Lucido, & Farber, 1977; Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969), whom were noted to elicit both 
positively- and negatively-valenced feelings (as will be discussed later). Furthermore, the 
aforementioned conceptualisations of prejudice coexisting with egalitarianism must also be 
ambivalent in nature, given that they are characterised by conflict between oppressive and 
egalitarian ideals. However, the broad spectrum of groups who trigger ambivalent attitudes and 
the unique antecedents and consequences of overtly positively-valenced prejudice was not fully 
recognised in the literature until much later.  
This corpus of work, which will be discussed in the following sections, suggests that 
prejudice can be expressed in positive as well as negative ways and, based on this work, prejudice 
is henceforth defined as positive or negative attitudes, directed towards individuals by virtue of 
their group membership (Haddock & Zanna, 1999). This definition can be further nuanced with 
reference to the theoretical content discussed in the previous chapter to formulate a definition of 
ambivalent prejudice as positive and negative attitudes – endorsed concurrently or interchangeably 
– towards groups and individuals by virtue of their group membership. 
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3.2 Racial Ambivalence 
Despite White Americans’ self-reported old-fashioned racism towards Black people 
appearing to have decreased over time (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), black Americans 
evidently continue to experience prejudice and discrimination. Katz and Hass (1988) theorised that 
this was because prejudice towards black Americans had become ambivalent; that white Americans 
were becoming increasingly committed to racial equality because they perceived Black people to 
be disadvantaged while simultaneously endorsing the racist belief that Black people are deviant. 
This was argued to arise from core American value conflict between communalism, emphasising 
egalitarianism and humanitarianism, and individualism, emphasising a strong work ethic and 
meritocracy. As such, feelings of sympathy arising from awareness of racial inequality co-occur 
with the Protestant ethic, “the right to make one’s own way in life and to succeed on the basis of 
one’s own individual merit” (Sampson, 1999, p. 97), resulting in ambivalent attitudes towards black 
people whereby they are seen as unequal in society and deserving of help, but are also seen as not 
working hard enough to help themselves. 
In order to measure these conflicting values, Katz and Hass (1988) constructed four scales: 
1) an anti-black scale; 2) a pro-black scale; 3) a Protestant ethic scale, and; 4) a humanitarianism-
egalitarianism scale. These were disseminated to participants in randomised pairs of one value 
questionnaire and one racial attitudes questionnaire, with the first questionnaire acting as a prime 
for the second. The results suggested that the Protestant ethic items primed greater endorsement 
of anti-black attitudes (but not pro-black attitudes) and that the humanitarianism-egalitarianism 
items primed greater endorsement of pro-black attitudes (but not anti-black attitudes). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, attitude pliancy is a common feature of ambivalent attitudes 
(Armitage & Conner, 2000), suggesting that White people’s positive and negative attitudes may 
occur concurrently (i.e., subjective ambivalence) when both communalist and individualist values 
are salient and accessible, or interchangeably (i.e., potential ambivalence) when one core value is 
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more salient and accessible than the other – by way of priming, for example (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). Evidence of subjective ambivalence towards Black people is apparent 
in Katz, Glass, and Cohen (1973), whereby participants engaged in guilt-reductive behaviours in 
order to reduce the discomfort triggered by an ambivalent attitude target. Participants were 
classified in terms of their prejudicial and sympathetic attitudes towards Black people (resulting in 
four combinations of high and low prejudice and sympathy) and were instructed to give their first 
impressions of a black confederate. They then took part in a fake extrasensory perception task, 
whereby they were instructed to transmit the image of twenty stimuli to the confederate (of which 
the confederate ostensibly failed to receive 50% of the time). When the confederate incorrectly 
received the message, the participants were instructed to administer a strong electric shock. 
Following this, participants were once against asked to evaluate the confederate. The authors 
hypothesised that those participants who were highly sympathetic and prejudicial towards Black 
people (i.e., ambivalent) would denigrate the confederate post-test as a means of reducing the guilt 
arising from transgressing their sympathetic attitudes and administering electric shocks. Of all the 
groups, the ambivalent participants were the only ones who rated the black confederate more 
negatively after administering electric shocks to them, suggesting that derogating targets that elicit 
ambivalence may be a way to reduce an ambivalent affective state. Within the framework of racial 
ambivalence proposed by Katz and Hass (1988), derogating Black people as ‘lazy’ may also have 
guilt-reductive functions because it allows White people to distance themselves from structural 
oppression. 
This ambivalence is commonly observed in discussions about affirmative action, which 
often gravitate towards simultaneously upholding meritocratic ideals (i.e., a tenet of the Protestant 
ethic) and endorsing egalitarianism. In doing so, people (rather paradoxically) construe equality as 
inequality and argue against equality measures as a threat to egalitarianism. This allows prejudiced 
individuals to reinforce the status quo while appearing non-prejudiced (Augoustinos, Tuffin, & 
Every, 2005), demonstrating the theorised self-presentational advantages to ambivalent prejudice 
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discussed in the previous chapter (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).  This was observed in qualitative 
data collected by Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000); participants commonly emphasised those 
people who “worked hard to get where they are” (p. 64) and argued that affirmative action confers 
unearned benefits onto those who “have done half as much of [sic] what you have” (p. 65). Here, 
attempts to combat structural racism are reconceptualised as reverse racism against White people 
on the basis that affirmative action undermines meritocracy and violates the Protestant ethic. 
Simultaneously, this assertion blames ethnic minorities for their position in society; oppression 
becomes wilfully reimagined as fecklessness endemic to a particular social group and, as a result, 
“society crush(es) people, and then penalise(s) them for not being able to stand up under the 
weight” (Malcolm X in Haley & Handler, 1992, p. 22). These attitudes are particularly pervasive 
because White people are often unaware of the various unearned privileges that come with having 
white skin (e.g., “I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against 
me”; McIntosh, 1990, p. 33) and the ways in which these privileges tip meritocracy in their favour. 
As a result, White people are averse to the possibility that their accomplishments are not entirely 
due to their own hard work because it undermines their sense of achievement (Knowles & Lowery, 
2012; Solomona, Porteli, Daniel, & Campbell, 2005). Awareness of privilege also undermines the 
system justification ideology central to the maintenance of racial ambivalence (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, 
& Chen, 2007), because it acknowledges the inequality in structural oppression. Further 
‘advantages’ of ambivalent prejudices will be covered in the next section, exploring ambivalent 
sexism theory. 
3.3 Ambivalent Sexism 
Ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) is arguably the most well-known 
and widely-cited theory of ambivalent prejudice and it has transformed academic and lay 
understanding of sexism and the maintenance of patriarchy. 
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Glick and Fiske (1996) situate ambivalent sexism within the framework of Jackman’s 
(1994) ‘Velvet Glove’ theory of paternalism. Jackman (1994) argues that dominant groups cannot 
rely solely on force when subordinating other groups because this would lead to resistance and 
rebellion. Instead, paternalistic ideology offers a way for these goals to be reinterpreted as being 
for the good of all – include those groups being dominated. Thus, positive feelings towards 
subordinates become intermingled with exploitation (i.e., ambivalence), resulting in a “coercive 
energy” (p. 383) that serves to foster deference from subordinate groups.  
Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that this asymmetric exchange arises in dyadic relationships 
between men and women: whereas men possess structural power in political and economic 
domains, women are seen to possess greater dyadic power over men as wives and romantic 
partners (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). As such, men exert power over women by making them 
dependent upon their money and influence while women exert power over men by making them 
dependent upon their affection and care. Although this relationship appears to be mutually 
beneficial, men still retain greater structural power than do women. Alongside hostile sexism – 
drawing on the traditional conceptualisation of prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 1954) discussed 
earlier in this section – these unique conditions are argued to result in three facets of benevolent 
prejudice, attitudes that are positive in feeling tone, yet enforce traditional and restricted roles upon 
women: 1) the belief that men and women possess complementary characteristics (complementary 
gender differentiation); 2) the desire for heterosexual intimacy and closeness (heterosexual 
intimacy); and 3) paternalistic beliefs that women should be cherished and protected (protective 
paternalism).  
These three facets are measured by the ambivalent sexism inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 
1996), which comprises benevolent items such as “a good woman should be set on a pedestal by 
her man” (p. 512). Although such a statement appears harmless, it opines that there is an ideal type 
of woman that complements (rather than competes with) men and offers rewards to those women 
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in the form of affection and protection. Thus, a woman who embodies patriarchal ideals (e.g., an 
unemployed housewife who is demure and genteel) is rewarded for her subscription to that ideal 
whereas those who subvert these expectations (e.g., promiscuous women) are punished. This can 
be seen in Viki and Abrams (2002), who provided participants with one of two vignettes detailing 
an acquaintance rape where the victim was either described as a married woman who was being 
unfaithful or not described at all. Benevolent sexism was measured and it was found that those 
who scored highest attributed more blame to the married victim than to the control victim. 
Because the married victim transgressed the patriarchal norm that women should be faithful to 
their husbands, they were not rewarded with the benevolence afforded to other women but, 
instead, attracted hostile victim blaming. A similar result is found when comparing a stranger rape 
vignette with an acquaintance rape vignette; those high in benevolent sexism attribute less blame 
to the perpetrator in the latter condition and recommend shorter sentences than those low in 
benevolent sexism, suggesting that those women viewed as promiscuous (i.e., the ‘fallen woman’) 
are also punished (Viki, Abrams, & Masser, 2004). 
Ambivalence towards men has the same theoretical underpinning, although the 
ambivalence towards men inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999) measures slightly different concepts. 
Women are argued to hold hostile attitudes towards men inasmuch as they resent men’s 
dominance over women (resentment of paternalism), endorse negative stereotypes about men 
which allow women to positively differentiate themselves from them (compensatory gender 
differentiation), and express aversion to experiencing heterosexual intimacy and contact with men 
(heterosexual hostility). However, despite widespread awareness of structural gender-based 
inequality and the resultant animosity directed at men, women may seek relationships with men in 
order to vicariously access power. However, in doing so, they reinforce their own disempowerment 
and men’s empowerment (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, maternalism by women achieves the same 
ends as paternalism by men; although women may exert power in limited domains by positioning 
themselves as carers for partners and children who they view as relatively incompetent (e.g., 
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“women ought to take care of their men at home, because men would fall apart if they had to fend 
for themselves”, Glick & Fiske, 1999, p. 536), this too reinforces women’s caregiving roles and 
justifies men’s economic agency and power. 
Hostile and benevolent sexism have been dubbed “complementary justifications for 
gender inequality” and “an ambivalent alliance” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p. 109). Where hostile sexism 
fails (because it prompts resistance), benevolent sexism succeeds because it is less likely to attract 
censure because it appears to be harmless and it, therefore, less likely to attract censure. Quite the 
contrary, benevolent attitudes have demonstrable negative effects on women such as mental 
intrusions related to incompetence (Dumont, Sarlet, & Dardenne, 2010) and long term transition 
into endorsing hostile sexism towards other women (Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007). Hostile 
sexism, on the other hand, is more overt and results in women engaging in collective action against 
inequality (Becker & Wright, 2011). Further, those women who challenge benevolent sexism are 
seen as cold and unlikeable by benevolent sexists (Becker, Glick, Ilic, & Bohner, 2011) because 
rebuking these paternalistic sentiments dispels romanticised patriarchal ideals of women as amiable 
and gentle (Cikara & Fiske, 2009; Cikara, Lee, Fiske, & Glick, 2009). Thus, paternalistic expressions 
of prejudice are highly effective at dominating subordinate groups and undermining their attempts 
at group resistance. 
One important difference between ambivalent sexism and racial ambivalence is that the 
former is dependent upon men and women being roughly equal in group size because of the need 
for cooperation and intimacy in heterosexual dyads. By comparison, White people outnumber 
Black people in North America (the cultural context in racial ambivalence is explicitly 
contextualised; Katz & Hass, 1988) and racial ambivalence is not contingent upon dyadic 
relationships between the two groups as a result. Indeed, historically, dyadic relationships (and 
even contact) between White people and Black people have been stigmatised by way of anti-
miscegenation and separatist policies. 
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The relationship between heterosexuals and gay men appears to resemble a composite of 
these two instances of intergroup relations. Like the proportion of White people to Black people 
(at least, in the Western contexts under discussion herein), heterosexuals greatly outnumber gay 
men; recent estimates suggest that gay men comprise approximately 3% of the adult population in 
the United Kingdom, whereas heterosexuals make up almost 90% (YouGov, 2015). Thus, dyadic 
relationships between heterosexuals and gay men are not necessary – unlike cooperative 
relationships between men and women – due to population disproportionality4. However, media 
portrayals of dyadic relationships between gay men and heterosexual women nonetheless depict 
such relationships as highly desirable. Paulin (1996) discusses the burgeoning trend towards more 
positive media representations of gay men in film and notes the phenomenon of the “non-
threatening gay best friend” (p. 39). For example, Paulin (1996) discusses the relationship between 
the harassed protagonist of Single White Female, Allison ‘Alli’ Jones, and her gay neighbour , Graham 
Knox (who comes to the rescue throughout the film), noting that, as compared to the other 
characters in the film, “Graham is the one character who does not harm Alli and who does not 
desire Alli” (p. 39).  
Beyond the make-believe, psychological research has empirically demonstrated that gay 
men are typically perceived as non-threatening by women. In their first of a series of studies, 
Russell, Ta, Lewis, Babcock, and Ickes (2016) found that women participants trusted mating (but 
not career) advice given by gay men more than they trusted mating advice given by heterosexual 
men and women. This was found to be due to the perceived lack of gay men’s motivations to 
sexually deceive women because of their lack of sexual interest in and sexual competition with 
women. Furthermore, Russell et al.’s (2016) final study demonstrated that women’s salient 
perceptions of sexual competition with other women predicted greater openness to forming 
friendships with gay men, but not with heterosexuals or lesbian women. Akin to the stereotyping 
                                                          
4 Sexual incompatibility is also a factor, however, not all dyadic relationships between men and women are 
sexualised (i.e., family relationships) 
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inherent to benevolent sexism, it appears that heterosexuals (particularly women) ascribe a number 
of idealised traits to gay men that make them highly desirable, which – as will be advanced later in 
this chapter – may come to resemble a form of benevolent prejudice towards gay men. 
3.4 Ambivalent Ableism 
Despite the far-reaching influence of Allport’s (1954) definition of prejudice, academics 
found very early on that attitudes towards (visibly) disabled people were not uniformly negative 
but that they are also sympathetic. Compared to a person who appears to be drunk, a visibly ill 
person is more likely to attract help-giving behaviour from bystanders (Piliavin et al., 1969). 
Wheelchair-users are also more successful than able-bodied confederates at acquiring small sums 
of money from strangers – regardless of whether they present themselves positively by giving a 
reason as to why they need the change or negatively by giving no reason at all (Taylor, 1998). 
Disability is seen as a legitimate and uncontrollable affliction, triggering sympathetic attitudes and 
altruism and increasing the motivation to help (Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 2015; Weiner, 1980). 
In much the same way as paternalism permeates sexism (Jackman, 1994), images of disabled people 
are often exploited on the basis that it is for the greater good because such images evoke sympathy 
from viewers and elicit altruistic behaviours. Shakespeare (1994) argues that charities abuse pitiful 
images of physical impairment to generate money, objectifying and dehumanising disabled people 
while simultaneously claiming to be helping them. This is also seen more widely in media 
depictions of disability where “syrupy messages infused with pity” also permeate (Haller, Dorries, 
& Rahn, 2006, p. 63).  
One common narrative employed in the media is the ‘overcoming the odds’ trope whereby 
a disabled person is viewed as inspirational for overcoming adversity. However, the effectiveness 
of such tropes hinge upon the consumer conflating disability and tragedy; disabled people are only 
admired when they achieve things they are presumed to be precluded from achieving by their 
impairment (Oliver, 1996). Peers (2009) similarly exposes the prevalence of such attitudes towards 
 
 
48 
 
Paralympians who also subvert passive stereotypes of disabled people: “Without this needy and 
powerless disabled population, volunteers and experts would not seem so benevolent, 
empowerment would not seem so necessary, and the discourse of athletes being passive recipients 
of empowerment would not seem so rational” (p. 658). 
Despite this veneer of benevolence, theorists argue that such attitudes conceal latent 
hostility towards disabled people. Although disabled people may elicit sympathy, disabling 
impairments evoke fear and hostility from able-bodied people (Söder, 1990). As disabled feminist 
author Jenny Morris explains, these polarised responses co-occur:  
“Our disability frightens people. They don’t want to think that this is something which could happen to 
them. So we become separated from common humanity, treated as fundamentally different and alien. Having 
put up clear barriers between us and them, non-disabled people further hide their fear and discomfort by 
turning us into objects of pity, comforting themselves by their own kindness and generosity” (Morris, 1991, 
p. 192).  
Here, Morris (1991) argues that ambivalence towards disabled people may be motivated 
by the permeability of (dis)ability; disabled people remind able-bodied people of the fragility of 
their dominance because the perceived ‘affliction’ of disability can happen to anybody. In turn, 
this elicits an ambivalent concoction of fear and discomfort at the prospect of being disabled 
oneself, and sympathy and altruism towards such a purportedly pitiful group of people. 
Experimental research also provides evidence in support of these claims. In a series of 
experiments, Whiteman and Lukoff (1965) found that attitudes towards ‘blindness’ and ‘physical 
handicap’ were more negative than attitudes towards ‘blind people’ and ‘physically handicapped 
people’. This may be because disabled people are seen as warm (i.e., disabled people do not have 
malevolent intentions towards able-bodied people), triggering positive attitudes – yet disabilities 
are seen to make people incompetent (i.e., disabled cannot compete with able-bodied people 
because of their impairments), altogether resulting in pitying affect towards disabled people (Fiske, 
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Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). This is corroborated by Baert (2016), 
who sent two copies of an application to 768 job vacancies; the first disclosing that the applicant 
was either blind, deaf, or had autism (which would not have significantly affected their job 
performance) and the second a control application that disclosed no disability. The disabled 
candidates were 48% less likely to receive a positive call-back by the employers then the non-
disabled candidates, suggesting that when disability is made salient and delineated from the disabled 
person, able-bodied individuals will be more inclined to engage in harmful – rather than facilitating 
– behaviours towards disabled individuals. 
This pattern may also arise because a disability is seen to have a negative impact on a person’s 
quality of life (Connally, 1994). This is the disability paradox at work; approximately half of 
disabled people who report severe limitations in their ability to perform day-to-day activities also 
report having a good to excellent quality of life, and qualitative research shows that they take pride 
in themselves and the skills they have retained, and view physical impairment as something that 
has made them grow as a person (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999). As such, the most damaging effects 
of ambivalence towards disabled people is that it has a “tendency to view disability as a continuing 
tragedy” (N. Weinberg, 1988, p. 152), nullifying disabled people’s personal pride and dignity.  
Research has demonstrated reducing this ambivalence may also be achieved in a similar 
way to reducing racial ambivalence. In a similar methodology as Katz et al (1973), Katz, Glass, 
Lucido, and Farber (1977) measured participant’s positive and negative attitudes towards disabled 
people on a split semantic differential scale. They then had participants play the teaching role in a 
learning task, with a female wheelchair-bound confederate as the learner. Whenever the 
confederate got an answer wrong, the participants were to administer a loud, noxious noise to 
headphones that the confederate was wearing. Following the learning task, the participants 
completed a questionnaire on their impressions of the confederate. The results were similar to the 
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1973 iteration of this study, where administering punishment to an ambivalent target prompted 
derogation as a means of guilt-reduction. 
Understanding prejudice towards disabled people from an ambivalence perspective is 
theoretically enlightening because it recontextualises ostensibly positive behaviours towards 
disabled people, exposing paternalistic behaviours and delineating these from genuinely prosocial 
ones. Ambivalence towards disabled people accounts for the flaws in defining prejudice as 
antipathy (Allport, 1954) and moves beyond the conceptualisations of modern prejudice towards 
people with disabilities that adhere to this assumption (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & 
Sonnander, 2006) by integrating benevolent attitudes, providing a more holistic account of ableist 
attitudes. 
As compared to the group boundaries between men and women, and Black people and 
White people, the group boundary between disabled and able-bodied people is relatively more 
permeable insofar that able-bodied people can – without significant barriers – transition into a 
state of disability. Such a transitional process is also one that is typically experienced by individuals 
coming to realise their nonheterosexuality. Nonheterosexual identity development models often 
emphasise a period of assumed (or, to some theorists, ‘compulsory’, Rich, 1980) heterosexuality 
before an individual begins to notice the ways in which they violate heterosexual norms and 
conceptualise these violations as indicative of nonheterosexuality (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; 
McDonald, 1982; Troiden, 1988). Likewise, the construct of homohysteria (Anderson, 2011) – 
men’s fear of being ‘homosexualised’ by virtue of their contact with men who violate acceptable 
masculine behaviours – echoes the fear evoked by contact with disabled people discussed earlier 
in this section. As well as this, homosexuality was once considered to be a disability, which was 
treated using (what would now be considered unethical) methods such as aversion therapy (Gold 
& Neufeld, 1964). 
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Altogether, it is clear that nonheterosexuals and disabled people have many shared 
experiences of oppression, which have historically drawn upon the undesirable nature of 
pathology. To this extent, heterosexuals may also endorse a range of pitying attitudes towards gay 
men somewhat resembling those levelled at disabled people discussed thus far. Evidence for this 
can be found in an early taxonomy of attitudes towards nonheterosexuals, the Riddle homophobia 
scale (Riddle, 1994), which comprises eight nominal categories ranging from ‘repulsion’ – where 
nonheterosexuality is seen as a crime against nature – to ‘nurturance’ – where nonheterosexuals 
are believed to be invaluable to society. Riddle (1994) also includes the category of ‘pity’, which is 
situated in the taxonomy as slightly less negative than repulsion (though negative nonetheless) and 
represents heterosexual chauvinism and the belief that nonheterosexuals are poor and unfortunate. 
More recent empirical evidence also suggests that gay men elicit a high amount of pity as compared 
to other outgroups, with only Native Americans eliciting higher levels of self-reported pity by 
participants (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Unfortunately, there is little other research exploring 
possible paternalistic attitudes towards gay men, necessitating further study in this area. 
3.5 Ambivalent Ageism 
Ambivalent ageism has been recently theorised to arise from conflicting positive and 
negative stereotypes about the elderly (Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016). Cary et al. (2016) draw 
on the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) in their theorising, which asserts that 
outgroups are typically stereotyped along two axes. The communal axis of the SCM comprises 
warmth (i.e., the outgroup has positive intentions towards my group) at one pole and coldness 
(i.e., the outgroup has negative intentions towards my group) at the other pole, whereas the agentic 
axis comprises competence (i.e., the outgroup has the means to action their goals) and 
incompetence (i.e., the outgroup does not have the means to action their goals). Thus, different 
outgroups are plotted on these two axes according to their perceived cooperation and competition. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the CAN model of attitudes posits that, in order to strike a 
balance between attitude accuracy and consistency, positive evaluative reactions must be able 
coexist in an attitude network with negative evaluative reactions (Dalege et al., 2016). Similarly, the 
communal and agentic axes of the SCM operate relatively independently, sometimes resulting in 
ambivalent stereotype content. Pitying stereotypes are one such example of ambivalent stereotype 
content, because they comprise the belief that the outgroup is warm (a positive evaluation) and 
incompetent (a negative evaluation). Fiske et al. (2002) demonstrate that disabled people and 
elderly people are typically stereotyped in this way and Cary et al. (2016) contend that this may 
result in benevolent ageism. By comparison, hostile ageism occurs as a result of contemptuous 
stereotypes arising from perceptions of old people as cold and incompetent and is univalent in its 
stereotype content. 
Based on the behaviour from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map (Cuddy, Fiske, 
& Glick, 2007), Cary et al. (2016) postulate that hostile and benevolent ageism results in different 
behavioural responses towards elderly people. Hostile ageism arising from contemptuous 
stereotypes and affect result in active harm (e.g., assaulting) and passive harm (e.g., excluding) and 
the consequences of such behaviours are well-documented in the literature, such as social isolation 
(Cattan, White, & Bond, 2005), diminished efficacy of physical (Hausdorff, Levy, & Wei, 1999) 
and mental therapy (Small, 1991), and elder abuse and neglect (Harbison, 2008). Benevolent ageism 
arising from pitying stereotypes and affect results in active facilitation (e.g., assisting) and passive 
harm. Although the BIAS map advances facilitation as a counterpoint to harm, there is evidence 
that some facilitating behaviours can nonetheless be harmful. With regards to the elder, active 
facilitation typically takes the form of over-accommodating elderly people, which has the 
unintended consequence of undermining the personal autonomy and confidence of the recipient 
(Hehman & Bugental, 2015). 
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Similar to women who do not live up to prevailing stereotypes of women as maternal, 
elderly people who subvert (in)competence stereotypes appear to be penalised in the warmth 
domain. Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) presented participants with a brief description of an 
elderly man named George and manipulated this description so that it either made him appear 
incompetent because of his bad memory or made George appear competent because of his perfect 
memory. Although neither of the descriptions were altered to affect the perceived warmth of 
George, the incompetent George was rated as significantly warmer than the competent George. 
Chasteen and Cary (2015) argue that this is because such stereotypes are prescriptive rather than 
descriptive. Whereas a descriptive stereotype is what one believes is true of a particular group of 
people, prescriptive stereotypes are what one believes is expected of a particular group of people 
(North & Fiske, 2013). By demonstrating competency, George violates the prescriptive stereotype 
of incompetence and is, thus, discredited in the warmth domain for failing to live up to this 
expectation. 
Like stereotypes about elderly people and traditional women, there is some evidence that 
stereotypes about gay men are prescriptive and that gay men who violate these stereotypes are 
penalised as a result. Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle (2009) recruited 56 heterosexual participants and had 
them read descriptions of two gay men students or two lesbian women students – one of which 
was presented as stereotypical (i.e., transgressing gender norms) and the other as 
counterstereotypical (i.e., confirming to gender norms). Participants then rated how much they 
liked the two students they read about. The results showed that the stereotypical lesbian student 
was rated as less likeable then the counterstereotypical lesbian student by both the men and women 
participants. This is in line with benevolent sexism; because lesbians who are perceived as 
masculine violate ‘acceptable’ behaviour for a woman, they do not receive the affection that 
feminine women do (Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, the men and women participants rated the 
gay man in different ways; whereas the men liked the counterstereotypical gay man significantly 
more than the stereotypical gay man, the women liked the stereotypical gay man (marginally; p = 
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.06) more than the counterstereotypical gay man. This may be related to the literature discussed 
earlier with regards to gay men being perceived as non-threatening by women (Russell et al., 2015), 
but further study in this area would need to be conducted in order to assess the extent to which 
prescriptive stereotypes such as these feed into benevolence towards gay men. 
3.6 Ambivalent Prejudice towards Gay Men 
In this section, this thesis will further explore the ontological similarities and differences 
between gay men and other oppressed groups discussed thus far and use the ontological 
uniqueness of gay men as a starting point for a novel and bespoke theory of ambivalent prejudice 
towards gay men. 
3.6.1 Delineating Prejudice towards Gay Men, Lesbian Women, and Bisexuals 
While heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, lesbian women, and bisexuals share some 
similarities in that they all represent violations of normative sexual identity and practice, they are 
also qualitatively different. The most well-documented difference between the contents of 
heterosexuals’ attitudes towards lesbians and gay men is that the former are considered to be 
masculine and the latter are considered to be feminine. In a study exploring heterosexuals’ 
stereotypical beliefs about gay men, Massey (2010) demonstrated that heterosexuals believed that 
gay men and lesbian women transgressed gender norms in both positive and negative ways. For 
instance, gay men were believed to act like women and, thus, perceived to be weak and flamboyant, 
but also as sensitive and caring. Inversely, lesbian women were believed to act like men and, thus, 
perceived as aggressive and having bad hygiene, but also as strong and capable. Based on these 
stereotypes, it appears that gender norm transgression in gay men is associated with disempowering 
characteristics, whereas gender norm transgression in lesbian women is associated with relatively 
more empowering characteristics (Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004).  
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This is possibly compounded by laypeople’s heightened awareness of penetrative and 
receptive partners in male same-sex sexual behaviour, which is commonly conflated with 
masculine dominance and feminine submission, respectively (Johns, Pingel, Eisenberg, Santana, & 
Bauermeister, 2012). Because heterosexuals’ understanding of sex is typically guided by a ‘coital 
imperative’ (i.e., the privileging of penile-vaginal intercourse as ‘real’ sex; McPhillips, Braun, & 
Gavey, 2001), lesbians could be less susceptible to having devalued character traits associated with 
their assumed sexual behaviour than are gay men because a penetrative element to lesbian sexual 
practice is commonly overlooked (Henderson, 1992). This may explain the pattern of results 
showing a preference for counterstereotypical (i.e., feminine) lesbian women, yet a slight 
preference for stereotypical (i.e., feminine) gay men (Cohen et al, 2009). Because traits associated 
with femininity pose less of a challenge to unequal power structures, gender norm violations 
among gay men may be more readily embraced than gender norm violations in lesbian women 
(Wilkinson, 2008). In other words, attitudes towards gay men are more likely than attitudes towards 
lesbian women to be benevolent, because lesbian women’s perceived gender transgressions would 
likely attract hostile (hetero)sexist attitudes because they threaten patriarchal ideals. 
Paradoxically, however, heterosexuals are commonly reported to hold significantly more 
negative attitudes towards gay men than towards lesbian women, and this difference is particularly 
pronounced among heterosexual men (Herek, 1988; Herek, 2000; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; LaMar 
& Kite, 1998). This is believed to be the case because heterosexual men objectify and oversexualise 
lesbian women, which has an ameliorative effect on self-reported prejudice because such 
objectification typically masquerades as mere appreciation (M. Hill & Fischer, 2008; Louderback 
& Whiteley Jr., 1997; Reichert, 2001). A similar tendency for heterosexual men to endorse more 
positive attitudes towards bisexual women as compared to gay and bisexual men is also 
documented in the literature (Herek, 2002; Steffens & Wagner, 2004) and may also result from the 
same oversexualisation. This seeming paradox in the literature can be reconciled by delineating 
heterosexuals’ attitudes towards nonheterosexual sexual behaviour and sexual identity. To 
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illustrate, exposing heterosexual men to male-male sexual intimacy can prompt more negative 
affect and self-reported prejudice towards gay men (Golom & Mohr, 2011; Mahaffey, Bryan, & 
Hutchinson, 2005; Hudephol, Parrott, & Zeichner, 2010), and similar results are found when 
exposing heterosexual women to female-female sexual intimacy, presumably because the 
oversexualisation element present among heterosexual men does not exist among heterosexual 
women (Parrott & Gallagher, 2008). It is, thus, important to bear in mind that – although gay men 
appear to attract particularly scathing reactions because of their assumed sexual behaviours (and 
the stigma attached to those behaviours), this is only one evaluative axis upon which gay men are 
judged negatively and it does not nullify the apparent ways in which gay men are judged positively. 
Gay men can also be differentiated from lesbian women from an ontological perspective 
because they are less likely to be ‘doubly-oppressed’ than are lesbian women. To reiterate, lesbians 
commonly self-identify as women and, thus, constitute an intersection of two oppressed groups 
in society (Shields, 2008). It is not until racial (Bowleg, 2013), religious (Rahman, 2010), and social 
class (Embrick, Walther, & Wickens, 2007) categories intersect with sexuality that gay men become 
oppressed across multiple social axes of difference. Such disproportionate vulnerability is 
particularly salient when comparing the lifetime risk of gay men and lesbian women developing 
psychiatric disorders; the latter are significantly more at risk of developing anxiety disorders (e.g., 
generalised anxiety disorder, simple phobia, and post-traumatic stress disorder), mood disorders 
(e.g., major depression), neurocardiogenic syncope (i.e., temporary loss of consciousness due to 
low arterial blood pressure, followed by a slow heart rate; Grubb & McMann, 2001), and substance 
dependence (Gilman et al., 2001). As compared to mental ill health prevalence in heterosexual men 
and women (which is roughly equal; Rosenfield & Mouzon, 2013), it would appear that non-
heterosexuality particularly increases women’s susceptibility to mental ill health despite social 
attitudes towards lesbians often being less negative than attitudes towards gay men. 
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Another drawback of being a member of multiple subordinate groups is intersectional 
invisibility; because individuals with intersecting identities may not fit the prototype of either group 
(e.g., a lesbian woman), they become relatively less visible and recognised (Purdie-Vaughns & 
Eibach, 2008). This can be seen in the disproportionate depiction of nonheterosexuals on prime-
time television, where gay men consistently outnumber lesbian characters (61% - 20%, GLAAD, 
2012; 46% - 30%, GLAAD, 2013; 54% - 28%, GLAAD, 2014; and 47% - 33%, GLAAD, 2015). 
Many portrayals of gay men in film and TV also revolve around friendships with heterosexual 
women and some have argued paternalistic sexism is reinvented in these dyads because of the 
complementary gender differentiation employed therein. Whereas the women in such dyads are 
commonly presented as vacuous and hysterical, the gay men are positioned as the perfect foil to 
remedy these character flaws with their supposed sage advice and worldly knowledge (Shugart, 
2003). Altogether, this is an important reminder that – despite being an oppressed group in society 
– gay men (unlike lesbian women) retain a stake in male privilege because they benefit from it 
(Jacobs, 1997).  
Gay men – unlike bisexuals – also have the (relative) advantage of adhering to a more easily 
comprehendible binary understanding of human sexualities (i.e., heterosexual-homosexual)5. As a 
result of this binary, bisexuality is often delegitimised based on the gender of a bisexual person’s 
current partner. For example, in one of their 71 semi-structured interviews, Better and Simula 
(2015) interviewed a bisexual woman who was in a monogamous marriage with her husband and 
found that others read her sexual identity as heterosexual rather than bisexual, thus obscuring an 
important part of her identity. Bisexual people also experience delegitimisation due to their 
deviation from a binary understanding of human sexualities in the form of trivialising statements 
such as “pick a side” (Burke & LaFrance, 2016) and accusations of sexual greed (Rust, 2000). 
                                                          
5 Sexologists and social constructionists take a more complex view of human sexualities (see Brickell, 2006), whereas 
this discussion is in reference to the more simplified understandings of human sexualities employed among non-
academics (see Johnson, 2004).  
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Because of this perception, bisexuals are viewed with suspicion and are judged to be untrustworthy, 
unfaithful, and promiscuous (McLean, 2008) – even by lesbian women and gay men (Welzer-Lang, 
2008). As one of McLean’s (2008) participants explains, “Bisexuality’s only visible in a negative 
way… there are no positive images at all” (p. 161). Given this overwhelming hostility towards 
bisexual people, they are also unlikely to be targets of benevolent prejudice like gay men are. 
3.6.2 Intergroup Relations between Heterosexuals and Nonheterosexuals 
In her appraisal of intergroup relations between dominant groups and subordinate groups 
in the arenas of class, race, and gender, Jackman (1994) offers a number of useful parameters with 
which to characterise these asymmetric relationships. The first parameter considers the distributive 
bases for inequality, that is, how does the dominant group secure its dominance by securing its 
economic wellbeing, social prestige, and control over decision-making? The second parameter 
concerns how individuals are ascribed to groups and is concerned with how well defined the 
intergroup boundary is and whether group membership is mutable or heritable. 
With regards to the ways in which heterosexuals have secured dominance over 
nonheterosexuals, this was achieved by colonising the social prestige domain. Heterosexuality is 
positioned as a social good because it produces the next generation of people and, thus, contributes 
to the continued success of a society. As such, unions between men and women are encouraged 
and incentivised, and heterosexuality becomes institutionalised (Heath, 2008). By comparison, 
homosexuality became institutionalised in the legal and medical arenas; in the United Kingdom, 
homosexual behaviour between two men was illegal until 19676 and was considered to be a mental 
illness in the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders until the DSM-III was published 
in 19737. Thus, homosexuality – particularly between two men – has a deep and ingrained history 
                                                          
6 As a caveat, it was still illegal for more than two men to have sex – because it constituted an act of public 
indecency – until 2003. 
7 Again, as a caveat, this was replaced by ego-dystonic homosexuality, which remained in the DSM-III until 1987 
when the DSM-III-R was published. 
 
 
59 
 
of stigma in the United Kingdom, which was further compounded by the height of the AIDS 
epidemic in the 1980, colloquially referred to as ‘the gay plague’ and ‘gay cancer’ (Flowers & 
Landridge, 2007). 
At odds with this stigma, however, is the boundary between heterosexuality and 
nonheterosexuality. As alluded to earlier in this section, the heterosexual-homosexual orientation 
binary is an overly-simplistic interpretation of human sexualities (Brickell, 2006) and, as such, the 
definitional boundary between ‘straight’ and ‘gay’ is rather poorly defined. For instance, men who 
have sex with men but who do not identify as gay or bisexual – sometimes colloquially known as 
‘being on the down-low’ (Millett, Malebranche, Mason, & Spikes, 2005) – undermine the ability 
for one group (i.e., heterosexuals) to dominate another (i.e., gay men) on the basis of discrete and 
well-defined group membership.  
Although the differences between, say, racial and gender categories are also simplistic, the 
criteria upon which these groups are stratified (e.g., skin colour) are typically visible. By 
comparison, nonheterosexuality is a concealable stigma (Herek & Capitanio, 1996); whereas gay 
men can ‘pass’ as a member of the dominant group (Johnson, 2002), other groups have relatively 
less control over others’ ability to identify their subordinate group membership. The concealable 
nature of nonheterosexuality may influence the content of prejudice directed towards 
nonheterosexuals. Parallels can be drawn here between nonheterosexuals and people with invisible 
or mental illnesses; people with invisible illnesses are criticised for having an illegitimate excuse for 
failing to conform to society’s expectations (Ong-Dean, 2005) and, likewise, gay men are also 
criticised for not assimilating into mainstream culture (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). The 
concealable nature of nonheterosexuality also means that attempts to oppress sexual minorities 
may unintentionally result in ingroup ‘casualties’ who are misidentified as gay, making such acts 
potentially costly to heterosexuals also (Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010). 
 
 
60 
 
Gay men can also be delineated from other groups on the basis of the mutability and 
heritability of group membership. As discussed earlier in this chapter, sexual minority identity 
development is theorised to proceed from a state of presumed heterosexuality to internalised 
nonheterosexuality (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; McDonald, 1982; Troiden, 1988). Inversely, some 
sections of society believe that sexual minorities can undergo sexual orientation conversion therapy 
to become heterosexual (Tozer & Hayes, 2004), though this has largely been refuted as being 
ineffectual (J. G. Ford, 2002), and highly unethical and damaging (Jenkins & Johnston, 2004). As 
such, nonheterosexual group membership can be crudely characterised in terms of a transition 
from assumed dominant group membership to actualised subordinate group membership – but 
rarely in the other direction. Because deviation from the dominant group undermines the 
legitimacy of that group’s dominance, this phenomenon may explain why much of the animosity 
directed towards gay men revolves around their supposed undermining of dominant (i.e., 
heterosexual) institutions, such as marriage (Brandzel, 2005). By restricting and delegitimising 
subordinates’ appropriation of hegemonic institutions, one undermines the subordinate group’s 
status (Eekelaar, 2014). 
The belief that sexuality is mutable is associated with higher levels of old-fashioned 
prejudice towards gay men (Haslam & Levy, 2006), which supports the assertions made in the 
previous paragraph. By comparison, essentialist beliefs about gay men may serve to engender 
tolerance and acceptance – that they were ‘born this way’ and are thus deserving of help (Jang & 
Lee, 2014). Given that such essentialist beliefs can be reified using stereotyping (Bastian & Haslam, 
2006), prevailing stereotypes about gay men pertaining to their perceived kindness and 
powerlessness may serve to bolster heterosexuals’ acceptance of gay men. Despite these 
stereotypes’ oppressive consequences, this thesis suggests that they are nonetheless intended in a 
positive way by well-meaning heterosexuals (see Conley, Calhoun, Evett, & Devine, 2002).  
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To illustrate, heterosexuals’ endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men correlates 
negatively with self-report measures of traditional anti-gay prejudice (Massey, 2010). Further, as 
has been previously discussed, benevolence is not a necessary component of the oppression of 
sexual minorities (unlike the oppression of women; Glick & Fiske, 1996) because intergroup 
relations between these dominant and subordinate groups are qualitatively different. Even if 
benevolence towards gay men did function in the same way as benevolent sexism (i.e., that it has 
oppressive intent), such a strategy would be stymied by how few gay men there are in relation to 
heterosexuals and the concealable nature of nonheterosexuality. Although such attitudes and 
stereotypes may be well-intentioned and may be indicative of lower levels of prejudice, this does 
not nullify their microaggressive potential; gay men are nonetheless targets of “brief and 
commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, [and] environmental indignities, whether intentional or 
unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults” (Nadal et al., 
2011, p. 235). 
3.6.3 Multidimensional Heterosexism 
Heterosexism is defined by Herek (1992) as “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, 
and stigmatises any non-heterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 
89). However, Walls (2008a) argues that such a definition focuses exclusively on antipathy, and 
claims that heterosexism can also be expressed in benevolent as well as hostile ways. Walls (2008a) 
suggests that hostile heterosexism takes two forms. The first, aversive heterosexism, is the belief 
that gay men and lesbian women are too politically militant and get too much attention. The second 
aspect of hostile heterosexism is amnestic heterosexism, the oblivion to and denial of continuing 
prejudice and discrimination towards gay men and lesbian women. Although these constructs have 
also been identified elsewhere in the literature (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), Walls (2008a) has 
defined them in such a way that is it difficult to differentiate the two. Whereas the former is defined 
as “attitudes, myths, and beliefs that dismiss, belittle, or disregard, the impact of sexual orientation on 
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life chances” (p. 46, own emphasis), the latter is defined as “attitudes, myths, and beliefs that deny 
the impact of sexual orientation on life chances” (p. 46, own emphasis). These definitions are 
unclear because a denial may reasonably be interpreted as dismissive and vice versa. Thus, greater 
definitional clarity is required with regards to theory development in this area  
The two benevolent components of multidimensional heterosexism are positive-
stereotypic and paternalistic heterosexism. The former is defined by Walls (2008a) as “subjectively 
positive attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express appreciation of stereotypic characteristics often 
attributed to lesbians and gay men, which function by denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and/or 
segregating any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 28). 
Here, Walls (2008a) and I agree that such positive stereotypes are only subjectively positive, as has 
been reiterated throughout this chapter. However, I disagree that such attitudes represent 
deliberate acts of social stratification with dominative intent. As I have already discussed, the 
endorsement of positive stereotypes about sexual minorities is associated with less anti-gay 
prejudice – not more (Massey, 2010). Of course, some individuals may purposely use positive 
stereotypes as a way of demeaning and segregating sexual minorities (Nadal, Whitman, Davis, 
Erazo, & Davidoff, 2016), but the malicious intent behind such an act would be difficult – if 
impossible – to access using a psychometric scale as Walls (2008a) has attempted to do. In other 
words, the assertion that positive stereotypes about gay men are purposive acts of oppression is 
unfalsifiable because any and all acts of this nature could be interpreted as supporting this thesis 
regardless of their subjectively positive tone. 
Paternalistic heterosexism, defined by Walls (2008a) as “subjectively neutral or positive 
attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional, or cognitive 
wellbeing of nonheterosexual persons while concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and 
or/segregating any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 
27-28), also suffers from this same problem. How can one adjudicate that a heterosexual’s concern 
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for a sexual minority’s wellbeing is merely social dominance in disguise? This is an overly 
uncharitable perspective and one that may dissuade heterosexual allies from supporting LGB 
causes if they feel they are being miscast as prejudiced. Rather, a fairer and simpler interpretation 
is that, while some paternalistic behaviours towards sexual minorities may constitute over-
accommodation, they are more likely to be missteps by well-meaning heterosexuals than acts of 
oppression (Conley et al., 2002). Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that many heterosexuals 
have prosocial motivations towards sexual minorities. ‘Heterosexual allies’ are seen to have a 
genuine commitment to justice and civil rights, often frame their commitment to equality in terms 
of patriotism, religiosity, or morality, and recognise that they can ‘spend’ their privilege to bring 
about positive change (Russell, 2011). Such individuals are more likely to identify as women, are 
more educated, and have more gay and lesbian friends (Fingerhut, 2011), which are all factors 
commonly linked to lower levels of anti-gay prejudice. 
Despite this fundamental difference of theoretical assumptions, the constructs identified 
by Walls (2008a) do hold some merit. While benevolent sexism theory cannot simply be 
extrapolated to gay men because of the aforementioned differences in intergroup relations, gay 
men have nonetheless been demonstrated in the literature to be targets of paternalism (Conley et 
al., 2002) and positive stereotypes (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). Ostensibly positive stereotyping 
of minority groups has also been demonstrated to have deleterious effects on group members. For 
example, Asians exposed to the stereotype that they have superior mathematical abilities 
experience significant impairments in concentration and resultant mathematical performance, 
suggesting that making such high expectations salient can cause target group members to suffer 
performance anxiety (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000). Although research has found that exposing 
gay men to the stereotype that they are highly fashionable can improve their performance on 
fashion-related tasks (Cotner & Burkley, 2013), the content of those stereotypes may still stratify 
that group in undesirable ways. For example, in a field study conducted by Drydakis (2015), they 
found that gay men job applicants received fewer interviews in traditionally male-dominated fields 
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than did heterosexual men. This is likely related to the positive traits associated with gay and 
heterosexual men; whereas gay men are stereotyped as more warm than competent, heterosexual 
men are stereotyped as more competent than warm (Kranz, Pröbstle, & Evidis, 2016). While these 
consequences may not be intended on the individual level, it manifests on the structural level 
nonetheless. 
Multidimensional heterosexism also does not discern between ambivalent attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbian women. Given that women who transgress gender-normative 
expectations are punished for going against patriarchal ideals (as discussed earlier in this chapter), 
how can lesbians – who are commonly seen to subvert acceptable gender norms (Geiger, 
Harwood, & Hummert, 2006) – be the targets of ‘benevolent’ attitudes such as “Lesbians are more 
independent than heterosexual women” (Walls, 2008a, p. 49)? It could be argued that 
nonheterosexuality diminishes a woman’s perceived womanhood to the point where they become 
mutually exclusive identities (Magee & Miller, 1992) and, thus, targets of mutually exclusive 
prejudices – but this seems an unlikely explanation. Further issues arise when considering how 
positive stereotypes may affect gay men and lesbian women in different ways. Because gender 
transgression is associated with disempowerment in the former group and empowerment in the 
latter group (Sirin et al., 2004), uniformly oppressive intentions underlying positive gender 
transgressive stereotypes is also unlikely (Massey, 2010). No substantive attempt has been made to 
reconcile multidimensional heterosexism towards lesbian women with ambivalent sexism theory, 
suggesting that Walls’ (2008) extrapolation of ambivalent sexism to fit attitudes towards gay men 
and lesbian women is in need of further justification. 
3.6.4 Polymorphous Prejudice 
Massey (2009) integrates queer theoretical perspectives with extant theories of modern 
prejudice towards sexual minorities to develop polymorphous prejudice theory, which accounts 
for the multitudinous expressions of positive and negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. 
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Massey (2009) has identified seven constructs: 1) Traditional heterosexism; 2) Denial of anti-gay 
discrimination; 3) Aversion towards gay men; 4) Aversion towards lesbians; 5) Valuing the gay 
rights movement; 6) Resistance of heteronormativity, and; 7) Positive beliefs about gay people. 
The first four factors are well represented in other scales measuring old-fashioned and modern 
prejudice towards sexual minorities (see Herek, 1984; Morrison & Morrison, 2003). The latter three 
are relatively new additions informed by queer-liberationist perspectives, suggesting that merely 
the absence of negative attitudes towards sexual minorities (i.e., ‘tolerance’; Herek, 1984) does not 
imply the presence of positive attitudes (Kite & Deaux, 1986).  
Massey (2009) argues that positive attitudes involve empowering sexual minorities, 
resisting heteronormativity as a way of destabilising heterosexist norms, and positively stereotyping 
as a way of valuing gay men and lesbian women’s differences. This supposition raises a number of 
issues. On a superficial level, where is the ‘prejudice’ in these facets of polymorphous prejudice? 
The author argues that there is no prejudice and, indeed, all three correlate negatively with the 
hostile prejudice subscales, particularly the valuing gay progress subscale (r = -0.86). At best, this 
is simply a linguistic contradiction – at worst, this would imply that traditional social psychological 
research on prejudice towards sexual minorities is incompatible with the queer-liberationist 
perspective.  
Further, this is not the only theoretical contradiction present in this theory. A primary 
directive of queer theory is to deconstruct essentialist identity categories by decoupling sexual 
orientation from attributes and personality traits (Jagose, 1996), yet items such as “gay men are 
more emotionally available than are heterosexual men” (Massey, 2009, p. 159) serve only to 
reinforce the essentialism that queer theorists are trying to destabilise. Massey (2009) also claims 
that rejection of biological explanations of sexual orientation is indicative of queer liberation yet, 
as discussed earlier, the belief in sexuality as a choice has been ubiquitously associated with higher 
levels of prejudice towards sexual minorities (Crawford, McLeod, Zamboni, & Jordan, 1999; Herek 
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& Capitanio, 1995) and is often relied upon as a way to undermine the legitimacy of non-
heterosexuals and their demands for change (Herman, 1996). 
In addition, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that positive stereotyping is more 
damaging that it appears (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Czopp, 2008, Gupta, Szymanski, & 
Leong, 2011) yet the assumption has been made that such attitudes are prosocial based on queer 
theory without any actual input from the targets of these stereotypes who may be comparatively 
more vulnerable than the scholars developing the theory. Such qualitative findings have shown 
that positive stereotyping is not as benign as Massey (2009) claims (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et 
al., 2011). Regardless of this evidence, Massey (2009) argues “These qualities, instead of leading to 
degrading benevolence… may be viewed as truly positive and desirable” (p. 168). This rationale is 
especially troubling for two reasons. Firstly, internalising positive stereotypes as desirable may 
contribute to system justification (i.e., that structural inequality is legitimate), giving way to more 
oppressive outcomes (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Secondly – akin to Walls (2008a) – Massey (2009) fails 
to differentiate gay men and lesbian women and to appreciate that lesbian women may also be 
subjected to ambivalent sexism wherein positive stereotyping may also be employed as an 
oppressive strategy (Glick & Fiske, 1996).  
In conclusion, multidimensional heterosexism and polymorphous prejudice can be 
critiqued in three ways. Firstly, they both misconstrue the motivations behind and consequences 
of positively-valenced attitudes towards gay men; multidimensional heterosexism posits they have 
oppressive motivations, which research evidence suggests is not the case, and polymorphous 
prejudice posits that they have prosocial consequences, which research evidence also refutes. 
Secondly, both scholar’s theoretical development proceeded with minimal input from laypeople, 
privileging academic theory over experiential reality. Finally, both theories fail to adequately 
distinguish between prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women resulting in theoretical 
inconsistencies with ambivalent sexism, a far more established and well-regarded theory. 
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3.7 Ambivalent Homoprejudice 
This subchapter will advocate using the word ‘homoprejudice’ as a useful way to describe 
prejudice directed at sexual minorities, regardless of its valence. Finally, ambivalent homoprejudice 
theory will be proposed as a novel and necessary advancement and correction of extant theory. 
3.7.1 ‘Homoprejudice’: A Terminological Clarification 
Before entering into the theory development section of this thesis, it is first necessary to 
clarify the deliberate use of the term ‘homoprejudice’. Social psychologists have employed varying 
terminology in their investigation of prejudicial attitudes directed towards sexual minorities, 
contributing to an academic language barrier whereby “positions not only similar but mutually 
supportive seem alien to one another” (Bruffee, 1986, p. 773). ‘Homoprejudice’ is argued to be a 
term highly compatible with the wider literature on sexual minority prejudice and the most 
preferable in light of the aims of this thesis. 
‘Homophobia’ (G. Weinberg 1972) has been widely criticised for having undesirable 
pathologising connotations (Herek, 1984) and research evidence suggests that such attitudes 
represent prejudice far more than it does phobia (Schiffman, Delucia-Waack, & Gerrity, 2006). 
Schiffman et al. (2006) further argue that this clinical association risks exonerating prejudiced 
individuals, framing them as the victim rather than perpetrator. Despite these issues, it is widely 
used among laypeople to describe sexuality-based prejudice. This is concerning because it allows 
prejudiced people to downplay their prejudice on the basis that it is not homophobic per se. 
Discourse analysis of political speeches show that this is commonly relied upon to avoid 
accusations of prejudice (Burridge, 2004), as can be seen in Baroness Blatch’s objections to 
repealing Section 28, a piece of UK legislation that prohibited the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality: 
“It is not homophobic to care about the moral and spiritual education of our children” (Hansard, 
2000, p. 119). In disclaiming the label of ‘homophobe’, it becomes challenging from a lay 
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perspective to adequately label the prejudicial attitudes being endorsed in its place because 
laypeople do not always have access to the broad lexicon that academics do. 
‘Sexual prejudice’, defined by Herek (1984) as “all negative attitudes based on sexual 
orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual” (p. 19), notably focuses 
on the negative aspects of sexuality-based prejudice. However, the measure derived from this 
definition, the attitudes towards lesbians and gay men scale (Herek, 1984), only measures old-
fashioned anti-gay prejudice, which is less prevalent in the UK than in other countries (McDermott 
& Blair, 2012). Given sexual prejudice’s synonymy with hostile old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice, 
this terminology was deemed unsuitable for the present theory development. Usage of the term 
‘homonegativity’ (Morrison, Parriag, & Morrison, 1999) herein would also be counterproductive 
and confusing when trying to define ambivalent attitudes that are both negative and positive. 
Finally, the utility of the term ‘heterosexism’ is similarly limited by its negative connotations; if 
benevolent attitudes towards gay men do, as theorised, have positive motivations, then how can 
they arise from an ideological system that actively seeks to deny, denigrate, and stigmatise gay men? 
In arguing that benevolent attitudes do have oppressive motivations, Walls (2008a) proposes 
changing Herek’s (1992) definition to “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, stigmatises 
and segregates any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 26-
27, author’s emphasis), yet the addition of ‘segregates’ does little to allay the negative connotations 
central to academic definitions of heterosexism. 
‘Homoprejudice’ is, thus, the most appropriate term for this thesis for a number of reasons. 
Its most useful asset is that it is unvalenced and accommodates both hostile and benevolent 
expressions of prejudice towards gay men, challenging the traditional and limited view of prejudice 
as antipathy (Allport, 1954). The term ‘homoprejudice’ also retains its relevance to the prejudice 
literature and Allport’s (1954) claim that “the net effect of prejudice is to place the object of 
prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own misconduct” (p. 9). The intentionality of a 
 
 
69 
 
prejudicial display is, thus, irrelevant – it is the way in which the target group (in this case, gay men) 
interprets it and is affected by it that is important (Nadal et al., 2011). Finally, this term also makes 
explicit the realist epistemology drawn upon in this thesis, which situates homoprejudice as held 
rather than done (the latter of which is better captured by the term ‘heterosexism’). 
3.7.2 Ambivalent Homoprejudice Theory 
What Walls (2008a) and Massey (2009) have both identified is that attitudes towards gay 
men are multifaceted, challenging traditional conceptualisations of prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 
1954). Researchers have also identified that attitudes towards gay men can be subjectively 
ambivalent insofar that individuals overtly report feeling ‘conflicted’ and having ‘mixed feelings’ 
towards gay men and individual differences in this ambivalence tap subtle and less objectionable 
prejudice (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2014). What theorists have not been convincing about are the 
origins and contents of such ambivalent attitudes. 
An initial point to consider is why are attitudes towards gay men ambivalent? Indeed, it 
would be simplistic to offer only one explanation because people may be ambivalent for a number 
of reasons. One potential reason is value conflict, akin to the theorised origins of racial 
ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988). Findings from the political science literature have revealed 
multitudinous value conflicts moderating support for gay rights and attitudes towards gay men 
(Craig et al., 2005; Callahan & Vescio, 2011). Religious individuals may also struggle to reconcile 
their religious beliefs about nonheterosexuality with their desire to be egalitarian (Bean & Martinez, 
2014). Similarly, Hegarty et al. (2004) demonstrate value conflict between heterocentrism – taking 
the traits of heterosexuals as descriptive and prescriptive of all sexual identities – and 
egalitarianism. Although such an ambivalent individual may endorse egalitarian ideals, they are 
stymied by the upholding of heterocentric ideals, resulting in preferential treatment of 
heterosexuals (Hegarty et al., 2004).  
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Another possibility is that ambivalence towards gay men is a consequence of ambivalence 
towards (heterosexual) men (Glick & Fiske, 1999). As has already been discussed, heterosexual 
women endorse more positive stereotypes about gay men than do heterosexual men (Morrison & 
A. Bearden, 2007; Massey, 2010). Given that women’s hostile attitudes towards men arise due to 
a rejection of paternalism (Glick & Fiske, 1999), gay men may be stereotyped in more benevolent 
ways by women because they are seen as more trustworthy than heterosexual men (Russell et al., 
2015). However, given that gay men still play a part in the maintenance of patriarchy (Shugart, 
2003), women may still retain negative attitudes towards them. This is a particularly enlightening 
interpretation given that ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) cannot very well 
explain ambivalent sexist attitudes toward sexual minority men and women because of its 
dependence on heterosexual intimacy. 
Alternatively, ambivalent attitudes towards gay men may occur due to the diverse range of 
subcultures within this social group. For instance, the stereotype content of ‘gay men’) is both 
moderately warm and competent (Fiske et al., 2002; Asbrock, 2010). However, further examination 
of gay men’s stereotype content reveals that different gay subtypes are stereotyped in different 
ways. For instance, gay men in the leather/biker subculture are stereotyped in contemptuous ways, 
effeminate gay men are stereotyped in pitying ways, activists are stereotyped in envious ways, and 
stereotypes about artistic gay men approach the admiring quadrant of the SCM (Clausell & Fiske, 
2005). These findings suggest that individuals may endorse ‘unconflicted’ ambivalence (see Glick 
& Fiske, 1996) whereby gay men are subtyped into liked and disliked groups. As such, hostile 
attitudes may be directed towards subtypes of gay men who are stereotyped as contemptible or 
envied whereas benevolent attitudes may be directed towards admired or pitied subtypes. 
This can be further substantiated using the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007). As has already 
been discussed, the BIAS map posits that different configurations of warmth and competence 
stereotypes about certain groups result in different behavioural manifestations of harm and 
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facilitation towards that group. Gay men have been documented in the literature to experience the 
entire catalogue of these behaviours. Active harmful behaviours towards gay men take the form 
of verbal gay-bashing (Bahns & Brancombe, 2011) and physical abuse (Meyer, 2012), whereas 
passive harmful behaviours towards gay men consist of social exclusion (Hammack & Cohler, 
2011) and disownment (Reczek, 2015). Likewise, active facilitation of gay men includes defending 
them from and challenging anti-gay attitudes (Lapointe, 2015), and passive facilitation takes the 
form of coveting them as friends (Worthen, 2013). These findings appear to be a useful foundation 
upon which to characterise the contents of ambivalent homoprejudice as contemptuous, envious, 
admiring, and pitying. 
Contemptuous forms of homoprejudice towards gay men are well documented in the 
literature. Gay men are stereotyped as incompetent due to their perceived weakness (Massey, 2010) 
and femininity (Madon, 1997), and also stereotyped as cold due to their association with disease 
(Grenfell et al., 2011), promiscuity (Kunda & Oleson, 1995), and their supposed subversion of 
traditional values (Clarke, 2001). These stereotypes are thus used to justify harm against gay men. 
For instance, anti-gay lobbying efforts typically make use of demonising imagery and depravity 
narratives (Irvine, 2005), sometimes refer to a conspiratorial ‘gay agenda’ (McCreanor, 1996) or 
frame gay rights as ‘propaganda’ (Burridge, 2004), and pejorative language about gay men often 
draws upon their perceived dirty sexual practices (Peel, 2005). I term this old-fashioned brand of 
homoprejudice ‘repellent homoprejudice’ and define it as a constellation of hostile attitudes 
towards gay men comprising contempt, disgust, and moral indignation. 
Envious forms of homoprejudice are also well-documented in the literature – though their 
envious content is somewhat concealed. Envy proper, defined by Smith and Kim (2007) as 
“feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute 
enjoyed by another person or group of persons” (p. 46) can be evident in people’s opposition to 
gay men. Although there are an array of areas where gay men are unequal to heterosexuals, the 
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battle for equality is often framed as an orchestrated push towards ‘special privileges’ (Brewer, 
2003) and many believe that gay men are treated better than heterosexuals in the UK (YouGov, 
2014). In actuality, heterosexuals benefit from taken for granted privileges, which these envious 
attitudes fail to account for (Wildman & Davis, 1995; Case & Stewart, 2010).  
Envy has also been implicated in prejudice towards other minority groups including Asians 
(Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) and women (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). 
Further, experimental research indicates that malicious envy can be differentiated from benign 
envy (which is experienced somewhat as admiration) by examining attentional biases. Crusius and 
Lange (2014) demonstrate that malicious envy results in attentional biases towards an envied 
person rather than the envied object that person possesses, suggesting that this brand of envy does 
not reflect a desire to ‘level-up’ by gaining the envied object but rather to level the other person 
down by causing that person harm. In the context of heterosexuals’ envy of gay men’s perceived 
‘special privileges’, individuals may deny feeling envious of these perceived advantages on the basis 
that they do not desire them. Instead, such an individual would exhibit their envy by attempting 
to harm or discredit the envied group (i.e., gay men). This is evidenced in many of the scales used 
to measure these modern aspects of hostile homoprejudice. For example the aversive heterosexism 
subscale of the multidimensional heterosexism inventory taps heterosexuals’ beliefs that “there is 
too much attention given to gay men on television and in the media” (Walls, 2008a, p. 49). The 
modern homonegativity scale also appears to tap heterosexuals’ concern for (un)fairness with 
items such as “If gay men want to be treated like everyone else, then they need to stop making 
such a fuss about their sexuality/culture” (Morrison & Morrison, 2003, p. 25). I term these 
attitudes ‘adversarial homoprejudice’, drawing on Glick et al’s. (2000) description of hostile sexism 
as “an adversarial view of gender relations in which women are perceived as seeking to control 
men, whether through sexuality or feminist ideology” (p. 764), and I define these attitudes as 
envious beliefs that gay men exaggerate the significance of their sexuality and their experiences of 
prejudice in order to obtain undue advantages over heterosexuals. 
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Admiration of gay men’s perceived positive character traits also appears to be increasingly 
studied in the literature. Gay men are perceived as having traits associated with warmth, such as 
emotional sensitivity and being sociable, as well various competencies and skills, such as a keen 
sense of fashion and interior design aesthetic (Conley et al., 2002; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; 
Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009; 2010, Mohr, Chopp, & Wong, 2013; Cotner & Burkley, 2013). As has 
been discussed so far, these stereotypes are embodied in depictions of gay characters in the media 
and, for many people, this will likely be their only contact with gay men (Linneman, 2008). While 
these traits may appear positive to the person ascribing them, they have negative implications for 
gay men. For instance, subscription to the stereotype that gay men are more affluent than 
heterosexuals negatively predicts support for gay rights because such a high level of perceived 
competence undermines their status as a disadvantaged group (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014). 
Stereotypes such as these constrain self-expression (Cover, 2004) and may potentially pressure gay 
men into living up to them, given the friendship and trust afforded to those who do (Worthen, 
2013; Russell et al., 2015), though more investigation would be required to see if this is the case. I 
term these attitudes ‘romanticised homoprejudice’ in reference to the tendency to view attitude 
objects more fondly than they are in reality (e.g., individuals may romanticise colonialism, Wall, 
1997), and I define it as the subscription to exaggerated positive stereotypes about gay men, which 
consequently imagine away gay men’s structural disadvantage and misrepresent their lived 
experiences. 
Finally, pitying affect towards gay men has received relatively little academic attention. The 
prevalent belief that gay men suffer from mental illness (Boysen, Fisher, Dejesus, Vogel, & Madon, 
2011) and an increasing awareness of sexuality-based inequality may elicit sympathetic and pitying 
feelings towards gay men (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). These feelings of pity towards gay men is a 
significant predictor of gay rights support among heterosexuals (Cottrell, Richards, & Nichols, 
2010), suggesting that pity towards gay men may motivate facilitating behaviours. However, Conley 
et al. (2002) document accounts of sexual minorities being over-accommodated and infantilised, 
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akin to that experienced by the elderly (Hehman & Bugental, 2015). Thus, pity may be interpreted 
as benevolence when nonheterosexuality is treated like a ‘personal tragedy’ for gay men (Corbett, 
1994). As a result, a well-intentioned prosocial gesture intended to comfort or defend a gay man 
may cause passive harm, transmitting patronising sentiment that undermines ones gay-affirmative 
identity, which may have disempowering and oppressive consequences (Thurlow, 1987). As such, 
I term these attitudes ‘paternalistic homoprejudice’, drawing on similar nomenclature as Glick and 
Fiske (1996) and Walls (2008a), and I define them as sympathetic attitudes towards gay men that 
simultaneously overstate gay men’s powerlessness, transmitting patronising messages and 
undermining personal autonomy and pride. 
In summary, there are four theorised facets of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay 
men, as suggested by the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007): 1) 
Repellent homoprejudice, which expresses contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay 
men; 2) Adversarial homoprejudice, envious beliefs that gay men receive undeserved privileges as 
compared to heterosexuals; 3) Romanticised homoprejudice, a benevolent component 
characterised by the idealisation of gay men based on prevailing stereotypes; and 4) Paternalistic 
homoprejudice, stifling and overbearingly sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning 
heterosexuals who consequently make gay men feel belittled, demeaned, and infantilised (see figure 
3.1).  
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Figure 3.1: A graphical representation of ambivalent homoprejudice theory, mapped on to the SCM and BIAS 
map. 
Altogether, these four constructs represent an encompassing and nuanced account of 
heterosexuals’ complex attitudes towards gay men and gay men’s varied experienced of – often 
unintended – prejudice. However, given that the two benevolent components of this theory – 
romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice – represent relatively new lines of inquiry in a field 
dominated by hostile characterisations of homoprejudice, primary data will be needed to 
investigate these nascent constructs further. 
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3.8 Prejudice and Ambivalence: Summary 
This chapter has built upon the previous chapter by integrating attitudinal ambivalence 
theory as a way to critique and reformulate academic understanding of prejudice towards gay men. 
Theories of ambivalence towards women, men, Black people, disabled people, and elderly people 
were used to demonstrate the utility of ambivalence frameworks in literature on prejudice as well 
as to highlight the fundamental differences and similarities between different intergroup relations. 
Extant theories of ambivalence toward sexual minorities were described and three broad areas of 
improvement were identified: 1) That the motivations and consequences of benevolent attitudes 
towards gay men must be evidenced; 2) That theory should be sensitive to the experiential 
differences between gay men and lesbian women with regards to prejudice, and; 3) That greater 
efforts must be made to gather perspectives from laypeople, rather than relying on a purely 
academic theoretical perspective. Finally, ambivalent homoprejudice theory was proposed as a 
coupling of hostile (repellent and adversarial homoprejudice) and benevolent (romanticised and 
paternalistic homoprejudice) attitudes towards gay men, and posited that benevolent attitudes are 
endorsed by otherwise well-intentioned heterosexuals who are often unaware of the more negative 
messages such attitudes can convey. 
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4. Chapter Four 
Qualitative Exploration of Ambivalent Attitudes towards Gay Men 
 The previous chapter established that hostile attitudes towards gay men (i.e., Herek, 1984; 
Morrison & Morrison, 2003) do not provide an exhaustive account of homoprejudice towards gay 
men. More recent research suggests that homoprejudice may also be experienced in benevolent 
forms characterised by overprotectiveness and paternalism (Walls, 2008a) and ‘favourable’ 
stereotyping (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), and that this is linked to pitying and admiring affect 
(Cuddy et al., 2007). More specifically, hostile prejudice was conceptualised as repellent 
homoprejudice that express contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay men and 
adversarial homoprejudice, which is linked to the belief that gay men received undue benefits due 
to their minority status. On the other hand, benevolence was characterised as positive attitudes 
that are intended as positive due to their superficially positive feeling tone, but may nonetheless 
be interpreted as negative by gay men. This took the form of romanticised homoprejudice; the 
subscription to admiring and aspirational stereotypes about gay men that transmit microaggressive 
message and trigger discomfort, and paternalism; protective and sensitive attitudes that may 
unintentionally make targets feel patronised and undermined. 
 The present chapter adopts an iterative approach to theory development and, ultimately 
scale development, aiming to supplement the literature review conducted thus far and address the 
criticisms identified in the previous chapter. This is achieved by way of a focus group study 
involving gay men and heterosexual men and women exploring positive and negative attitudes 
towards gay men. Four themes are identified, largely corroborating the theory development present 
in the previous chapter. Limitations and implications for scale development are discussed. 
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4.1 Limitations of Previous Research 
 Previous research investigating benevolent attitudes towards gay men has typically been 
approached from a post-positivist perspective insofar that the emerging theory is validated with a 
quantitative measure explicitly designed for such a purpose (i.e., Walls, 2008a). Although this 
approach may be a useful tool for assessing how well data ‘fit’ prescribed theory (that is, it indicates 
the extent to which deductive theory development has been successful in capturing a particular 
phenomenon; Clark & Watson, 1995), it also hampers the ability of theoretical constructs to be 
organically drawn from data. Such an approach ultimately privileges scale development over theory 
development (Hogan, 2007), which is especially problematic when the theory is only in a nascent 
stage of development.  
Rather, I argue that a systematic approach to scale development is required in order to fully 
conceptualise the phenomena under investigation and prepare them for operationalisation in scale 
form. To this end, I refer to Luyt’s (2012) framework for mixing methods in quantitative measure 
development, validation, and revision. The first stage of this framework comprises three levels. 
The first level involves defining the background concept, that is, “the broad constellations of 
meaning and understandings associated with a given concept” (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 531). 
The previous chapter developed definitions of four broad facets of ambivalent homoprejudice 
towards gay men in light of extant empirical and theoretical literature; this chapter aims to nuance 
these constructs further using primary data. The second level involves developing the systematised 
concepts, described by Luyt (2012) as a “narrower or more specified set of subordinate concepts 
that underlie the background concept” (p. 299). The principal research question at this juncture is: 
beyond the scope of the contents of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic 
homoprejudice identified thus far, how else may these attitudes be expressed? Luyt (2012) 
identifies focus group methodology as a useful aid to identifying and conceptualising these 
systematised concepts because the operationalisation (i.e., scale items) of these concepts can use 
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the terminology and rhetoric employed in group discussion (Nassar-McMillan & Borders, 2002). 
As a result of this approach, the operationalisation of these concepts in scale form (the third level 
of this process, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5) will demonstrate enhanced content 
validity because the items will tap a greater breadth and depth of the background concept.  
4.2 Qualitative Inquiry 
 Qualitative methods are a particularly advantageous tool when attempting to capture a rich 
understanding of people’s beliefs about and attitudes towards various contentious issues (Zorn, 
Roper, Broadfoot, & Weaver, 2006). The detail lost in the reductionist scale development process 
is retained in the exhaustive data transcription process, which is particularly valuable in research 
areas where secondary sources are scarce.  
Furthermore, conducting qualitative analysis before constructing a psychometric measure 
allows ideas and concepts which had not been anticipated by the researcher to be integrated into 
subsequent scale development (Hinkin, 1995) resulting in a more ‘complete’ measurement tool. 
This is an extremely important consideration for researchers to make when seeking to create 
measures of attitudes that they do not endorse themselves. Likewise, those researchers that are the 
targets of such attitudes may come to rely on their own lived experience and introduce bias when 
generating their scale items. Qualitative research is also advantageous in addressing the latter issue 
because it emphasises the importance of reflexivity; an introspective account of the epistemological 
and ontological factors that may influence the way in which data collection and analysis was 
conducted (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003). By acknowledging, or ‘bracketing’, these factors, the 
qualitative research process becomes more transparent and the researcher gains additional insight 
into the subtle ways in which they may be influencing the data and its analysis (Ahern, 1999). I 
engage in this process later in this chapter. 
Finally, the use of qualitative research with a view to developing an attitude measurement 
tool is a useful way to actively involve the targets of these attitudes (i.e., gay men) in the theory 
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and subsequent scale development. Not only does this empower the group by privileging their 
views over those groups whose representation in society is comparatively larger but it will also 
enhance the content validity of one’s systematised concepts, resulting in an initial item pool with 
greater “comprehensiveness and representativeness” (Yaghmaie, 2003, p. 25) than one generated 
without such input. 
 Focus group methodology was decided to be a particularly useful way to collect such data 
because of the emphasis on investigating inter-participant interactions (Kitzinger, 1994). Group 
discussion of potentially controversial subject matter may cause participants to (dis)agree with each 
other or elaborate on each other’s points, providing interesting interactional sequences to analyse. 
Further to this, deliberate focus group composition can manufacture a group dynamic whereby 
heterosexual participants (who may be reticent to talk about their attitudes towards gay men) 
outnumber the gay facilitator, fostering an environment where participants may be more willing 
to share their thoughts and feelings during the discussion. Inversely, gay men will be more 
empowered to talk about the issues that are important to them without heterosexuals overruling 
their lived experiences, stymying the ability of the facilitator to elicit further data from them. 
4.3 Purpose of Study 1 
 Exploring heterosexuals’ potentially mixed beliefs, thoughts, and feelings about gay men 
as well as gay men’s own experience of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic 
homoprejudice will address a considerable void in this area of research. To date, no such 
exploratory qualitative study into positively- and negatively-valenced prejudice towards gay men 
exists. Such a methodological approach is also be a useful way of bridging the gap between the 
different epistemic stances that have been drawn upon thus far, as qualitative data can be readily 
interpreted from both realist and relativist perspectives, allowing for diversity of academic inquiry. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to: 1) Corroborate and nuance the background concepts 
pertinent to ambivalent homoprejudice as outlined in the previous chapter; 2) Elaborate and add 
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to the systematised concepts identified thus far; 3) Examine the relationship between these 
concepts; and 4) Investigate the reported consequences of endorsing or being the target of 
ambivalent homoprejudice. 
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Reflexive Statement 
 Before proceeding with a description of how this study was carried out, I will briefly engage 
in the process of reflexive bracketing whereby I will “be honest and vigilant about [my] own 
perspective, pre-existing thoughts and beliefs, and developing hypotheses [and] … recognise and 
set aside (but not abandon) [my] a priori knowledge and assumptions” (Starks & Trinidad, 2007, 
p. 1376). To this end, I include a brief personal statement below: 
 I (the first author) am a 24-year old White gay man and have come from a working class 
background. Throughout my childhood and adolescence, I was exposed to a great deal of anti-gay 
sentiment. My most extreme experience of this occurred when I was 10 years old when my upstairs 
neighbour – who became an acquaintance of my father – was arrested and imprisoned for luring 
a gay man away on what was ostensibly a date, and kicking him to death. For the interested reader, 
the victim’s name was Lee Harvey. Nowadays, I rarely experience the hateful anti-gay climate that 
I experienced when I was younger, but I have grown increasingly conscious of the ways in which 
I am positively stereotyped by people who I consider to care a great deal about me. My own 
experiences of a diverse range of reactions to my sexual orientation, thus, fuels my interest in this 
topic and my assertion that benevolent homoprejudice is largely unintentional is not just from an 
academic perspective, but also from a personal one. 
4.4.2 Participants 
 Twelve heterosexual participants (3 men and 9 women) between the ages of 18 and 50 
years (M = 25.3) participated in 3 focus groups (consisting of one group of five discussants, one 
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group of four discussants, and one group of three discussants). Ten gay male participants between 
the ages of 19 and 52 (M = 31.2) participated in 4 focus groups (consisting of three groups of two 
discussants and one group of three discussants). Of the heterosexual participants, ten were white, 
one was black, and one was Asian. All of the gay men were white. The highest level of education 
attained was a Masters level degree, and the lowest level of education attained was the British A-
level school leavers’ qualification. The participant pool included undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, and skilled and unskilled professionals. Focus group composition was segregated insofar 
that heterosexuals and gay men took part in separate discussions. While some researchers may 
argue that heterogeneous focus groups offer opportunities to explore disagreement between focus 
group discussants (Hollander, 2004), it is argued here instead that the structural asymmetry 
between gay men and heterosexuals would stifle the discussion. For example, heterosexual 
discussants may feel reticent if there are equal numbers of gay and heterosexual discussants. 
Similarly, the presence of heterosexuals in this forum may make the gay discussants feel reluctant 
or unable to share their personal experiences. It is for this reason that the focus groups were 
segregated in this manner. 
4.4.2.1 Sampling 
 Participation was solicited in a variety of ways. Heterosexual participants were recruited 
from local social media community pages (n = 4) and online message boards (e.g., Gumtree; n = 
2), as well as from the psychology department in exchange for course credit (n = 6). Gay 
participants were recruited from gay-oriented social media pages (n = 5), local message boards (n 
= 1), from the psychology department in exchange for course credit (n = 1), and from geospatial 
social networking apps (e.g., Grindr; n = 3), which have proven to be an excellent source of 
prospective gay male participants for researchers elsewhere (Burrell et al., 2012; Usher et al., 2014). 
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4.4.3 Procedure 
 Participants were seated around a table in a meeting room at a university in the East of 
England and invited to read an information sheet detailing their participation in the study and a 
consent form to sign copies of. One copy of the consent form was retained by the participant in 
the event that they wanted to withdraw from the study. Further, the facilitator (first author) 
verbally explained that the participants would be voice-recorded, that personally-identifying 
information (names, locations, etc.) would be replaced in the transcript, and that participants could 
withdraw at any time without penalty or consequence. In order to facilitate open discussion, 
participants were encouraged to be respectful of other participants and their right to 
confidentiality, as well as to listen and interact with each other during the course of the focus 
group. This research obtained ethical approval from the Faculty Research Ethics Panel (FREP), 
the authority delegated by the University to assess ethical adherence in high-risk research. 
Two semi-structured topic guides were developed in order to guide the group discussions 
– one for the gay men focus groups and one for the heterosexual focus groups. The focus groups 
were organised in this way in order to facilitate both samples feeling comfortable about sharing 
with the group and to reduce, as much as possible, the motivation to control prejudiced reactions 
(Dunton & Fazio, 1997) The first part of the topic guide in both gay and heterosexual groups 
focused on two vignettes detailing a strained interaction between a heterosexual and a gay man. 
Vignettes have been shown to be particularly useful tools when researchers want to encourage 
openness to discussion and self-disclosure on issues where social desirability may otherwise limit 
such data being elicited (Borrill, Lorenz, & Abbasnejad, 2012).  
Specifically, these interactions would be interpreted from an academic perspective as 
‘microaggressive’; that is, they contained “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, or 
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, 
derogatory, or negative slights and insults towards members of oppressed groups” (Nadal, 2008, 
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p. 23). The first vignette described an ostensibly positive interaction that made a gay character feel 
uncomfortable: 
James is an 18-year-old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his first year of 
university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be 
open with everyone from the outset, he drops into conversation that he’s gay and Diane reacts 
enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I’ve always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally 
cute together!” 
James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make him feel 
uncomfortable 
Although Diane’s intentions were, on the face of it, positive and prosocial, it was 
experienced as a dehumanising and exoticising microaggression by James. Sexual minorities 
commonly document being targets of these microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2011). Comments such 
as these may be symptomatic of romanticised homoprejudice, and identification with the vignette 
was anticipated to lead to the group elaborating on other potentially benevolent aspects of 
homoprejudice. 
The second vignette detailed a relatively more hostile exchange between a gay man named 
Yotam and another heterosexual person, Yasmin: 
Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating each other. 
After a month of dating, they decide that things are going to well that they should be introduced to each 
other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and his friends get along with Yotam very well. 
As James’s friends drink more, they become bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one 
friend, Yasmin, asks them “Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean” 
Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and Yasmin later 
remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “Moody” 
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This vignette also taps a number of microaggressions that sexual minorities commonly 
experience. In a similar fashion to the first vignette, this interaction also employs exoticising 
microaggressions – though in this instance, it is by way of intrusive and oversexualised questioning. 
Secondly, it conveys the assumption that intimacy between men only serves to emulate the 
penetrative and receptive elements of sex between men and women. This was also anticipated to 
prompt further discussion about hostile aspects of homoprejudice. On the face of it, it may make 
sense to have employed four vignettes encompassing the four facets of ambivalent homoprejudice, 
but this was avoided for two reasons. The first reason was simply that there would not have been 
enough time to cover four vignettes in sufficient detail. The second justification was that including 
four vignettes explicitly tapping the four theorised components of ambivalent homoprejudice may 
have been overly leading. For these reasons, the topic guide was restricted to two vignettes that 
tapped the broader concepts of hostile and benevolent homoprejudice. 
The second part of both the heterosexual and gay focus group discussions focused on 
findings from a YouGov poll (2014), which asked 1,958 British adults ‘Do you think that gay 
people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse than straight people?’. This was 
included in a package alongside the vignettes and provided to the participants. During the focus 
groups, this question was clarified and participants were asked how they thought specifically gay 
men were treated in relation to heterosexuals in the UK and to draw on their own experiences of 
this. The participants were then encouraged to discuss the findings of the survey and the ways in 
which they thought gay men were treated equal to, worse than, and better than heterosexual 
people. Where heterosexual participants identified gay men being treated better than heterosexuals, 
they were asked to consider the extent to which envy characterised this perception. Given that 
adversarial homoprejudice is theorised to arise from perceptions of gay men being (unjustly) 
treated better than heterosexuals, discussion about this issue was anticipated to arise from this line 
of questioning. Similarly, heterosexual participants were encouraged to talk about pitying affect if 
they believed that gay men were treated worse than heterosexual. Likewise, discussion about gay 
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men’s disadvantage and reported sympathetic attitudes towards gay men were anticipated to arise 
from this line of questioning. Inversely, gay participants were asked if they could recall instances 
where they felt envied or pitied by heterosexuals by virtue of their perceived relative 
(dis)advantages. Data discussions such as this have also been found to be an effective way of 
encouraging discussion about topics that participants may be inclined to present themselves in a 
socially desirable way (Borrill et al., 2012). 
The final section of the focus group introduced the concept of microaggressions to 
heterosexual participants and asked them to categorise statements considered microaggressive in 
Nadal et al. (2011) as microaggressive or not. They were then asked if they could recall instances 
of using such statements and whether gay men should excuse them as simply benign mistakes. 
This was included in order to assess the reported intentionality of such comments. For the gay 
focus groups, participants were introduced to the concept of benevolent prejudice (adapted from 
Glick & Fiske, 1996) and were provided with a number of examples arising from prior theory 
development and from the facilitator’s personal experience. Participants were encouraged to recall 
any similar experiences of what they deemed to be benevolent prejudice. Further, participants were 
asked how they appraised this benevolence and how such attitudes made them feel in order to 
ascertain whether exposure to benevolence fuels similar psychological dilemmas to those identified 
in the microaggression literature (Sue, 2010). For transparency and brevity’s sake, the topic guides 
are included as Appendices 1 and 2. 
The focus group discussions lasted between 90 and 120 minutes and, upon completion, 
participants were debriefed and invited to supply an email address that the researcher could use to 
send a £15 shopping voucher as a token of appreciation for their time. In the event that a 
participant was enrolled on the psychology course, they were offered course credit instead. 
Participants were then thanked for their time and advised that they would soon receive their 
remuneration. 
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4.4.4 Data Analysis 
 The facilitator transcribed the focus group recordings verbatim (i.e., inclusion of 
conversational features such as false starts and paralinguistic cues such as “erm” were included). 
Halcomb and Davidson (2006) suggest that the case in favour of verbatim transcription is a poor 
one, given the increasing demands it places on the transcriber and the seemingly negligible pay-
off. However, in the present study, the aspects of speech that might be erased during the 
production of a ‘clean’ transcript, such as false starts, may potentially be indicative of ambivalence 
insofar that it could represent a rapid shift from positive to negative evaluative positions. QSR 
NVivo 10 was used to organise the data and facilitate the analytic process. The order in which the 
transcripts were coded was randomised. The data were subject to thematic analysis as outlined in 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006), who propose a top-down (i.e., theory-driven or deductive) 
and bottom-up (i.e., data-driven or inductive) dual coding procedure. This method of analysis was 
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there was enough identified research in the literature to rule out 
an entirely inductive grounded theory approach. Secondly, the previous chapter critiqued other 
approaches to this topic on the basis that they prioritised theory over data; addressing this critique 
necessitates an analytic approach that privileges both. 
The first stage is integral to all qualitative analyses; a “careful reading and re-reading of the 
data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258), which is initiated in the transcription process and repeated with 
each iteration of coding. Next, the development of the coding manual begins. This began with a 
template of theory-driven codes identified a priori, which were labelled, defined, described as they 
were anticipated to arise in the data, and categorised according to their conceptual discreteness 
(see table 4.1). These were entered into NVivo as nodes and applied to a single transcript by the 
first author and first supervisor who identified meaningful units of text for each code, and no 
notable differences in interpretation were reported. The other six transcripts were then coded in 
this manner in the aforementioned randomised order. 
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Code 1 
In-text label Warmth 
Definition 
Are gay men’s motives towards heterosexuals 
positive? 
Description Kind, amicable, humorous, sociable 
Table 4.1: A theory-driven code in the ‘Stereotype Content Model and Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and 
Stereotypes Map’ category alongside its definition and description 
Next, the data were summarised around the main discussion points. Not only did this 
facilitate the development of themes, but this also highlighted epistemological differences between 
the two groups’ perceptions of what was ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. As can be seen in table 4.2, gay men’s 
exclusion from blood donation was not brought up in any of the heterosexual focus groups, but 
was brought up in three of the four gay focus groups. Clearly, there are epistemological and 
ontological difference between the heterosexual and gay male participants in this instance; the two 
groups may have differing knowledge about the issues affecting gay men, may be differently able 
to access these issues, or may attach differing levels of importance to these issues (Krueger, 2014). 
Sue (2010) has identified that reality clashes such as these are integral to how microaggressions are 
differentially understood by privileged and oppressed groups. As such, this approach provides 
important insight into how ostensibly positive attitudes and behaviours can be interpreted as more 
malevolent than intended in the present qualitative analysis.  
During the process of summarising the data, the transcripts were coded again, this time 
using data-driven codes applied to units of text with recurring meaning throughout the transcript. 
These codes were defined and described in NVivo, and approximately 150 codes were applied to 
over 1300 units of text. The coded data were then summarised around the research aims set out 
at the beginning of this chapter. This provided an initial thematic template to be developed 
throughout the analysis as well as a means of assessing the validity of the concepts identified in the 
previous chapter by way of their emergence (or lack, thereof) in the focus group discussions.
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Discussion point FG1 (Het) FG2 (Het) FG3 (Gay) FG4 (Gay) FG5 (Gay) FG6 (Het) FG7 (Gay) 
How do you think 
gay men are 
treated in relation 
to straight people 
in the UK? 
Better: They get 
special privileges 
at work that 
straight people do 
not. People are 
afraid to criticise 
gay men for fear 
of being accused 
of prejudice. They 
get too much 
media attention 
 
Equally: Gay men 
have equal access 
to jobs. Marriage 
equality 
 
Worse: Gay men 
do not get 
enough media 
representation. 
Gay men suffer 
verbal and 
physical abuse. 
Gay men are 
assumed to be 
heterosexual. Gay 
men avoid public 
displays of 
affection for fear 
of violence. Being 
gay is a stigma. 
 
 
Better: They get 
special privileges 
at work that 
straight people do 
not. They get too 
much media 
attention. 
 
Equally: 
Heterosexuals are 
trying to be more 
accepting of gay 
men. Marriage 
equality 
 
Worse: Gay men 
do not have 
enough media 
representation. 
Gay men suffer 
verbal and 
physical abuse. 
Gay men avoid 
public displays of 
affection for fear 
of violence. Gay 
men stay closeted 
in sport to 
protect 
themselves. Gay 
men suffer 
discrimination at 
work 
Better: Sought 
out as friends by 
women. 
Protection 
afforded by 
minority status at 
work. 
 
Equally: Feel like 
an equal at work 
and university. 
Marriage equality 
 
Worse: Bullied at 
school. Shocked 
reactions to 
public displays of 
affection. Gay 
men stay closeted 
in sport to protect 
themselves. 
Salacious media 
coverage of gay 
men. 
Better: Positive 
action at work. 
Pink pound 
 
Equally: 
Marriage 
equality. 
Adoption, 
surrogacy, and 
fostering. Hate 
crime laws 
 
Worse: 
Exclusion from 
blood donation. 
Insults regarding 
marriage vs civil 
partnership. 
Religious 
exclusions. 
Employment 
discrimination 
and pay 
disparity. Sexual 
deviance 
Better: Pink 
Pound 
 
Equally: Feeling 
of acceptance. 
 
Worse: Abusive 
reactions to 
public displays 
of affection. 
Businesses 
electing to not 
serve gay people. 
Assumed to be 
heterosexual. 
Uncertainty 
regarding 
sexuality 
disclosure on 
equal 
opportunities 
forms. Exclusion 
from blood 
donation 
Better: Sought 
out as friends. 
Positive action at 
work. Pink 
pound. 
 
Equally: More 
liberal attitudes 
towards gay 
men. More gay 
role models 
 
Worse: Moral 
objections still 
exist. 
Employment 
discrimination. 
Parents reject 
their gay 
children. 
Bullying in 
schools. Lack of 
education about 
gay issues. 
Aggression. 
Stigma. 
Better: Positive 
action at work 
 
Equally: 
Heterosexuals 
are trying to be 
more accepting 
of gay men. 
Marriage 
equality. 
Adoption 
 
Worse: 
Exclusion from 
blood donation. 
Religious 
exclusions. 
Verbal and 
physical abuse. 
Gay men stay 
closeted in sport 
to protect 
themselves 
Table 4.2: A single discussion point summarised across the seven focus groups
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Finally, the identified themes were corroborated by scrutinising their constituent codes to 
ensure they were a faithful representation of the data. The themes were then clustered to form 
second-order themes, as can be seen in Table 4.3. 
4.5 Findings 
 The heterosexual participants expressed a range of hostile and benevolent attitudes 
towards gay men. Particularly prevalent in focus groups one and two were attitudes resembling the 
previously theorised concept of adversarial homoprejudice, a hostile and envious facet of 
ambivalent homoprejudice couched in the belief that gay men receive undeserved privileges as 
compared to heterosexuals. Such attitudes typically drew on the belief that gay men are no longer 
oppressed, that gay men make illegitimate demands for change, and that gay men’s 
ostentatiousness was their downfall, akin to modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). 
However, other abstract hostilities towards gay men beyond the scope of modern homonegativity 
also emerged in the data, including the belief that gay men use accusations of prejudice to achieve 
their goals and that heterosexuals are silenced by gay men’s sensibilities. 
 To a lesser extent, repellent attitudes that express contempt, disgust, and moral indignation 
towards gay men also emerged in the analysis. Data provided by the gay participants suggest that 
many of these attitudes arise in the workplace and in schools and that they revolve around religious 
objections and perceptions of sexual deviance among gay men. Some gay participants also reported 
suffering verbal and physical violence, which they attributed to their sexuality. 
 Benevolent attitudes reflecting aspects of homopositivity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) 
and positive-stereotypic heterosexism (Walls, 2008a) also emerged in the analysis and resembled 
the previously identified concept of romanticisation, the enthusiastic admiration for gay men. 
These positive stereotypes about gay men tapped warmth (e.g., funny) as well as competence (e.g., 
affluent), yet were critiqued by gay participants for misrepresenting their lived experience, 
excluding gay men who fail to live up to them, and dehumanising gay men as accessories. 
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 Finally, paternalism emerged in the analysis similar to its prior conceptualisation as stifling 
and overbearingly sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning heterosexuals who consequently 
make gay men feel belittled, demeaned, and infantilised. Many of the heterosexual participants 
evidenced prosocial motivations towards gay men characterised by the belief that they are 
wrongfully disadvantaged in society and, thus, need help and protection. However, some of the 
behavioural manifestations of these sympathetic attitudes were interpreted as patronising and 
demeaning by the gay participants, and elicited psychological conflict. 
First-order theme Clustered themes Second-order theme 
Coldness (D) 
Competence (D) 
Denial of societal heterosexism (D) 
Malicious envy (D) 
Passive harm (D) 
Unconflicted ambivalence (D) 
Victim blaming (I) 
Acquiescence (I) 
Adversarial Homoprejudice 
Hostile Homoprejudice 
Coldness (D) 
Incompetence (D) 
Active harm (D) 
Biological essentialism (I) 
Coital imperative (I) 
Disgust (I) 
Passive harm (D) 
Religion (I) 
Repellent Homoprejudice 
Warmth (D) 
Competence (D) 
Media contact (I) 
‘Failed gay’ (I) 
Passive facilitation (D) 
Heterosexual safety (I) 
Pink pound (I) 
Exoticisation (D) 
Romanticised Homoprejudice 
Benevolent Homoprejudice 
Incompetence (D) 
Counterweighting (I) 
Active facilitation (D) 
Passive harm (D) 
Shame (I) 
Double-binds (I) 
Cautiousness (I) 
Zealousness (I) 
Paternalistic Homoprejudice 
Table 4.3: A graphical representation of the thematic structure; (D) denotes deductive codes, (I) denotes inductive 
codes  
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4.5.1 Theme 1: Adversarial Homoprejudice 
Based on the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), adversarial 
homoprejudice was theorised to be envious affect towards gay men arising from evaluations of 
gay men as cold (i.e., that they have negative intentions towards heterosexuals) and competent (i.e., 
that they have the means to achieve their goals) and that this envy results in passive facilitation 
(e.g., including) and active harm (e.g., attacking). 
The ascriptions of coldness traits to gay men was particularly prevalent in focus group one; 
Grace, a heterosexual woman, described gay men as “quite offensive” (FG1; 105), “loud and 
brash… and outspoken” (FG1; 137), “intimidating” (FG1; 140), “annoying” (FG1; 465) and 
recalled individuals who would “bitch about you to his friends” (FG1; 142) and be critical, “that 
dress is really ugly, oh don’t worry honey, you can change” (FG1; 572). Fiona, a heterosexual 
woman, repeated and expanded upon Grace’s description of gay men as offensive and annoying, 
claiming “they [gay men] don’t have a filter” (FG1; 560). Fiona further claims that “they’re [gay 
men] also quite weird with girls… they’ll grab your boobs or your bum” (FG1; 574-575). Luca, a 
heterosexual man, corroborates this, recalling “they was [sic] like a couple and I was working like 
part time and they grabbed my arse, one of them… they were just complimenting me and I don’t 
want it” (FG1; 583-585). Cold traits were also discussed in focus group two; Lara, a heterosexual 
woman, spoke of gay men being exclusionary, “I have seen people and they’ve been very serious 
and they say if you’re straight, you’re white, and you’re happy with your gender, I don’t wanna 
know you” (FG2; 689-691) and also reiterated the perceptions of gay men as loud and imposing 
in the first focus group, “If they’re being flamboyant and maybe overly exposing themselves… 
like walking around in skimpy clothes and shouting… shut up, go away and put some clothes on” 
(FG1; 897-899).  
Traits such as these were commonly used to blame gay men for heterosexuals’ lack of 
social acceptance of gay men and the most extreme instance of victim blaming was shared by 
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Hakeem, a heterosexual man. He first begins with a minimising statement to the gay facilitator, 
“don’t take it personally” (FG2; 563) before continuing, “I don’t think gay men will ever be 
accepted overall… I think the more you fight for it [equality], the more you try to shove it down 
people’s throats… if you keep putting it out there, people are gonna resist more… I think it’s just 
becoming a vicious circle there, and every time you shove it down our throats, we get more 
aggressive” (FG2; 563-567). Hakeem later continues, “you never see a heterosexual parade, but 
you only see the gay parade and once I see that gay parade I’m like, okay, why are you – because 
you are exposing your gayness to me – it’s, you’re shoving it down my throat in some way, so that 
means… you’re gonna take my reaction towards it” (FG2; 571-574). This sentiment was echoed 
by Tim, a gay man, “I’m not saying I’ve got anything against people who are really sort of in your 
face camp, but I do think they do a disservice to the rest to us who aren’t like that really and it’s 
not helping society move forward because people are still seeing people like that and saying ‘look 
at- look at them, urgh’ and I inwardly am thinking ‘yes, I know what you mean’” (FG3; 913-916). 
Not only does this perspective place an onus on gay men to police their identities in order to be 
accepted, but it also shares victimhood with heterosexuals who are depicted as justifiably 
responding to gay ‘aggressors’ in hostile ways. As Sue (2010) describes it, “this interpretation not 
only has the perpetrator “blaming the victim,” but it also has the perpetrator “playing the victim”!” 
(p. 53). 
Competence traits were also ascribed to gay men – particularly by the participants in focus 
group one. Many of the aforementioned cold traits were argued by the participants to be justified 
by gay men on the basis of sexuality. Returning to the sexual assaults discussed earlier, Fiona 
reasons that gay men use their sexuality as a way of minimising such a harmful behaviour, “they 
think they can do what they want… and it’s fine because they’re gay so it’s not actually sexual” 
(FG1; 574-576). This is followed up later by an interaction between Fiona and Luca, who claim 
that challenging such a behaviour would result in them being labelled as a homophobe, compelling 
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them to acquiesce (which may loosely be interpreted as passive facilitation in the form of tolerance) 
to inappropriate behaviours: 
“Fiona: If you see like a guy at a pub at the bar grabbing the waitress’s arse- 
Luca: You would hit them 
Fiona: Yeah, they’d make such a big deal out of it whereas a gay guy can just do it and be like ‘oh I was 
 just joking’ 
Luca: If I would have done that, he would have said it’s against us 
Fiona: It would be homophobic” (FG1; 586-591) 
While Fiona, Grace, and Luca seemed to be alluding to gay men using accusations of 
prejudice as weapons against heterosexuals, Clare, the other heterosexual participant in this focus 
group, instead alluded to an attribution bias explanation of gay men having a keen sense of 
perceived prejudicial slights. On the topic of questions about gay sexual practice, Clare argued “I 
think because we have a stereotype about them [gay men], they have a stereotype about us – that 
we only ask these questions because they’re gay and not because they’re your friends and that’s 
what you do with your friends” (FG1; 298-300) and, in response to this, Grace ponders “I guess 
it could be a defence” (FG1; 307). Indeed, Sue (2010) has argued elsewhere that such 
hypervigilance is a defensive microaggressive stressor leading to a cultural mistrust of majority 
groups by oppressed groups. However, taken to its logical extreme, Sue (2010) suggests that this 
hypervigilance could result in “marginalised group members… see[ing] racism, sexism, and 
heterosexism everywhere… externalising all their failings and avoiding responsibility for their own 
actions” (pp. 103-104), which may explain the claims that gay men use their sexuality to excuse 
behaviour deemed inappropriate. 
 As well as claiming that gay men used their sexuality to excuse cold personality traits, the 
majority of participants in focus group one also claimed that gay men used their sexuality to get 
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special privileges at work. Grace argued “at work, they [gay men] suck up – it’s a personality trait 
– they suck up to the manager… a lot of people wouldn’t get away with that, or they get like 
privileges” (FG1; 327-328). Fiona later elaborates on this perception of workplace inequality, 
claiming “if the gay employee does something wrong, the boss might feel like he can’t say 
something because it’ll be like ‘oh, you’re doing this because I’m gay’ so I feel they kinda use it as 
an advantage sometimes” (FG1; 337-340). These perceptions of outgroup advantage were coupled 
with the denial of societal heterosexism. Luca claimed “In London, everybody is okay with it 
[homosexuality] and you don’t see worse [treatment], everybody is happy with gay people” (FG1; 
504-505) and, when asked whether or not they felt that gay men were oppressed in the United 
Kingdom, Grace, Fiona, and Luca all responded in the negative.  
Altogether, these evaluations of gay men as being cold and competent – for some – were 
associated with feelings of malicious envy. When asked whether they envied the perceived 
advantages discussed in the focus group, Grace and Fiona initially responded in the negative, 
before shortly clarifying: 
“Grace: I think if they get away with the things that we’ve spoken about like [negative] comments, I’m 
not jealous of that because I’m not that kind of person that would wanna make- 
Fiona: It’s not jealous, it’s just you kinda feel like that it’s a bit unfair they should have it but you don’t 
want it” (FG1; 624-627) 
 Rather than desiring the perceived advantages of being a gay man that Fiona and Grace 
identified throughout the focus group and attempting to ‘level-up’ their own status to attain them, 
they instead argue that gay men should be ‘levelled-down’ by removing their perceived exemption 
from criticism (i.e., malicious envy; Crusius & Lange, 2014). Gay participants also noted subtle – 
potentially envious – slights from heterosexual colleagues at work related to perceptions of 
favouritism. Jim, a gay man, recalls “you might get the odd office bitchiness where sorta, somebody 
will sit there and say… ‘you’ll get away with anything because she likes the gays’” (FG5; 914-916) 
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and another gay participant, Neil, similarly reports perceptions of favouritism at work, “I just got 
a promotion at uni and my boss is gay and the general assumption from some of my friends is that 
I got that because he fancies me rather than on my own merit, whereas I would like to believe – 
and I do believe – that I got it because I’m good at my job” (FG7; 695-697). Rather than the active 
harm towards envied targets that is to be expected within the context of the BIAS map, these 
demeaning comments are more representative of passive harm in the form of relational aggression 
(e.g., gossiping; Crothers, Lipinski, & Minutolo, 2009). This passive manifestation of aggression 
towards gay men may be related to the previously-identified concerns that heterosexuals who 
outwardly criticised gay men would be accused of prejudice, potentially suppressing the active 
harm hypothesised by the BIAS map. 
 To summarise, adversarial homoprejudice is characterised by evaluations of gay men as 
both aggressive and socially and sexually manipulative, resulting in the belief that gay men’s 
ostentatious behaviours are their downfall, that they no longer experience prejudice, and that gay 
men actually receive preferential treatment, special privileges, and free passes by virtue of their 
sexual orientation. These perceptions of illegitimate outgroup advantage appear to elicit envious 
affect and passive harm rather than active harm, contrary to the predictions of the BIAS map 
(Cuddy et al., 2007). 
 4.5.2 Theme 2: Repellent Homoprejudice 
 Repellent homoprejudice – theorised to be contempt, disgust, and moral indignation 
towards gay men – also emerged in the data. Cold traits were also implicated here but rather than 
these traits portraying gay men as an annoyance as was seen in the previous theme, gay men’s 
negative intentions towards heterosexuals appeared to be framed in terms of sexual deviance. Carl, 
a gay man, recalled a gay friend’s experiences of prejudice in light of their contact with children at 
work, “A friend of mine, a teacher – a primary school teacher – he would be nervous about being 
outed because… people still conflate homosexual behaviour with suspect sexual tendencies” 
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(FG4; 763-766). Jim also spoke of a gay friend’s experiences in teaching, “as I said, you know, a 
gay teacher, well, he’s a gay teacher, he wants to teach children, he must be a paedophile, and that’s 
literally the jump that’s made in three steps and, you know, it’s completely as far from the truth as 
possible” (FG5; 632-634). Oliver – himself a childcare assistant – voiced similar concerns about 
connotations of sexual deviance when he was passed over for work in favour of a female staff 
member, “I kinda got this sense, oh no, it’s like, it’s more appropriate for a woman to look after 
them… but I think perhaps I got a sense that it was like, we can’t have you because, you know, 
I’m homosexual” (FG4; 741-744). Later, Oliver talks about a more overt experience of discomfort 
with his sexuality in the workplace, “I had a boss recently, that was it, I was talking with a colleague 
about my upcoming wedding and that, and I could see he was so uncomfortable and his behaviour, 
once he found out – maybe he didn’t know I was gay – once he found out I was marrying my 
fiancé, my husband… his attitude towards me and the way he spoke to me, I definitely felt he was 
homophobic” (FG4; 751-754).  
 Gay men were also found to be oversexualised by heterosexuals. Oliver recalls challenging 
a friend’s perceptions of gay men’s sex lives, “you all go to leather clubs and BDSM and I’m like, 
that’s a very, like, minor niche, you can’t say like all gay guys are into that, like, a lot of heterosexual 
people are into that” (FG4; 445-446). Paul, a gay man, also reports an experience of 
oversexualisation from his daughter, “she’s got two friends in the house that are gay and, you 
know, she decided that I couldn’t stay in her digs because there were two other gay men in the 
house and obviously- they have daddy issues, she said… while she’s accepting and she’s a 
wonderful girl, she’s still making that kind of assumption that just because I’m gay I’m gonna try 
and shag both her friends” (FG3; 208-212). Jim also recalls being propositioned by a heterosexual 
friend in a toilet, “I’ve been, you know, to the pub in the gents and I’ve gone to the loo and, you 
know, one of my so-called friends next to me has turned around and sorta left it [his penis] hanging 
there going ‘I’d bet you’d like a bit of this’” (FG5; 330-332). Paradoxically, Jim later reports that 
heterosexual friends have felt threatened in toilets in gay venues, “I’ve been out with straight 
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friends in a gay pub because we’ve ended up in a gay pub after a pub crawl and then it’s ‘come to 
the loo with me’ and I go ‘why?’ and they go ‘because I don’t wanna go by myself’ and you sit 
there thinking it’s just a toilet, just go. I said ‘if you’re that embarrassed, go in the cubicle’, ‘no, no, 
no, just come because, you know, I’ll feel safer’ (FG5; 901-904). This fear was also reported by 
Naima, a heterosexual woman, who spoke about her experiences of going to a gay club with a 
heterosexual male friend, “there’s this club in London called Heaven and it’s a gay club and we’re 
all like saying we should go there, we should go there, and he was like I don’t wanna go to a gay 
club, I don’t wanna go because I don’t want all the guys to hit on me” (FG6; 517-519). 
 Incompetence characteristics were also associated with gay men. Hakeem – who has a 
fighting background – talks of his own friendship circle’s attitudes towards gay men, “If we come 
to a confrontation [with a gay man] and we’re like ‘no, don’t do that or don’t say that’, he’d be like 
‘what’s he gonna do? He’s gay”, so you would assume because he’s gay, he’s weak, he’s almost- 
you’d put him like he’s almost worthless” (FG2; 169-171). Hakeem’s discussion about gay men 
being associated with weakness continued as he discussed a cage fight between a gay man and a 
heterosexual man, “during the ring when you have to stand in front of each other and the ref is 
talking to you, the other guy gave him a smooch just because he was gay and he just winked at him 
like, it’s like- the whole thing is like you’re mine, you’re my toy now in the ring, ‘cause you’re gay” 
(FG2; 178-181). This culture also led to passive harm, as Hakeem explains, “If you’re gay, you’re- 
even the coach will probably not wanna train you, he doesn’t wanna be associated with you because 
they don’t think fighting is much of a feminine thing” (FG4; 182-183). Jane, a heterosexual woman, 
also reiterated perceptions of incompetence among gay sportsmen, “certain football teams and 
managers might not want to buy that player… if their preconceptions of someone who is 
homosexual is that they’re weaker” (FG4; 508-510). 
 Traits such as weakness and femininity may be gleaned from heterosexuals’ knowledge of 
receptive (colloquially referred to as ‘bottoming’) and penetrative (colloquially referred to as 
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‘topping’) sex roles among gay men. Grace pondered, “I wonder who goes on top and who’s on 
bottom because you associate it with certain personality traits” (FG1; 254) and Oliver describes 
this as trying to “heterosexualise us” (FG4; 428-429). Whereas, penetrative sex roles were often 
conflated with masculinity, receptive sex roles were often conflated with femininity, as Oliver 
explains, “I’m the woman, he’s the man, or like someone’s dominant, someone’s sub, or someone’s 
top and someone’s bottom” (FG4; 428-430). Paul also reiterates this association, “they’re making 
a further judgement on you, you know, if you’re a top maybe you’re more masculine, if you’re a 
bottom, maybe you’re more of a girl” (FG3; 332-333) and this is also echoed in an interaction 
between Neil and another gay participant, Howard: 
 “Howard: … They assume that if you are a bottom then you’re less of a man and you’re a lot more 
 feminised whereas if you’re a top then it’s a lot more masculine… 
 Neil: It’s almost Roman, isn’t it? [laughs] It doesn’t matter where you stick it as long as you’re the one 
 sticking it” (FG7; 401-405). 
 Indeed, anal sex seems to be a sticking point even for heterosexuals who appear accepting 
of gay men, as Jane explains, “my mum she says, you know, she seems generally quite accepting 
of people being gay but I had a riding instructor who used to be gay [sic] and she said ‘oh, he’s so 
lovely, I can’t believe you’d wanna have anal sex’ [laughs]… it’s very common, a lot of people are 
almost okay with people being gay but they don’t wanna think about what they do in the bedroom” 
(FG2; 212-216). Jane later returns to this topic, pointing out a diverse range of sexual expressions 
beyond coitus “there are lots of gay men who don’t, you know, have anal sex, they just pleasure 
each other and do other things… people are very, very fixated on anal sex and that’s almost like, 
you know, what the biggest anger is… they sort of tie it in with AIDS” (FG2; 364-368). However, 
for Hakeem, the legitimacy of homosexuality appears to hinge upon this coital imperative, “for 
guys, we understand sex as one thing and it’s only penetration… so when someone says I’m gay 
but my sexual, you know, routine with my partner is not anal sex… my mind would come into 
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such a stupid question like why would you need him there? You know, why can’t you just do it by 
yourself?” (FG2; 373-376). This perspective is corroborated by Jim, who recalls his discussions 
about sex with heterosexuals, “The biggest shock to a lot of people I’ve found, you know, if you’re 
having an open and a frank conversation and you kinda sit there and say well, you know, there’s 
[sic] a lot of gay guys who don’t do anal sex and they go ‘yeah, well you must do, how do you have 
sex?’ and you go ‘you don’t have to have anal sex to have sex with someone’- ‘yeah, but, you can’t 
be having gay sex then if you’re not having anal sex” (FG5; 410-414).  
 Gay identities were also delegitimised by rejecting biological essentialism, as Hakeem 
explains, “when you say something like that ‘he, it’s not the choosing to be gay’ [sic] they’d be like, 
come on, that doesn’t make sense and they argue against it scientifically saying there’s nothing 
wrong with their bodies and they look at the DNA and all that so they say it’s their choice… there 
is no way to convince them or to have them look at it, they’re always hateful towards them” (FG2; 
188-192). By framing nonheterosexuality as a conscious choice, negative attitudes towards gay men 
can be externalised as gay men’s character flaws and, thus, victim blaming. Inversely, biological 
essentialism can also be wielded as a means of medicalising and pathologising gay identities, as can 
be seen in the following exchange between Hakeem and Lara: 
 “Lara: Well if the cause, well not cause, but the reason why people are gay is a biological reason and a 
 defect, then I don’t think it’s wrong to say that it’s something that has gone wrong if it is abnormal to how 
 people are meant to- 
 Hakeem: Yeah, but I wouldn’t call it a ‘defect’ either because ‘defect’ is also saying it’s wrong” (FG2; 
 1041- 1044) 
 Gay participants reported experiences of both active (e.g., attacking) and passive harm 
(e.g., excluding) in the focus groups. Oliver, recalls a microaggressive interaction between him and 
an uncle, “he sent us a card on the day [of their wedding] saying ‘congratulations on your civil 
partnership’ and used language which I, like, found homophobic because it’s not acknowledging 
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that… me and Larry are married” (FG4; 643-646) and reasons that it may have religious 
motivations, “to my uncle, my homophobic uncle, to him, a wedding’s only a wedding if it’s in a 
church and the church of his religion” (FG4; 710-711), which was a theme that also continued 
into Oliver’s experiences of workplace bullying, “I had a boss ages ago who was an Evangelical 
Christian, he would vocally express his homophobia from time to time” (FG4; 745-746). Matt, 
another gay participant, also recalls experiences of bullying at school, “I came out when I was in 
year 12 and I think I got bullied about being gay before I even came out” (FG3; 350-351) and 
Liam also spoke of being excluded at school for being gay, “they try and kick you out of groups 
but they do it really discreetly… they’re obviously not comfortable with it” (FG3; 93-96). Other 
participants spoke of more extreme experiences; Jim, for example, recalled being a target of verbal 
abuse while with his partner, “I’ve walked home on a Sunday afternoon with my significant other 
half and we’ve been arm in arm… suddenly some chav will come by in a car and literally, 
deliberately slow down, hang out the car, and you’ll get a torrent of abuse just because it’s two men 
walking sort of arm in arm” (FG5; 68-71) and Howard spoke of his experience of physical abuse, 
“I’ve been beaten up for being gay, which was definitely dehumanising” (FG7; 667). 
 In summary, repellent homoprejudice emerged in the data as it was initially theorised. Gay 
men are associated with a range of incompetent and cold traits, and these latter traits are 
qualitatively different to those cold traits found to be associated with adversarial homoprejudice. 
Together, they resulted in contemptuous attitudes towards gay men, revolving around sexual 
disgust and religious objections, and gay participants reported experiences of active and passive 
harm in line with the BIAS map. 
4.5.3 Theme 3: Romanticised Homoprejudice 
Romanticised homoprejudice was theorised to be the admiration of gay men based on 
prevailing warmth and competence stereotypes, which exoticise and misrepresent the lived 
experiences of gay men. Gay men were perceived as competent in a range of stereotypical ways by 
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the participants. Chris, a heterosexual man, noted their sartorial finesse, “I dunno if this is just my 
internalised stereotype, but they’ve always been really… very good at knowing what shirts to put 
on someone else” (FG2; 745-746), which was reiterated by Luca, “I like them because they dress 
nice” (FG1; 787). Oliver expands upon these competence stereotypes, citing expectations that he 
helps his friends with interior design, “interior design is a good example, interior design- me and 
Larry have just bought a place and Jill’s like ‘oh, you have to help us with our house and give us 
advice’” (FG4; 377-378), which was similarly reported by another gay participant, Mark, “I have a 
flat here… and then they’re [his friend] like sitting inside and they’re like ‘oh it’s gorgeous! I should 
have expected it would be gorgeous, you’re gay and everything’. No, I just know how to match 
black and white… it’s not really hard, but they’re like ‘I could never do this well’ and I’m like, well 
you’re just an idiot” (FG5; 764-770). 
On the face of it, these appear to be complimentary, however, Oliver highlights the 
disappointment that heterosexuals experience whenever he fails to live up to such lofty 
expectations, “People can be disappointed sometimes… like ‘come on let’s go clothes shopping’ 
and it’s like- I hate clothes shopping” (FG4; 63-65). Consequently, the strategy employed by many 
of the gay men in order to challenge positive stereotypes was self-deprecation. Paul explains, “I 
think we’ve got that label where we’re supposed to be good at fashion and things like that, which 
you can tell that’s one thing I’m terrible at” (FG3; 123-124), and this sentiment was also reiterated 
by Neil, “Well I have no fashion sense at all, so that’s another stereotype broken” (FG7; 134), 
Mark, “They think we know how to dress, to be fair, you can see what I’m wearing, you know, I 
can’t dress to save my life” (FG5; 41-42), and Howard, “Most of the qualities that are automatically 
assumed on homosexuality for gay males is [sic] usually good… I feel I genuinely don’t live up to 
a lot of them [laughs]” (FG7; 781-783). This strategy may be preferable, due to the dangers of 
more confrontational ways of challenging these stereotypes. For instance, there was an indication 
from Hakeem that he would respond negatively to a gay man who challenged such assumptions 
in a more confrontational way, “If he said something like ‘I find that offensive’ or something small, 
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I’ll apologise, but if he makes such a big thing out of it, I think that’s what would put me on the 
defensive and would make me also challenge” (FG2; 103-105). 
The failure to live up to positive stereotypes came to be labelled as the “failed gay” (FG4; 
66) by Carl, the “failed homosexual” (FG7; 794) by Neil, and “not gay enough” (FG4; 67) by 
Oliver. Elsewhere, Howard recalls, “I’ve just been called, like, oh you’re the worst gay, you’re 
terrible at it” (FG7; 182) and Neil also recalls such critique from heterosexuals: 
“Neil: It’s very- when you get told you’re practically straight 
Facilitator: Have you been told you’re practically straight? 
Neil: Oh God yes, always in jest but obviously that comes from somewhere” (FG7; 184-186) 
Conversely, gay men may also feel uncomfortable about living up to such stereotypes, as 
Oliver explains, “In some ways I feel I am quite stereotypically gay… you can feel bad for living 
up to that… thinking back in my own friendships… it can feel like I am a cliché” (FG4; 179-182) 
Gay men were also associated with a range of warmth characteristics by some of the 
heterosexual participants. Luca claimed that, “in general, gay men are more friendly” (FG1; 80-
81), Fiona described gay men as “happy and enthusiastic” (FG1; 705), “entertaining” (FG1; 737), 
and “sassy and outgoing” (FG1; 76) and Katie, a heterosexual woman, suggested that gay men are 
perceived as “more caring [and] more in touch with [their] emotions” (FG6; 144) than are 
heterosexual men. These perceptions appeared to motivate contact between gay men and 
heterosexual women because heterosexual men were seen as relatively more dangerous, as Emma, 
a heterosexual woman, explains, “I remember feeling safer going to gay clubs in Toronto… we 
didn’t have to worry about where out drinks were, you know” (FG6; 169-171). This sentiment was 
also expressed by Katie, “As a woman you can- there’s lots of guys, you know, you might not be 
able to trust them… but if you know he’s gay, then maybe you think well okay so he’s, he’s not 
going to be aggressive” (FG6; 165-168). Gay men similarly documented women’s perceptions of 
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safety in these dyads, as Matt explains, “A lot of friends I’ve had over the past few years that 
they’ve – girls especially – they feel more comfortable around gay men than straight men” (FG3; 
139-140). Liam later elaborates on this, noting the lack of sexual compatibility between gay men 
and heterosexual women, “maybe it’s also the fact that it’s to do with sexual attractions maybe, 
‘cause like getting changed in front of someone who is straight, you might be like oh they might 
fancy me” (FG3; 154-156) and Howard also highlights the lack of sexual competition within this 
dyadic relationship, “it’s basically having all the qualities of a friend who’s a girl but without any 
competitiveness in that area, so if we’re both looking for a boyfriend, for example, very rarely is it 
gonna be the same person you’re after” (FG7; 141-143). 
Positive stereotypes about gay men and gay male/heterosexual female dyads were also 
related to media contact with gay men. Emma quotes a line from ‘Sex and the City’, regaling gay 
men, “The only thing I can think about is ‘Sex and the City’ where Samantha says something like 
‘gay men know what’s important: cocktails, compliments, and cocks’” (FG6; 148-149; the true 
quote actually refers to ‘clothes’ rather than ‘cocktails’). Earlier in the focus group, Emma also 
discussed ‘Kickass’ where the eponymous hero, Kickass, must inadvertently pretend to be gay in 
order to get closer to his love interest, Hit-Girl, “He wants to get to know this girl and he totally 
has a crush on her, but she thinks he’s gay and that’s how they get to know each other, she’s like 
‘oh, I’ve always wanted a gay friend’” (FG6; 94-96). Paul also noted how the media has influenced 
mainstream perceptions of gay men and alluded to its historical origins, “I think a lot of it, I think, 
comes from 60s, 70s, 80s media that played on those social stereotypes, you’re old enough to 
remember ‘Are you Being Served’? With John Inman?” (FG3; 660-661). The character Paul was 
referring to, Mr. Humphries, was well-known on British television at the time as “the smiling sales 
assistant, ever ready to whip out his tape measure, go down on his knees, and measure up any 
browsing male customer” (Healy, 1995, p. 243). Paul also cites a more contemporary influence, 
“‘Queer Eye for the Straight [Guy]?” (FG3; 124-125), a show featuring the ‘Fab Five’ who “offer 
guidance in their respective areas of expertise to a hapless heterosexual man in search of style as a 
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special occasion in his life approaches” (Hart, 2004; p. 245). The aforementioned areas of expertise, 
food and wine, grooming, interior design, fashion, and culture all appear to feed into the positive 
stereotypes discussed in the focus groups. 
Together, desires for a gay man as a friend because of their perceived skillset and relatively 
more benign nature in comparison to heterosexual men may result in the transmission of 
exoticising messages, as Emma points out, “it’s just quite reductionist, so a gay, I’ve wanted a, like 
you’ve wanted a ferret or something [laughs] you know? Like it just seems to be really objectifying 
and not seeing them as a full person” (FG6; 22-24). This sentiment was echoed by Jim, who felt 
that “gay men have become a bit more of an accessory to women now” (FG5; 21-22), and by 
Howard who said, “I feel like we’re being used as an accessory, like a handbag or like a Paris Hilton 
Chihuahua” (FG7; 128). Two of the gay participants also raised the sexual exoticisation of gay men 
by heterosexual women, as Liam explains, “I think a lot of friends who are women, they really, 
really like find gay people- gay men kissing hot” (FG3; 284-285) and Oliver discusses, “Apparently 
loads of heterosexual women watch gay porn… my friend Sara, he said- she said like I only watch 
male on male gay porn and I was like, oh my goodness, I can’t believe you watch gay porn all the 
time!” (FG4; 541-544). Given the linkages between heterosexual pornography consumption and 
attitudes condoning violence against women (Hald, Malamuth, & Yuen, 2009), this finding may 
also be indicative of gay men’s association with safety by heterosexual women and may feed into 
the benevolence that has been documented thus far. 
Altogether, positive stereotypes about gay men place gay men in an intractable position; 
the gay participants often criticised themselves in order to refute such positive stereotypes – 
perhaps because refuting them in a less ambiguous manner would lead to reprisals – yet some also 
felt wary about living up to them. Gay men also experienced criticism from heterosexuals for what 
Neil described as “betraying their gay charge” (FG7; 794-795). As well as this, ostensibly positive 
stereotypes about gay men transmit subtly negative messages, as Neil explains, “It was generally 
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assumed that I would be a more pleasant housemate because I would be less messy and I would 
be more aware of my own personal hygiene… It makes me feel great because I think, oh, they 
think I’m clean and tidy and healthy and nice, that’s great, but of course it comes from them 
basically saying [I’m] not a normal man” (FG7; 772-777).  
To summarise, romanticised homoprejudice largely emerged in the data as it was described 
in the initial theory development. Gay men are associated with a range of stereotypical 
competencies, such as being fashionable, and warmth traits such as gentleness. Attempts to 
challenge these stereotypes reported by the gay participants typically revolved around self-
deprecation, echoing the self-directed ridicule identified by Raley and Lucas (2006) with regards to 
gay-themed humour in popular media. The traits ascribed to gay men also appeared to be linked 
to media portrayals of gay men and a phenomena termed here as ‘heterosexual safety’ (akin to the 
concept of heterosexual intimacy in ambivalent sexism theory; Glick & Fiske, 1996) whereby gay 
men are evaluated by heterosexual women as non-threatening because they do not elicit the sexual 
discomfort that heterosexual men do (though this is obviously caveated by an individual’s 
experiences of contact with gay men, given the documented experiences of sexual assault discussed 
in a previous section). While this resulted in passive facilitation, such as associating with gay men, 
this also resulted in passive harm because such stereotypes were interpreted as dehumanising and 
exoticising, and because those gay men who did not conform to them were seen as failures. This 
is a divergence from the BIAS map, because admired groups should theoretically not experience 
harm from allied groups and should instead experience active and passive facilitation (Cuddy, Fiske, 
& Glick, 2007) These findings suggest that facilitating behaviours need to be interpreted from 
multiple standpoints – while facilitation may appear beneficent on the part of the facilitator, it may 
be interpreted less positively be the person being facilitated (Hehman & Bugental, 2015). 
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4.5.4 Theme 4: Paternalistic Homoprejudice 
Paternalistic homoprejudice was initially conceptualised as stifling and overbearingly 
sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning heterosexuals, which consequently belittle gay men. 
These attitudes were theorised to arise from perceptions of gay men as incompetent (e.g., 
disadvantaged in society) and warm (e.g., benign), resulting in active facilitation, such as defending 
and protecting, and passive harm, such as undermining and demeaning. 
Many of the heterosexual participants drew upon perceptions of outgroup (i.e., 
nonheterosexual) disadvantage, particularly with regards to sexuality-based violence, as Jane 
explains, “I don’t have to worry if I walk… holding my partner’s hand, whereas homosexual 
people, if the wrong person see them, they could, you know, be beaten up” (FG2; 446-450). Emma 
further highlights that “Matthew Shepard was in my generation” (FG6; 86) and that her awareness 
of anti-gay behaviour elicits negative affective responses, “If a friend had told me a story where 
they were discriminated against, I would definitely, I’d probably feel anger and- and frustration” 
(FG6; 547-548). Naima also discusses her desire for greater acceptance of nonheterosexuals, “if 
they [gay men] want to go travel around, a lot of other countries aren’t as tolerant as England, so 
it’s like, you know, to go out there and not be discriminated by, it’s much worse out there than it 
is here so, definitely, I wish it wasn’t like that” (FG6; 541-543).  
Together, awareness of outgroup disadvantage, experiences of anger and frustration in 
response to this disadvantage, and the desire to redress this disadvantage all motivate sympathetic 
attitudes and active facilitation. This often took the form of protective behaviours; Jane recalls an 
instance of her mother standing up for a (assumed) gay man being harassed in a betting shop, “this 
jockey had obviously decided that he was [gay]… and he kept going ‘do you fancy him?’… and my 
mum just sorta turned to this jockey and went ‘are you jealous or unhappy? Why don’t you leave 
him alone?” (FG2; 220-223) and Tara also recalls defending a gay friend who suffered bullying at 
a Catholic school, “on quite a few occasions I did start – not fights, but – arguments, and quite 
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heated debates about the way they were speaking about my friend” (FG2; 146-147). Active 
facilitation in the form of what came to be termed by Emma as “counterweight[ing]” (FG6; 53) 
was also found. Given an awareness of gay men’s negative experiences of prejudice and 
discrimination and a desire to uphold one’s egalitarian ideals, one may attempt to counteract gay 
men’s negative lived experiences by being positive, as Katie explains, “people, well, try to be sort 
of liberal-minded and accept people for who they are, so they don’t want to be prejudiced but they 
slightly overreact sometimes because it’s kind of- you know that person’s going to be getting a lot 
of negativity, so you kind of go a bit the other way, you just want to be positive” (FG6; 216-219). 
Howard also appears to allude to such a reaction, and highlights its patronising connotations, 
“people were trying very hard to kind of either adopt or try and present themselves as quite liberal 
and quite understanding… it comes across as incredibly patronising” (FG7; 40-42) 
Although such help-giving behaviours appear to have prosocial motivations, they can 
nonetheless be interpreted as patronising and demeaning. Neil recalls his experiences of working 
with a protective manager when he first came out, “she practically mothered me because she 
assumed that I’d fall to pieces every time I was challenged… it was this need to be taken care of 
because, because I was less of a man and I wasn’t able to stand my ground and I needed a mother 
figure to look after me because, obviously, I was more emotional and all these things, which I 
wasn’t” (FG7; 813-816). Neil implicates the same perceptions of incompetence that were discussed 
earlier in this chapter: weakness. Indeed, within the context of the stereotype content model, the 
defining difference between pitiful and contemptible outgroups are the differential associations 
with warmth and coldness, respectively (Fiske et al., 2002), so a degree of overlap between these 
two constructs with regards to incompetence is to be expected. 
Imposing paternalistic behaviours were also implicated in the coming out process for two 
of the gay participants. As Paul recalls, “When I first came out, the first person I told was my 
brother who’s 9 years older than me and he didn’t react, and the first thing he said afterwards was 
 
 
109 
 
‘do you want me to talk to mum and dad?’ to which my answer was ‘I’m fucking 40, I can talk to 
my own parents’” (FG3; 564-566). Although Paul’s brother had possibly meant to ease the 
perceived burden of sexuality disclosure, his proposed intervention was interpreted as infantilising 
by Paul. Liam also voiced his concerns about heterosexuals’ understanding of the coming out 
process, “sometimes you feel like you’re entitled [sic] to let people know that you’re gay, otherwise 
it’ll come across that you’re ashamed” (FG3; 930-931) and he goes on to talk about an interaction 
with his counsellor where this association was made, “they were like, if you don’t tell people, if 
you’re not out with it, some people might see that as you being ashamed of who you are” (FG3; 
934-936). Given the dangers one may face when coming out, valorising sexuality disclosure as a 
moral imperative problematises non-disclosure rather than the oppressive forces that create it 
(Rasmussen, 2004). The coming out imperative also transmits the message that there are restricted 
ways in which one can be a happy and healthy gay man, which are contingent upon disclosing to 
heterosexuals (McLean, 2007). 
Some of the gay participants also reported matchmaking behaviours by heterosexuals and 
highlighted the negative inferences they drew from such facilitation, as Neil explains, “I don’t think 
I’ve ever necessarily wanted anybody to help me find somebody and I never want anyone to 
assume I needed [sic] somebody and that kind of assumption can make you feel maybe slightly 
more insecure about yourself because you might give off a vibe that you can’t portray yourself as 
a strong independent person” (FG7; 55-58). Oliver suggests that this may arise from heterosexuals’ 
awareness of the relative size of the gay populations, “at a party I went to… it was kind of like well 
you two should be a couple because there’s not many [gay men] out there kinda thing… they think 
they’re being nice but at the same time, they are being like quite funny” (FG4; 54-56) and later in 
the focus group, Oliver recalls another example of matchmaking and explains its more demeaning 
connotations, “she was like ‘I want them to be boyfriends’, it was almost for her and it’s like oh, 
then I’ve got two little gays that I can take out with me” (FG4; 206-207). Luca also recalls his past 
attempt at matchmaking and exposes its paternalistic underpinnings, “I’ve wanted to be the 
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matchmaker between two gay people, it was wrong [laughs], but my intentions was [sic] right and 
I wanted something nice but it was like too much, I was thinking too much for them and it was 
wrong” (FG1; 679-681). 
In summary, paternalistic homoprejudice emerged in the data similar to how it was 
conceptualised in terms of the SCM and BIAS map. Gay men were perceived as incompetent 
inasmuch as they are disadvantaged in relation to heterosexuals, and they were not believed to 
have negative intentions towards heterosexuals. These perceptions elicited sympathetic attitudes 
towards gay men and sympathetic individuals expressed frustration towards continuing inequality 
and sought out ways to redress is (i.e., facilitation). However, a recurring pattern among these 
facilitating behaviours is that they undermined their target’s autonomy and personhood; gay men 
were compelled to disclose their sexuality for their own good (even if they did not want to), were 
spoken up for yet seemingly denied a voice themselves, and were shoehorned into potential 
romantic relationships without regard for personal preferences. Though these behaviours often 
had altruistic motivations, these findings highlight their relatively more demeaning connotations – 
in other words, they caused passive harm. 
4.6 Limitations 
There are several limitations to be discussed. Firstly, the focus groups were facilitated by a 
gay man who may have been identified as such by the participants. Although this may have made 
the gay participants more willing to share their experiences, this may have caused the heterosexual 
participants to control their prejudiced reactions. In one focus group (FG1) the participants 
endorsed markedly more hostile and benevolent attitudes than those participants in the others and 
it is not clear whether they were simply more prejudiced participants or whether they didn’t 
perceive the facilitator’s identity. However, in one focus group (FG2), one participant actively 
attempted to allay the facilitator’s potential discomfort before voicing hostile views and it is 
uncertain to what extent the facilitator’s identity inhibited other participants’ responses. 
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Secondly, the participants were sampled in a relatively affluent city in England. Since the 
participants identified age and identity security as potential factors that moderate the harm caused 
by benevolent homoprejudice, poverty may also be another factor, given that it compounds sexual 
minority men’s mental ill health (Diaz, Ayala, Bein, Henne, & Marin, 2001). Unfortunately, this 
sampling strategy was unable to investigate this effectively. Furthermore, the ethical approval 
gained before undertaking this study restricted the sample to adults, whereas adolescents may be 
more vulnerable to benevolent homoprejudice due to their relatively less developed sexual identity. 
In light of the potential risk factors identified by the participants, eliciting participation from young 
men and boys coming to terms with their sexual orientation could have provided further insight. 
In addition, there was a disappointing ethnic mix in the sample – particularly among the gay men, 
where there were no non-white participants. This may have occurred because one sampling 
strategy used to solicit participation from gay men was via geospatial social networking applications 
aimed at gay men, which have been implicated in racial prejudice (Callander, Holt, & Newman, 
2015). Black participants may have been underrepresented in this sample as a result of them being 
a stigmatised and, thus, underrepresented demographic in such applications. Investigating 
ambivalent homoprejudice using a more diverse sample would allow the research to further 
explore the ontological arguments advanced herein. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Four themes were identified during data analysis: 1) Adversarial homoprejudice, an 
expansion of the modern homonegativity literature (Morrison & Morrison, 2003) incorporating 
envious affect; 2) Repellent homoprejudice, resembling much of the literature on ‘homophobia’ 
and ‘sexual prejudice’ (Herek, 1984); 3) Romanticised homoprejudice, encompassing prevailing 
warmth and competence stereotypes (e.g., ‘homopositivity’; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) 
disseminated by contemporary Western media and their microaggressive connotations; and 4) 
Paternalistic homoprejudice, the prosocial desire to protect gay men from harm in light of their 
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relative disadvantage, while simultaneously (and unintentionally) reinforcing unequal structural 
relations between heterosexuals and nonheterosexuals. The qualitative findings further 
demonstrated that adversarial, repellent, romanticised, and paternalistic attitudes towards gay men 
are generally consistent with envious, contemptuous, admiring, and pitying affect within the 
context of the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002) and that these feelings correspond with 
discrete combinations of active and passive harmful and facilitating behaviours (Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2007).  
Adversarial homoprejudice was linked to the belief that gay men were cold (i.e., that they 
had negative intentions towards the ingroup) and competent (i.e., that they had the means to action 
those intentions). These stereotypes were related to the belief that prejudice towards gay men was 
a thing of the past and, by extension, the belief that gay men got preferential treatment akin to the 
perception of reverse inequality. The behavioural manifestations of this also fit well within the 
BIAS map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) inasmuch as such envious affect emerged in the data as 
passive facilitation (e.g., begrudgingly associating with gay men) and active harm (e.g., scapegoating 
and victim blaming). However, envious affect was also associated with passive harm (e.g., 
gossiping), which the BIAS map does not hypothesise. This discrepancy may be because the BIAS 
map does not take account of the suppressive forces that inhibit overt expressions of prejudice 
(see the justification suppression model; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). One such suppressive force 
may be the unique way in which gay competence was characterised by the participants. As 
compared to how competence in other envied outgroups such as Jews and Asians are typically 
conceived (e.g., wealth and intelligence, respectively), gay men’s stereotyped competencies were 
more socially manipulative in nature, revolving around the perception that gay men used 
accusations of homophobia to achieve their goals. This perception would necessitate more passive 
harmful behaviours because active harm would be more easily recognisable by gay men as 
malicious and labelled as homophobic, furthering gay men’s perceived goals. 
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Repellent homoprejudice also demonstrated good conceptual fit inasmuch as it was 
associated with cold and incompetence stereotypes and related to active and passive harm. Further, 
the data reiterated many of the trends documented in research on this old-fashioned brand of 
homoprejudice elsewhere; gay men were oversexualised (Kunda & Oleson, 1995), were feminised 
(Madon, 1997), and associated with sexual deviance (Angelides, 2005). Given these unremarkable 
findings and the breadth of literature already devoted to this construct, they will not be discussed 
further. 
Romanticised homoprejudice emerged in the data as warmth and competence stereotypes 
pertaining to gay men’s fashion, tasteful interior design, and favourable personality traits, and these 
motivated facilitating behaviours, commonly voiced in the data as the desire for a ‘gay best friend’. 
Elsewhere in the literature, gay men have also been found to be associated with culinary skill 
(Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), creativity (Massey, 2009), and emotional availability (Walls, 2008a). 
Gay men were also perceived by most of the women participants to be sexually non-threatening 
and non-competitive (as has been found elsewhere; Russell, Ta, Lewis, Babcock, & Ickes, 2015), 
motivating gendered desires for a ‘gay best friend’ as was theorised in an earlier chapter. Although 
these favourable stereotypes are gender transgressive (i.e., they subvert traditional ‘sex roles’; Bem, 
1974), there was little indication in the data that this combination of gay male stereotypes 
resembled the ‘warm-but-dumb’ stereotype levelled at women who are ascribed these same traits 
(Fiske, 2012).  
This may be evidence of intersectionality, which was argued in the previous chapter to 
influence gay men’s unique experiences of prejudice. Gay men experience sexuality-based 
oppression and gender-based privilege and, while heterosexist oppression detracts from male 
privilege (as can be seen in the early pathologising of homosexuality as a failure of masculinity; 
Coston & Kimmel, 2012), male privilege also ameliorates one’s experiences of heterosexist 
oppression – in other words, intersecting identities are mutually constitutive (Bowleg, 2013). The 
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effect of this intersectionality can be seen in contemporary media portrayals of gay men and how 
they relate to their heterosexual counterparts; whereas heterosexual women are portrayed as 
childish and irrational, their gay foils display worldliness and competence and they take on a quasi-
parental role within that dyad (Shugart, 2003). Gay men are similarly depicted in this paternalistic 
way in relation to heterosexual men in shows such as ‘Queer Eye for the Straight Guy’, which 
juxtaposes gay men’s stereotyped skillset with the purported ineptitudes of a heterosexual man in 
need of help from the show’s cast, ‘the Fab Five’ (Hart, 2004). Such depictions of gay men are far 
better described as aspirational than pitiful and this arguably derives from male privilege because 
portraying gay men as superior in these contexts nonetheless maintains the patriarchal assertion 
that men at large are superior.  
Particularly illuminating were the ways in which gay men interpreted these ostensibly 
positive stereotypes as microaggressions and how they challenged them, which has received 
relatively little academic attention (though see Nadal et al., 2011). Gay participants expressed 
concerns that the aforementioned stereotypes and the trope of the ‘gay best friend’ that resulted 
from them were dehumanising and exploitative. Further, those men who do not live up to these 
expectations – ‘the failed gays’ – reported being criticised by heterosexuals for their purported 
failings, yet confessing to one’s ‘failed gay’ status appeared to be the most accessible and least 
confrontational way in which these stereotypes could be challenged. This is a novel finding in the 
area, and one that has great importance with regards to improving wellbeing among gay men. 
Research has established that gay men (as compared to heterosexual men) are particularly prone 
to making social comparisons against idealised images of the male physique in the media (Levesque 
& Vichesky, 2006) and that such comparisons may be associated with disordered eating and body 
dissatisfaction among gay men (Kaminski, Chapman, Haynes, & Own, 2005). Similarly, long-term 
exposure and attendance to romanticisesd stereotypes about gay men may lead to feelings of 
failure, life dissatisfaction, and social exclusion by heterosexuals – particularly among those gay 
men in the nascent stages of their sexual identity development (see Cass, 1984). ‘The failed gay’ 
 
 
115 
 
also has worrying implications for those fleeing sexuality-based persecution, because successful 
asylum often hinges upon evidencing such stereotypes in order to validate one’s sexual identity 
(Morgan, 2006). 
Paternalistic homoprejudice was coded in the data as perceptions of gay men as 
incompetent, but this coding occurred in tandem with neither warmth nor coldness. This is in 
contention with the SCM because paternalistic prejudice should be associated with pitying affect 
arising from incompetence and warmth stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002). However, one subtle caveat 
to this can be found in their description of paternalistic stereotypes: “Paternalistic stereotypes 
portray out-groups that are neither inclined nor capable to harm members of the in-group” (p. 
879). Believing that an out-group is disinclined to harm one’s in-group does not necessarily imply 
that the out-group is warm – only that the out-group is not cold. Regardless of this discrepancy, 
heterosexuals appear to actively facilitate gay men by protecting them from harm and assisting 
them with important decisions relating to their sexuality (e.g., sexuality disclosure). On the other 
hand, these behaviours can be interpreted as infantilising and demeaning, causing passive harm 
and supporting the assertion that this can be accurately described as paternalistic.  
Akin to Walls’s (2008) description of paternalistic heterosexism as “subjectively neutral or 
positive attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional, or cognitive 
well-being of [gay men]” (pp. 27-28), paternalistic homoprejudice is similarly founded upon these 
concerns. However, there was no evidence in the present study suggesting that such concerns were 
“concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of 
behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (Walls, 2008a, p. 28). Rather, these concerns 
could be more accurately described as inflated and exaggerated, resulting in overzealous 
behavioural facilitations (see Conley et al., 2002) that are imposing and demeaning rather than 
mundanely altruistic. This theoretical assertion is especially important because it further contends 
that if paternalism is not a vehicle for heterosexist oppression, then hostile and benevolent aspects 
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of ambivalent homoprejudice are not complementary justifications for sexual inequality (unlike 
ambivalent sexism theory; Glick & Fiske, 2001). In this regard, ambivalent homoprejudice is truer 
to more traditional notions of ambivalence, focusing on the attitudinal level and its behavioural 
consequences rather than on the ideological level and its oppressive motivations. 
Altogether, these findings illuminate a void in the literature on multidimensional attitudes 
towards gay men and elaborate upon the background and systematic concepts identified in the 
previous chapter. Given this important theoretical insight, the identified constructs are now well-
enough formulated to be operationalised as a selection of scale items that adequately sample from 
the content categories under investigation (Luyt, 2012). The next chapter will elaborate on this 
item generation process, will further examine the psychometric properties of the multidimensional 
heterosexism inventory (Walls, 2008a) and polymorphous prejudice scales (Massey, 2009), and will 
detail the exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic techniques used to construct the ambivalent 
homoprejudice scale. 
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5. Chapter Five 
Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale 
 The previous chapter detailed the use of qualitative methodology to characterise four 
distinct attitudinal tendencies towards gay men in the UK: 1) Repellent homoprejudice; 2) 
Adversarial homoprejudice; 3) Romanticised homoprejudice; and 4) Paternalistic homoprejudice. 
However, qualitative methods do not offer a consistent way with which to measure the co-
endorsement of hostile and benevolent homoprejudice. Thus far, it has only been demonstrated 
that attitudes towards gay men are multifaceted. In order to assert that attitudes towards gay men 
are also ambivalent, the development of a new psychometric measure of these attitudes is 
necessary. As such, this chapter will first critique two other measures of multifaceted prejudice 
towards gay men in order to identify weaknesses in the literature that can be addressed in the 
present scale development process. The rest of the chapter presents the first part of this process, 
that is, ascertaining the factor structure of a selection of questionnaire items derived from the 
qualitative analysis by conducting exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on one sample (N = 500) and 
then corroborating this factor structure alongside other competing factor structures by conducting 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on another sample (N = 301). For clarity’s sake, these studies 
are delineated as study 2a and study 2b, respectively. 
5.1 The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory and Polymorphous Prejudice Scale 
Chapter 3 engaged in a critical analysis of two other theories of multidimensional prejudice 
towards gay men: multidimensional heterosexism (Walls, 2008a) and polymorphous prejudice 
(2009). Here, this process is continued and the issues in the scales derived from these theories, 
namely, the multidimensional heterosexism inventory (MHI; Walls, 2008a) and the polymorphous 
prejudice scale (PPS; Massey, 2009) are addressed.  
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The first area of critique concerns the content validity of these two scales. Mokkink et al. 
(2010) define content validity as “The degree to which the content of an… instrument is an 
adequate reflection of the construct to be measured” (p. 743). One way to assess content validity 
is by simply appraising the measure at face value – does the instrument qualitatively appear to be 
an adequate reflection of the construct to be measured (Mokkink et al., 2010)? Given that an item 
pool can be, theoretically, infinite because a construct can be observed in an infinite number of 
ways (Yaghmaie, 2003), another way to assess content validity is to appraise whether or not an 
adequate number of items were generated and retained before and after factor analysis. 
In generating their items, Walls (2005; 2008) and Massey (2009) do not refer to any primary 
empirical data specifically exploring hostile and benevolent attitudes towards gay men. Walls (2005; 
2008) derives their items from an extrapolation of ambivalent sexism theory and the social 
dominance literature. Likewise, Massey (2009) extracts and/or rewords items from other measures 
of hostile homoprejudice, racism, and sexism, and refers to the queer and feminist literature in 
their item generation process. Although such an approach places fewer demands on the researcher 
to collect their own primary data, the risk is that the generated items may only provide a limited 
representation of the underlying construct. The researcher can also not justifiably deviate too far 
from these sources because items generated on this basis may not reflect the construct at all (as 
will be demonstrated in a later discussion regarding paternalistic heterosexism). These issues can 
be allayed somewhat by having a panel of experts generate the items, which both Walls (2005; 
2008) and Massey (2009) do. However, neither scholar provide sufficient details as to the 
credentials of these collaborators. Altogether, the consequences of this approach is that the 
generated items will likely only reflect what has already been discovered. As such, this is not just 
an issue of content validity, but also of novelty. 
While Walls’s (2005; 2008) and Massey’s (2009) item generation process demonstrate a 
similar level of theoretical sampling of the constructs, the two approaches differ with regards to 
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their numerical sampling of the constructs. Whereas Walls (2005; 2008) conducted EFA with 23 
items, ultimately resulting in a 23-item measure, Massey (2009) conducted two EFAs: one on 79 
items measuring negative attitudes towards gay men and another on 73 items measuring positive 
attitudes towards gay men, ultimately resulting in a 70-item measure. Of course, a longer measure 
will require a greater breadth of sampling of the content categories than will a shorter measure. 
However, one should always generate more items than they will ultimately need, because it allows 
the researcher to select those items that consistently and most effectively tap the underlying 
construct (DeVellis, 2012). Ultimately, a balance must be struck between quality and quantity with 
regards to item generation. 
The consequence of an over-sampled item pool is that it may result in an unwieldy measure 
that fatigues respondents. The 70-item PPS is unnecessarily comprehensive given that many of its 
items bear resemblance to those seen in more widely-used measures of hostile homoprejudice – 
namely, the attitudes towards gay men scale (ATG; Herek, 1984) and the modern homonegativity 
scale (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). However, by comparison, the consequences of under-
sampling the content categories are arguably more problematic. This issue can be observed in the 
paternalistic heterosexism subscale of the MHI. Each of the seven items in this subscale begin: “I 
would prefer if my SON/DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because…” (Walls, 2008a, p. 48, 
author’s capitalisation). Because of their negative phrasing, these items may have produced an 
artefactual factor (Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997). The extent to which parental 
locus of control (Campis, Lyman, & Prentice-Dunn, 1986) and other potentially confounding 
factors obscure the intended meaning of this subscale has also not been considered. It is even 
possible that these items measure the general aversion to having a homosexual child, which 
contradicts what Walls (2005; 2008) claims this subscale actually measures. Without any 
alternatives to these items, one has no way of discerning how well they represent the underlying 
construct or whether the construct could be better represented using different items. 
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The MHI (Walls, 2005; 2008) also suffers from having no confirmatory analysis in support 
of the factor structure proposed by the EFA. Although DeVellis (2012) notes that obtaining the 
same factor structure from two EFAs can be compelling evidence in support of the stability of a 
given factor structure because of the lack of model constraints imposed by the researcher, Walls 
(2005; 2008) obtains two different factor structures in their two analyses. The first EFA produced 
a 3-factor solution comprising apathetic, positive-stereotypic, and paternalistic heterosexism. 
However, the second EFA produced a 4-factor solution that split the apathetic heterosexism factor 
into aversive and amnestic heterosexism. In their papers, Walls (2005; 2008) does not actually 
acknowledge this as a methodological problem. Inversely, Massey (2009) obscures the quality of 
their 79- and 73-item EFAs by not reporting it in adequate detail, despite notably including items 
with worryingly low factor loadings. 
In summary, there are two areas of improvement that can be addressed in the present scale 
development. The first area of improvement identified is that the present scale development must 
convincingly demonstrate good content validity. To a large extent, this has been addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 already. This will be further demonstrated in this chapter using a comprehensive 
item pool based on the theory development and empirical findings documented thus far. The 
second area of improvement identified is that the present scale development must demonstrate 
greater analytic rigour and transparency. This will be addressed in this chapter by offering the 
reader a detailed account of: 1) The item generation and reduction processes; 2) The rationale 
informing factor and item retention; and 3) Potential alternative and competing factor structures. 
 If the theory development and empirical findings documented thus far are a valid 
representation of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men, the items should load onto four 
factors resembling the themes identified in Chapters 3 and 4. As such, the research question to be 
answered herein is: Does a large-scale sample produce the same facets of repellent, adversarial, 
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romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice advanced thus far and are these facets stable across 
different samples? 
5.2 Study 2a Methods 
5.2.1 Item Generation 
 DeVellis (2012) recommends a systematic process of scale item generation. Firstly, an 
extensive literature review of attitudes towards gay men was conducted, resulting in an initial 
deductive conceptualisation of ambivalence towards gay men. This model was used to guide the 
topics under discussion in a subsequent qualitative study of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay 
men, and gay men’s experiences of positively- and negatively-valenced attitudes (as covered in 
Chapter 4). This approach was particularly advantageous because it led to well-defined background 
and systematic concepts, and allowed concepts otherwise not well-covered in the literature, such 
as the ‘failed gay’ and gay men’s explicit warmth- and competence-related stereotypes to emerge, 
resulting in a more adequately-sampled item pool. 
 In order to create the initial item pool, a panel of experts (N = 7, consisting of a professor, 
three senior lecturers, and three postgraduate researchers including the first author) drawn from 
two universities – the first author’s home institution and a large public university in Canada – were 
enlisted. This panel consisted of academic researchers in the fields of psychometric test 
construction, gender, attitudinal ambivalence, and sexuality. Four of the experts were gay (three 
men and one non-binary), one was a heterosexual man, and two were heterosexual women. An 
abridged thematic analysis was provided to the panel, detailing the aforementioned themes and 
providing illustrative quotes from the qualitative data upon which item generation could be based. 
An initial pool of 562 items were generated between the experts. The panel then met and agreed 
to reject items that: 1) made an implicit assumption about the gender and/or sexuality of the 
respondent (e.g., ‘All the men that I fancy turn out to be gay’); 2) did not pertain immediately to 
the research area (e.g., ‘I admire the fact that lesbian women are so committed to monogamy’); 
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and 3) were duplicates or worded very similarly. Further, the panel agreed upon a number of 
phrasing conventions: 1) Avoidance of the word ‘homosexual’ to reduce item ambiguity and the 
priming of more negative responses (see Rios, 2013); 2) Avoidance of the first person, reducing 
the respondents’ motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997); and 3) 
Phrasing items in a suitable way for Likert scaling along a 7-point strongly agree-strongly disagree 
continuum. Based on this meeting, 163 of the items were rejected and others were reworded to fit 
the phrasing conventions. The remaining items were grouped thematically and coded based on the 
themes and nodes emanating from the previous qualitative analysis. Those items that could not be 
coded using the pre-existing nodes, indicating that they corresponded poorly with the qualitative 
findings, were rejected (N = 19). The nodes also provided an indication of content validity, 
prompting the retention of a varied sample of 96 items; 24 items for each facet of homoprejudice. 
Specifically, items referred to: aversion towards contact with gay men (1 item), gay men’s contact 
with children (3 items), pathology (2 item), disgust (4 items), immorality (3 items), tolerance (3 
items), mutability of nonheterosexuality (2 items), religious intolerance (2 items), sexual disgust (3 
items), violence (1 item), advice-giving (6 items), ‘failed gay’ (4 items), friend material (5 items), 
heterosexual intimacy (2 items), positive stereotypes (7 items), altruism (5 items), counterweighting 
(3 items), fragility (3 items), incompetence (4 items), protection (4 items), sympathy (5 items), 
heteronormative assimilation (3 items), denial of inequality (5 items), fear of prejudicial accusations 
(4 items), reverse inequality (4 items), maintenance of the status quo (5 items), and the 
weaponisation of nonheterosexuality (3 items). The factor structure of this 96-item iteration of the 
ambivalent homoprejudice scale (AHS-96; see Appendix 4) was explored. 
5.2.2 Participants 
 5.2.2.1 Sample Size 
 EFA is generally regarded as requiring a large sample size. Although some studies have 
advocated for the use of EFA on smaller samples (i.e., N < 50) and evidenced their reliable usage 
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(de Winter, Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009), this is not a popular custom in the psychological 
community. Indeed, multiple systematic reviews of the use of EFA in academic research have been 
particularly critical of studies for their perceived low sample size (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986; 
Osborne & Costello, 2009). Small samples subjected to EFA may fail to converge at all (i.e., the 
analysis fails and the software produces an error message) or may provide a solution with 
misspecified variables (e.g., items loading onto incorrect factors; Schmitt, 2011).  
Despite the concerning consequences of low sample size in EFA, there is no single agreed-
upon standard for sample size. Common rules of thumb regarding sample size for EFA, such as 
taxonomies describing different sample sizes or participant to variable ratios as acceptable or 
otherwise (Comfrey & Lee, 1992; Gorsuch, 1983, and many others) have largely fallen out of vogue 
because of their lack of credibility (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999; Osborne & 
Costello, 2009) and poor performance in practice (Rouquette & Falissard, 2011). Rather, there is 
a present emphasis on first testing the ‘strength’ of the data – in other words, the suitability of the 
data for EFA, as measured by metrics such as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (which will be reported later in this chapter). If 
these analyses suggest that the data are unsuitable for EFA, then it would be advisable to collect 
more data until EFA becomes a viable analysis. 
5.2.2.2 Demographics 
801 British adults completed the AHS-96, which was randomly split; 500 participants’ data 
were reserved for the initial exploratory factor and reliability analyses (Study 2a) and 301 
participants’ data were reserved for the subsequent confirmatory factor and reliability analyses 
(Study 2b). Separate demographics for these samples can be seen in table 5.1. A further, 75 
participants identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or ‘other’ also completed the survey. These results 
were retained for known-groups validity analyses and will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
 
124 
 
Alongside the AHS 96, all 801 participants completed a selection of randomly assigned 
measures for use in the validation testing (Study 2c). Because the validity testing pertains to the 
entire sample (due to the random assignment of validation measures), these measures and results 
will also be covered in Chapter 6. 
 Study 2a (N = 500) Study 2b (N = 301) 
Age 
 Min 
 Max 
 M 
 SD 
 
18 
79 
31.43 
11.63 
 
18 
72 
31.70 
12.45 
Gender 
 Men 
 Women 
 Other 
 
163 
333 
4 
 
103 
198 
0 
Sexuality 
 Exclusively heterosexual 
 Mostly heterosexual 
 
402 
98 
 
227 
74 
Education 
 None 
 GCSEs/O-levels 
 AS/A-levels 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 
1 
12 
122 
185 
138 
42 
 
3 
13 
92 
106 
68 
19 
Race 
 White 
 Black 
 Asian 
 Mixed 
 Other 
 
445 
9 
26 
17 
3 
 
261 
12 
16 
8 
4 
Religious service attendance 
 Never 
 On special occasions 
 Now and then 
 Weekly 
 
259 
138 
59 
44 
 
167 
77 
34 
23 
Table 5.1: Participant demographics for Study 2a and Study 2b 
5.2.2.3 Sampling 
A number of recruitment streams were used to solicit participation. Participation was 
solicited from students and staff in a number of universities across the United Kingdom by way 
of blanket emails and poster displays. Online advertisements were also taken out on popular social 
media and online bulletin boards, and a press release was issued resulting in the research being 
featured in a number of UK news outlets in print, online, and on TV. A prize draw to win one of 
six £15 shopping vouchers was offered as an incentive to take part. 
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  5.2.2.4 Exclusively vs. Mostly Heterosexuals 
 Research findings support a discrete sexual identity category between exclusive 
heterosexuality and bisexuality; non-exclusive heterosexuality or those who identify as ‘mostly 
heterosexual’ (Vrangalova & Savin-Williams, 2012). Savin-Williams and Vrangalova (2013) found 
that such individuals report low levels of same-sex sexual attraction and behaviour, represent a 
substantial proportion of the population, remain stable in their self-categorisation over time, and 
report that such an identity is personally meaningful to them. Perhaps for these reasons, data 
supplied by ‘mostly heterosexuals’ are often omitted from factor analyses principally interested in 
heterosexuals’ attitudes (see Morrison & Morrison, 2003).  
However, no research evidence exists to suggest mostly heterosexuals and exclusive 
heterosexuals differ in terms of their attitudes towards gay men – at least, not in a structural sense 
that would compromise the present analysis. Mostly heterosexuals could potentially evidence less 
intense prejudiced attitudes and more affirmative attitudes towards gay men due to their openness 
to nonheterosexual potential. If this is the case, then their inclusion may enrich the analysis, rather 
than undermine it. To confirm this, two factor analyses were run in order to compare the latent 
factor structure of exclusive heterosexuals’ and both exclusive and mostly heterosexuals’ attitudes 
towards gay men. Both factor analyses produced similar factor structures, suggesting that the 
mostly heterosexual data would be appropriate to include in the analysis (see Goodman & Moradi, 
2008).  
5.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
The survey was administered using the Qualtrics survey platform and consisted of an 
information sheet that described the survey as ‘a study of positive and negative attitudes towards 
gay men’, a consent form, demographic questions asking the participants’ gender, age, sexual 
orientation, race, and country of residence, the AHS-96, a selection of other validation measures 
(which will be reported in more detail in Chapter 6), a debrief sheet, and spaces to enter an email 
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with which to enter into the prize draw and/or consent to being contacted for a test-retest study. 
The survey took approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. This study received ethical approval 
from the Departmental Research Ethics Panel (DREP), the designated departmental authority that 
confers ethical approval to low-risk research projects.   
5.3 Data Analytic Strategy 
5.3.1 Factor Analysis vs. Principal Component Analysis 
 In reducing a large number of variables down to a smaller, more meaningful and condensed 
set of variables, researchers have a choice between principal component analysis (PCA) and factor 
analysis (FA). The biggest difference between the two analytic techniques are the assumptions 
made about the resulting components/factors. In PCA, the principle components are assumed to 
be caused by the observed variables (i.e., item scores) whereas, in FA, the factors are assumed to 
indicate the presence of latent variables that are causing the variance in the observed variables 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2014). Because PCA does not make this theoretical assumption about the 
relationship between observed and latent variables and simply seeks to reduce large numbers of 
variables to smaller numbers of variables, it is unsuitable for scale development (DeVellis, 2012). 
Given the general assumption that attitudes (i.e., unobservable latent variables) affect item 
responses (i.e., the observed variables), factor analysis was concluded to be the more appropriate 
statistical technique. 
5.3.2 Missing Data 
 In order to ascertain whether those who submitted partial responses differed from those 
who responded in full, Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test (Little, 1988) was used 
to analyse non-response in the whole sample (N = 801). Ideally, statistical non-significance (p< 
.05) is desired because this indicates that missing values are not caused by any observed (e.g., 
gender) or other missing variables (i.e., that the data are MCAR). The Little’s test was significant, 
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indicating that non-response was systematic. In order to discern whether or not this pattern of 
non-response was ignorable because missingness could be attributable to non-missingness on 
other variables (i.e., missing at random; MAR) or non-ignorable because missingness could be 
attributable to missingness on other variables (i.e., missing not at random; MNAR), the separate 
variance t-tests were inspected. Missingness on one variable did not appear to be attributable to 
missingness on other variables, so the data were assumed to be MAR and, thus, could be dealt 
with using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Enders, 2001) built into the MPlus structural 
equation modelling software used to run the analysis. 
5.3.3 Factor and Item Retention 
Factor retention was guided by the use of parallel analysis, detailed in O’Connor (2000). 
This technique generates a random data set of x variables and y cases of the same dimensions as 
the collected data set (in this instance, 96 variables and 500 cases) and performs an exploratory 
factor analysis on this data. If a factor in the observed data set is substantive, its eigenvalue should 
exceed that of its corresponding factor garnered from the randomly generated data at the 95th 
percentile. As compared to the Kaiser criterion whereby factors with an eigenvalue of 1 or more 
are considered for retention, parallel analysis tends not to overestimate the number of factors to 
retain when large numbers of variables are factor analysed (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). 
Guidance from R. Worthington and Whittaker (2006) suggests only retaining items with 
factor loadings of .5 or greater and items with cross-factor loadings of less than .32. Further item 
reduction was performed by examining each factor for redundant items. This may be indicated by 
items correlating excessively with each other (e.g., by > .9; Field, 2009) or by being similarly-
worded, in which case the item with the lower factor loading was deleted. Item redundancy may 
also be indicated by a prospective deletion having a negligible or even augmentative effect on the 
scale’s internal consistency when deleted. 
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5.4 Study 2a Results 
5.4.1 Preliminary Results 
The suitability of the sample for factor analysis was tested using Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy on both multiple and 
individual variables. Bartlett’s test of sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix 
is an identity matrix whereby each variable correlates perfectly with itself and not at all with any 
other variable, rendering the data inappropriate for factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
statistically significant, X2(4560) = 30545.56, p < .001, indicating that the data were suitable for 
factor analysis. The KMO test calculates the ratio of the squared correlation between variables to 
the squared partial correlation between variables and the test statistic can range between 0 
(indicating that the partial correlations are large relative to the correlations and that the data is 
unsuitable for factor analysis) and 1 (indicating that the partial correlations are small relative to the 
correlations and that the data is suitable for factor analysis). A test statistic of .5 or more is 
considered to be adequate for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). The KMO statistic for the present 
data was .96, considered to be ‘superb’ under Hutcheson and Sofroniou’s (1999) naming 
conventions. Finally, an examination of the KMO statistics for each individual variable in the anti-
imaging matrix found no items with a KMO statistic of less than .5 (values ranged from 8.32 to 
9.81). 
The items on all of the scales were examined for normality. Very few of the items 
evidenced both acceptable skewness and kurtosis (< .80 and < 3, respectively; Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2014). This tendency was particularly evident in items comprising an overt expression of prejudice, 
which were often positively skewed and leptokurtic, together indicating that there was a high level 
of peakedness towards the lower scores on these items. Following Log10, square root, and 
reciprocal transformations, skewness and kurtosis were still at unacceptable levels. Given that such 
attitudes appear to be in decline in the Western world, floor effects among these items may be 
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unavoidable. As such, a robust estimation method available in the MPlus structural equation 
modelling software version 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 2011), weighted least squares controlling for 
means and variance (WLSMV), was used. This estimator has been recommended elsewhere as “the 
best option for modelling categorical or ordered data” (Proitsi et al., 2011) because it does not 
make assumptions about normality. 
5.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
Parallel analysis was conducted using SPSS syntax provided by O’Connor (2000). The 
analysis produced five hypothetical 95th percentile eigenvalues (2.07, 1.99, 1.93, 1.88, and 1.85) that 
were exceeded by their corresponding true eigenvalues in the factor analysis (37.97, 11.47, 4.14, 
2.94, and 2.10) and a sixth hypothetical eigenvalue (1.81) that exceeded its corresponding true 
eigenvalue (1.75), suggesting the retention of five factors. Thus, the EFA was initially conducted 
forcing a five-factor solution. An inspection of the rotated matrix revealed that the fifth comprised 
items with factor loadings below the .5 cut-off set herein (relevant absolute loadings ranged from 
.31 to .49). The items loading on this factor appear to tap selectivity in choosing gay friends based 
on their fulfilment of romanticised expectations of gay men (i.e., the failed gay). However, items 
such as “Gay men who aren’t fashionable have not succeeded as a gay person”, which loaded onto 
this factor, also loaded strongly (i.e., > .5) onto the first factor, which resembled repellent 
homoprejudice. Given the apparent ambiguous wording of the items loading most strongly onto 
the fifth factor, the analysis was re-run forcing a four-factor solution. 
Given the possibility for positive and negative attitudinal substrates to correlate positively 
with each other (i.e., ambivalence), the analysis was conducted using a geomin rotation (δ = 0). 
This oblique rotation method is advantageous because it allows the factors to correlate with each 
other (reflecting the complexities of the underlying factors), but provides a more easily 
interpretable solution than other oblique rotations (Sass & Schmitt, 2010). The factor correlation 
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matrix showed an above-marginal correlation (i.e., > .32; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014) between the 
two hostile factors and between the two benevolent factors, supporting this analytic decision. 
The aforementioned item reduction criteria were applied to every iteration of the factor 
analysis, with deletion priority given to those items with low factor loadings (< .50), then to items 
with high cross-loadings (≥ .32), then to excessively-correlating items (r ≥ .90), and finally to items 
with unclear, confusing, or ambiguous wording. A snapshot of the initial 96-item factor analysis 
and each item’s subsequent deletion record is included as Appendix 4. 
5.4.2.1 Further Item Reduction and Internal Consistency 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, factor loadings, and item wordings were consulted in order 
to identify further opportunities for item reduction. Items resulting in higher or largely preserved 
alpha coefficients were deleted from each factor. In the event that the deletion of one of two items 
would result in the same alpha coefficient post-deletion (i.e., a ‘tie’), the item with the lowest factor 
loading was deleted. Raubenheimer (2004) recommends retaining no fewer than three items in a 
subscale when multiple factors are extracted, in order to preserve the factor’s internal consistency. 
Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) similarly suggest retaining between four and 
six items per factor. Conceptual breadth is also another important factor in deciding item retention; 
whereas narrow and concrete constructs can be measured adequately using single item measures 
(Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007), broader constructs require greater numbers of items in order to be 
adequately captured (W. Bearden & Netemeyer, 2011). Further, this latter demand must also be 
balanced with the need for scale brevity in order to mitigate against participant fatigue (Netemeyer 
et al., 2002). Based on these criteria, six items for each factor were sought for retention, resulting 
in a 24-item scale comprising items 3, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 30, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 50, 54, 55, 68, 69, 70, 
74, 79, 81, 82, 84, and 94.  
The parallel analysis was re-run to reflect the change in the final EFA’s parameters from 
96 variables to 24. This produced four hypothetical 95th percentile eigenvalues (1.51, 1.42, 1.36, 
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and 1.32) that were exceeded by their respective true eigenvalues (8.37, 5.08, 2.72, and 1.33) and a 
fifth hypothetical eigenvalue (1.28) that exceeded its corresponding true eigenvalue (.69), 
supporting the retention of the 4-factor solution, which explained 64.87% of the variance. Subscale 
items and factor loadings can be seen in table 5.2. 
These four factors resemble the constructs of repellent, romanticised, paternalistic, and 
adversarial homoprejudice towards gay men, respectively, which were previously identified in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Items 3-23 tap the construct of repellent homoprejudice, which conveys disgust 
towards gay men, disapproval of sexual intimacy between men, and the belief that gay men are 
mentally defective. Items 30-44 tap the construct of romanticised homoprejudice, which enforces 
stereotypes pertaining to gay men’s supposed sociability and compatibility with women. Items 50-
70 tap the construct of paternalistic homoprejudice, which express the need to compensate for gay 
men’s ostensibly tragic existence by way of helping them and being kind to them. Finally, items 
74-94 tap the construct of adversarial homoprejudice, the beliefs that gay men complain too much 
about how they are treated, that they are overly-sensitive to perceived slights, and that they use 
accusations of prejudice to silence heterosexuals.  
The mean scores on each subscale were also inspected to check for floor or ceiling effects. 
These results suggested floor effects in the repellent homoprejudice subscale, which had a 
minimum possible score of 1 and a mean score of 1.47 (SD = .94). However, further inspection 
of the ranges of each item within this subscale revealed that the higher rating, 7, was also utilised 
by some participants. Rather than an issue with the subscale itself, it appears that most of the 
participants simply endorse low levels of repellent homoprejudice. The other subscales performed 
relatively better with regards to mean scores. Participants endorsed moderate levels of 
romanticised (M = 2.86, SD = 1.02), paternalistic (M = 3.50, SD = 1.16), and adversarial 
homoprejudice (M = 3.05, SD = 1.23), which were relatively closer to the scale midpoint of 4 (see 
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figure 5.1). Again, the ranges of each item in these subscales were inspected and this revealed that 
participants utilised both the upper and lower response bounds of their constituent items. 
 
Item 
Factor 
 1 2 3 4 
3. Gay men should be banned from working with children .88 -.01 -.04 .04 
8. Gay men are revolting .82 -.01 -.05 .12 
10. Gay men are immoral .87 -.07 .05 .07 
16. Gay men should seek therapy to treat their condition 1.08 .01 .05 -.05 
20. Physical intimacy between two men is against nature .79 .02 -.01 .11 
23. Gay men are a blight on society .86 .04 .02 -.01 
30. Gay men are a great source of gift ideas -.15 .62 .04 .27 
37. Every friendship circle needs a sassy gay friend .14 .84 -.04 -.07 
39. Everyone needs a gay best friend .02 .85 -.04 -.05 
41. Behind every great woman is a fabulous gay best friend .24 .74 -.03 -.01 
42. Gay men know what turns a good night out into a great night out -.14 .62 .12 .29 
44. A gay man will never fail to make their friends laugh .01 .60 .17 .12 
50. It’s important to help gay men because they’ve been through so much -.05 .12 .75 -.04 
54. People should be nice to gay men because of the tough time they have .06 .10 .83 .03 
55. Gay men have it rough, so everyone needs to do what they can to make up for it .03 .01 .72 -.07 
68. People should feel sorry for gay men because of their struggles .05 -.04 .78 .06 
69. Gay men deserve sympathy for all that they go through -.05 -.03 .77 -.04 
70. It’s hard to imagine how gay men cope with everything they have to go through -.03 -.01 .70 -.02 
74. Gay men need to stop making such a fuss about their sexuality .09 .00 -.18 .74 
79. Gay men exaggerate the amount of prejudice they experience .11 -.01 -.12 .74 
81. One cannot say anything about gay men without being accused of prejudice .10 .02 .04 .72 
82. Many people are afraid of criticising gay men for fear of being accused of being 
prejudiced 
.01 -.13 .10 .68 
84. Gay men readily perceive criticism as prejudice -.03 .01 -.02 .83 
94. It seems gay men always find some new issue to complain about .26 .03 -.09 .58 
Table 5.2: Loadings on factor: 1) Repellent; 2) Romanticised; 3) Paternalistic; and 4) Adversarial homoprejudice. 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
                                                          
8 Oblique rotated factor loadings are regression coefficients and can be larger than 1 in magnitude. If this is caused 
by negative residual variance (i.e., a Heywood case; Kolenikov & Bollen, 2012), this can suggest model 
misspecification or that the sample size is not large enough (Jöreskog, 1999). The residual variance for item 16 was 
.07 (the other items also had positive residual variances), meaning that this is not a Heywood case. 
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Figure 5.1: Mean scores for the repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales (N 
= 500) 
Next, reliability checks were performed. Internal consistency was analysed using 
Cronbach’s alpha (α). These analyses showed that the repellent (α = .93, 95% CI = .92 - .94), 
adversarial (α = .88, 95% CI = .86 - .90), romanticised (α = .84, 95% CI = .81 - .86), and 
paternalistic homoprejudice (α = .88, 95% CI = .86 - .90) subscales demonstrated good internal 
consistency.  
Together, the higher measures of reliability produced by the repellent homoprejudice 
subscale as compared to the other subscales indicates potential item redundancy. To investigate 
this further, average inter-item correlations between the repellent homoprejudice subscale items 
were consulted. As compared to the average inter-item correlation in the adversarial (r = .54), 
romanticised (r = .46), and paternalistic homoprejudice (r = .56) subscales, the average inter-item 
correlation in the repellent homoprejudice subscale (r = .71) was substantially higher. Clark and 
Watson (1995) suggest that ideal average inter-item correlations for narrow constructs such as 
those measured by the AHS subscales should fall in the range of .40 and .50, suggesting that the 
repellent homoprejudice subscale suffers from item redundancy. This apparent redundancy will be 
addressed in the discussion section.  
5.5 Study 2a Discussion 
This chapter previously criticised the development of the MHI (Walls, 2008a) and the PPS 
(Massey, 2009) as lacking in content validity and not providing a transparent account of the 
statistical rigour therein. The methodology of Study 2a addressed the first of these issues; the 
content validity of the AHS was assured by generating scale items based on the theorising detailed 
in Chapter 3 and on the empirical findings detailed in Chapter 4, and a surplus of prospective items 
were generated so as to demonstrate that the latent construct had been adequately sampled from. 
The second of these issues was addressed in Study 2a by providing an account of the criteria used 
to retain (or delete) items and factors, and every item’s initial factor loading. 
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The results of Study 2a suggest that the AHS demonstrates a multidimensional factor 
structure consistent with the previous theorising and empirical findings which asserted that 
ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men comprises repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and 
paternalistic homoprejudice. Although these factors share certain stereotype contents (i.e., both 
repellent and adversarial homoprejudice emphasise gay men’s perceived coldness), the present 
findings support the thesis that these are discrete subdomains of ambivalent homoprejudice. 
Examination of each subscale’s descriptive statistics showed that the participants endorsed 
moderate levels of adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice towards gay men. 
However, the repellent homoprejudice subscale suffered from floor effects, which has also been 
demonstrated elsewhere with regards to a similar measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice, 
Herek’s (1984) ATG (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). This is most likely due to such attitudes 
becoming less acceptable in Western cultural contexts (Twenge, Sherman, & Wells, 2016), 
highlighting the need for alternative measures – such as the other AHS subscales – able to capture 
different dimensions of homoprejudice.  
Reliability analyses suggest that the AHS demonstrates good internal consistency. 
However, the disproportionately high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and average inter-item 
correlation of the repellent homoprejudice subscale suggest that this subscale also suffers from 
item redundancy. This has also been found elsewhere in studies using the ATG; McDermott and 
Blair (2012), for example, cite Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .81 to .96, with the upper bound 
suggesting item redundancy here. Despite these findings, closer inspection of the repellent 
homoprejudice item wordings does not flag up any overly repetitious themes. For instance, the 
belief that homosexuality is unnatural (i.e., a scientific perspective) cannot necessarily be equated 
with the belief that homosexuality is immoral (i.e., a sociocultural perspective). From a content 
validity perspective, these items should be retained because each item taps the underlying construct 
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in qualitatively different ways. For this reason, no items were omitted from the repellent 
homoprejudice subscale at this stage. 
Together, the findings covered thus far represent a promising advancement in the 
homoprejudice literature and attest to the successful theorising and data analysis covered in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Study 2b aims to extend these findings by assessing the stability of the AHS’s 
factor structure in a second sample using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and providing 
additional reliability analyses. 
5.6 Study 2b Methods 
5.6.1 Participants 
 As covered in Section 5.2.2, 301 of the 801 participants were randomly sampled for the 
CFA. The demographics of these participants can be found in that section in table 5.1. 
5.6.2 Materials and Procedure 
 The same materials and procedure used in Study 2a were used in Study 2b. These are 
detailed in Section 5.2.3. 
5.6.3 Data Analytic Strategy 
 CFA is a multivariate statistical technique belonging to a collection of statistical methods 
known as structural equation modelling (SEM). CFA tests a priori theoretical hypotheses by 
assessing how well the researcher’s proposed model fits the data, thus providing a means of 
assessing a scale’s construct validity. For this reason, it is an integral step in the latter stages of scale 
development after exploratory factor analysis has been conducted (T. Brown, 2006; MacCallum & 
Austin, 2000), because it demonstrates the stability of a factor structure across different samples. 
Unlike EFA, which does not control for error variance (e.g., measurement error) and 
creates ‘phantom’ factors (i.e., scree) in an attempt to explain the maximum possible variance, in 
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CFA the researcher can model relatively error-free latent variables by accounting for this error. As 
well as this, the fit indexes garnered through CFA allow the researcher to compare the fit of 
multiple competing models in order to assess which latent variables best explain the observed 
variables (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). 
 Numerous fit indices were consulted to evaluate the appropriateness of each proposed 
model. The chi-square is an absolute fit index that “assesses the magnitude of discrepancy between 
the sample and fitted covariances matrices” (Hu & Bentler, 1999, p. 2) and indicates poor fit when 
it is statistically significant because this signifies a significant difference between the proposed 
matrix and the sample it is being fitted to. However, this index is extremely sensitive to large 
sample sizes, resulting in inflated false negatives. Wheaton, Muthén, Alwin, and Summer (1977) 
propose using the normed chi-square, Q, by dividing the chi-square value by the degrees of 
freedom. Numerous thresholds have been suggested (see Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) but 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) offer the most conservative threshold, suggesting that a chi-
square/degrees of freedom ratio of <2 indicates excellent model fit. 
 The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) – a widely-used measure of model 
fit – was also consulted. Values close to .06 are considered to indicate good model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). As well as this, the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval should ideally be 
close to 0 (indicating perfect fit), whereas the upper bound should ideally not exceed .08 (Hooper 
et al., 2008). 
 The comparative fit index (CFI), which can range from 0 to 1, was also consulted as a 
measure of good fit. Byrne (1994) suggests that a CFI of >.93 indicates acceptable model fit. 
Finally, the Tucker-Lewis index, another comparative fit index, was consulted and Hu and Bentler 
(1999) suggest that values >.95 indicated acceptable model fit. 
 
 
 
137 
 
5.6.4 Proposed Models 
 Four models will be tested in order to explore any other unforeseen factor structures 
underlying the AHS. The first model to be tested will be a unidimensional factor structure with 
the underlying latent variable defined as ambivalence towards gay men. In this model, all 24 items 
will be forced to load onto this single factor. Scale unidimensionality – that is, when all scale items 
load onto a single factor – has been described as a “top priority in scale development” (Herche & 
Engelland, 1996), presumably because such unidimensionality appeals to the Ockhamist notion 
that a simpler proposition is preferable to a more complex one. Not only is ascertaining whether 
a measure is unidimensional or multidimensional important from a validity perspective, but it is 
also important from a reliability perspective; though a set of items may reliably measure a construct, 
a reliability index does not indicate what construct the items are actually measuring (Hattie, 1985). 
In other words, the four AHS subscales may have demonstrated similarly high levels of reliability 
because they all measure the same underlying construct of ambivalence towards gay men. 
 The second proposed model is a 2-factor model representing the agentic axis of the SCM 
(Fiske et al., 2002). Given that contemptuous, envious, admiring, and pitying stereotypes share 
certain stereotype contents (e.g., both repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice tap perceptions 
that gay men are incompetent), it is a possibility that the AHS is tapping gay men’s perceived 
(in)competence. As such, this model consists of the repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice 
subscales loading onto the theorised latent variable of incompetence and the adversarial and 
romanticised homoprejudice subscale loading onto the theorised latent variable of competence. 
Alternatively, the AHS subscales may be tapping the communal axis of the SCM, comprising 
warmth and coldness stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002) about gay men. Given that the ambivalent 
sexism inventory taps benevolence (i.e., warmth) and hostility (i.e., coldness) towards women 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996), such a factor structure might also underlie the AHS – especially since the 
hostile and benevolent homoprejudice factors positively correlated with each other. As such, this 
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model consists of two factors: warmth – made up of the romanticised and paternalistic 
homoprejudice subscales – and coldness – made up of the repellent and adversarial homoprejudice 
subscales. 
 The final model that will be tested is the 4-factor model proposed by the EFA, comprising 
the repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading on 
separate factors. If this factor structure is stable and valid, then it should retain its dimensionality 
across different samples and demonstrate good model fit.  
5.7 Study 2b Results 
 MPlus structural equation modelling software (Muthén & Muthén, 2011) was used to 
analyse the data using the WLSMV estimator, as was outlined in Section 5.4.1. 
5.7.1 Model Fit 
 5.7.1.1 The 1-Factor ‘Ambivalence Towards Gay Men’ Model 
 The 1-factor model with all 24 AHS items loading onto a single factor representing general 
ambivalence towards gay men demonstrated poor model fit; χ2 (252) = 3251.75, p <.001; Q = 
12.90, RMSEA = .20 (90% CI: .19 - .21), CFI = .56, TLI = .52. These findings suggest that 
ambivalent homoprejudice is most likely a multidimensional construct that is inadequately 
characterised by a single latent variable. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.5. 
 5.7.1.2 The 2-Factor ‘Competence-Incompetence’ Model 
 This 2-factor model, with the adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice subscales 
loading onto a ‘competence’ factor and the repellent and paternalistic subscales loading onto an 
‘incompetence’ factor demonstrated better model fit than the 1-factor model, but also did not 
reach any of the goodness-of-fit thresholds; χ2 (251) = 2764.58, p <.001; Q = 11.01, RMSEA = 
.18 (90% CI: .18 - .19), CFI = .64, TLI = .60. It is, thus, unlikely that the AHS only measures 
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stereotypes of gay men as either competent or incompetent. The path diagram of this model is 
shown in figure 5.6. 
 5.7.1.3 The 2-Factor ‘Warmth-Coldness’ Model 
 This 2-factor model, with the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales 
loading onto a ‘warmth’ factor and the repellent and adversarial subscales loading onto a ‘coldness’ 
factor demonstrated a markedly improved model fit as compared to the previous two models, with 
all fit indexes marginally below the thresholds necessary to assert adequate goodness-of-fit; χ2 (251) 
= 1264.43, p <.001; Q = 5.04, RMSEA = .12 (90% CI: .11 - .12), CFI = .85, TLI = .84. On this 
basis, it is likely that the agentic and communal dimensions of the SCM in isolation do not provide 
a nuanced account of ambivalent homoprejudice and the AHS’s latent variables. The path diagram 
of this model is shown in figure 5.7. 
 5.7.1.4 The 4-Factor ‘Ambivalent Homoprejudice’ Model 
 The 4-factor model advanced on the basis of the EFA, comprising the four 6-item 
subscales pertaining to repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice 
demonstrated good model fit on all of the aforementioned fit indices: χ2 (246) = 459.80, p <.001; 
Q = 1.87; RMSEA = .054 (90% CI: .046, .061); CFI = .97; and TLI = .97. By comparison, neither 
of the 2-factor models, nor the 1-factor model met any of the aforementioned goodness-of-fit 
thresholds, suggesting that the 4-factor model of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men is a 
theoretically and statistically sound model. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.89. 
5.7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 With the multidimensionality of the AHS supported by the findings from the CFA, the 
descriptive statistics of the four subscales were once again consulted. As was also found in Study 
                                                          
9 Because it was not necessary to covary any of the items in my analyses to improve model fit, I have not graphically 
represented error terms on the path diagrams. 
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2a, the repellent homoprejudice subscale exhibited floor effects with its low mean score (M = 1.50, 
SD = .88) whereas the participants endorsed moderate levels of adversarial (M = 3.09, SD = 1.16), 
romanticised (M = 3.03, SD = 1.03), and paternalistic homoprejudice (M = 3.45, SD = 1.12; see 
figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.2: Mean scores for the repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales  
(N = 301) 
5.7.3 Reliability Analysis 
The four subscales were once again analysed for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. These 
analyses showed that the repellent (α = .89, 95% CI = .87 - .91), adversarial (α = .85, 95% CI = 
.82 - .87), romanticised (α = .83, 95% CI = .79 - .86), and paternalistic homoprejudice (α = .84, 
95% CI = .81 - .87) subscales demonstrated good internal consistency. 
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Figure 5.3: Path diagram for the proposed 1-factor ‘general ambivalence towards gay men’ model. Zeroes precede all decimals. 
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Figure 5.4: Path diagram for the proposed 2-factor ‘competence-incompetence’ model. Zeroes precede all decimals. 
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Figure 5.5: Path diagram for the proposed 2-factor ‘warmth-coldness’ model. Zeroes precede all decimals.
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Figure 5.6: Path diagram for the proposed 4-factor model of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men. Zeroes precede all decimals. 
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5.8 Study 2b Discussion 
 The results of study 2b provide further evidence in support of the proposed 
multidimensionality of prejudice towards gay men. Four different factor structures were imposed 
on the data: a 4-factor model discerning between repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and 
paternalistic homoprejudice, as well as three other competing models tapping the agentic and 
communal models of the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and general ambivalence towards gay men. The 
CFA results showed that the 4-factor model informed by the prior theory development, qualitative 
findings, and EFA demonstrated excellent model fit, whereas the other models did not meet any 
of the fit index thresholds. As well as this, each subscale once again demonstrated favourable 
internal consistency. 
 As was also seen in Study 2a, floor effects were observed in the repellent homoprejudice 
subscale. Similar results have been found elsewhere in Canadian, Irish, and North American 
research contexts (Morrison & Morrison, 2003; Morrison et al., 2005; McDermott & Blair, 2012) 
with regards to the ATG (Herek, 1984) and this is likely due to the apparent decline in self-reported 
old-fashioned homoprejudice towards gay men in the West (Twenge, et. al., 2016). Of the entire 
sample of 801 participants, only 29 (3.62%) of them had a mean score of at least 4 (the scale 
midpoint) on the repellent homoprejudice subscale. This may be partly due to the demographics 
of the sample, which was predominantly female, white, well-educated, and secular, which have all 
been related to lower levels of old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, 
& Tsang, 2009; Petersen & Hyde, 2010; Whitley, Jr., 2009).  
 However, the mean scores on the other three AHS subscales suggest that homoprejudice 
is not necessarily in decline, as many others have suggested (McCormack, 2013; Plummer, 2014; 
Twenge et al., 2016). Rather, the present findings suggest that prejudice towards gay men is taking 
more covert and positively-valenced forms that – on the face of it – appear legitimate or even 
beneficent but nonetheless nullify gay men’s experiences of prejudice and discrimination (Nadal 
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et al., 2011), enforce prescriptive stereotypes (Conley et al., 2002), and undermine feelings of sexual 
pride (Corbett, 1994). This further highlights the need to reconceptualise and operationalise 
homoprejudice as both benevolence and hostility in order to more holistically capture the changing 
nature of homoprejudice towards gay men. 
Although the stability of the AHS’s factor structure has been established, further 
exploration of the AHS’s construct validity (Study 2c) and test-retest reliability (Study 3) is required 
in order to assure its psychometric utility. These studies will be detailed in the next Chapter. 
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6. Chapter Six 
Additional Psychometric Assessment of the Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale 
6.1 Purpose of Study 2c 
 Construct validity is defined by Mokkink et al. (2010), as “The degree to which the scores 
of an… instrument are consistent with hypotheses (for instance with regard to internal 
relationships, relationships to scores of other instruments, or differences between relevant groups) 
based on the assumption that the… instrument validly measures the construct to be measured” 
(p. 743). The internal relationship between the items of the AHS items was demonstrated in 
Chapter 5 by way of EFA (Study 2a) and CFA (Study 2b). Study 2c thus aims to provide evidence 
that the AHS behaves logically in relation to construct-relevant attitudinal and personality 
measures (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity), and that different groups of people theorised 
to score differently on the AHS do, in fact, score differently (i.e., known-groups validity). 
 Many published measures of old-fashioned homoprejudice towards gay men exist, 
including the ATG (Herek, 1984), which has been alluded to throughout this thesis. The ATG is 
often referred to as a “gold standard” measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice (Morrison, 
Morrison & Franklin, 2009, p. 525). It is, thus, a good benchmark against which the repellent 
homoprejudice subscale – also a measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice – can be compared in 
order to assess its construct validity. Likewise, the modern homonegativity scale (MHS; Morrison 
& Morrison, 2003) is a widely-used measure of modern hostile homoprejudice and is, accordingly, 
a good benchmark against which the adversarial homoprejudice subscale – also a measure of 
modern hostile homoprejudice – can be judged against. The homopositivity scale (HPS; Morrison 
& A. Bearden, 2007), a measure of the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men that 
has received limited attention to date also appears to be a suitable measure of the romanticised 
homoprejudice subscale’s construct validity.  
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Given the novelty of paternalistic homoprejudice in the literature, there exist no validated 
scales with which to directly assess the construct validity of the paternalistic homoprejudice 
subscale. However, given that paternalistic homoprejudice exaggerates gay men’s negative lived 
experiences and that adversarial homoprejudice nullifies those lived experiences, the construct 
validity of the former could be evidenced by how it behaves in relation to the latter. The construct 
validity of the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale could also be assessed by examining its 
relationship with other potentially related measures, such as the support for lesbian and gay human 
rights scale (SLGHRS; Ellis, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2003) and other political ideologies, such as 
social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA; Zakrisson, 2005). 
The validity of the AHS can also be assessed by comparing the scores on each subscale 
between groups theorised to score differently. As discussed in the previous chapter, the present 
sample was predominantly female, white, well-educated, and secular – all demographics found to 
be associated with lower levels of homoprejudice (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 
2009; Petersen & Hyde, 2010; Whitley, Jr., 2009). By splitting the sample into separate 
demographics (e.g., men and women) and comparing their scores on the AHS, hypothesised 
differences should be observed, attesting to the AHS’s sensitivity to individual differences. 
Given the large number of validation scales included in this study (16 in total), this thesis 
takes the unorthodox approach of stating the hypotheses in Section 3.3 after the psychometric 
properties of each of the scales used to validate the AHS are detailed in Section 3.2. This 
presentation order should make the rationale behind the hypotheses far clearer to the reader as 
compared to the alternative, where the hypotheses are presented without the necessary theoretical 
insight into the measures they pertain to. 
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6.2 Study 2c Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
 This study uses the same 801 heterosexual participants detailed in the previous chapter, 
but their results are pooled in the present analysis10. The demographics of this pooled sample can 
be seen in table 6.1. 
 Study 2c (N = 801) 
Age 
 Min 
 Max 
 M 
 SD 
 
18 
79 
31.57 
11.94 
Gender 
 Men 
 Women 
 Other 
 
266 
531 
4 
Sexuality 
 Exclusively heterosexual 
 Mostly heterosexual 
 
629 
172 
Education 
 None 
 GCSEs/O-levels 
 AS/A-levels 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 
4 
25 
214 
291 
206 
61 
Race 
 White 
 Black 
 Asian 
 Mixed 
 Other 
 
706 
21 
42 
25 
7 
Religious service attendance 
 Never 
 On special occasions 
 Now and then 
 Weekly 
 
426 
215 
93 
67 
 Table 6.1: Heterosexual participant demographics for Study 2c. 
 A further 75 nonheterosexual participants also completed the survey and were retained for 
known-groups analyses. The demographics of this sample can be seen in table 6.2. 
 
                                                          
10 Due to the random assignment of validation scales, which gives the researcher a greater diversity of hypotheses to 
test (Rye & Meaney, 2010) it was necessary to pool the Study 2a and 2b samples at this stage in order to maintain 
statistical power. 
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 Study 2c (N = 75) 
Age 
 Min 
 Max 
 M 
 SD 
 
18 
72 
31.56 
13.16 
Gender 
 Men 
 Women 
 Other 
 
56 
15 
4 
Sexuality 
 Exclusively Gay/Lesbian 
 
33 
 Mostly Gay/Lesbian 11 
 Bisexual 22 
 Other 9 
Education 
 None 
 GCSEs/O-levels 
 AS/A-levels 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 
1 
3 
22 
26 
16 
7 
Race 
 White 
 Black 
 Asian 
 Mixed 
 Other 
 
69 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Religious service attendance 
 Never 
 On special occasions 
 Now and then 
 Weekly 
 
47 
16 
11 
1 
Table 6.2: Nonheterosexual participant demographics for Study 2c. 
6.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
In addition to the aforementioned demographic questions regarding the participants’ age, 
gender, country of residence, sexual orientation, highest educational attainment, and religious 
service attendance, participants were also randomly assigned to complete between one and three11 
of the following additional measures. Question order was randomised. Some measures have been 
rescaled as a 7-point Likert scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) for 
the sake of response consistency for the participants; research evidence suggests that this does not 
                                                          
11 At the beginning of testing, participants completed only 1 additional validation measure. This was gradually 
increased to 2, and then to 3 additional measures according to the varying research demands. 
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compromise the data (Dawes, 2008). It will be explicitly stated which measures have been rescaled 
in their respective sections. 
6.2.2.1 The Ambivalence towards Men Inventory (AMI; Glick & Fiske, 1999) is a 20-
item measure of ambivalent attitudes towards men. In the present study, 179 women between the 
ages of 18 and 72 (M = 34.54, SD = 13.21) completed this measure. Ten items measure hostile 
attitudes towards men (AMI-H) and tap resentment of men’s paternalism towards women (e.g., 
“Most men pay lip service to equality for women, but can’t handle having a woman as an equal”, 
p. 536), compensatory gender differentiation (e.g., “When it comes down to it, most men are really 
like children”, p. 536), and heterosexual hostility (e.g., “A man who is sexually attracted to a woman 
typically has no morals about doing whatever it takes to get her in bed”, p. 536). The other ten 
items measure benevolence towards men (AMI-B) and tap maternalism (e.g., “Men are mainly 
useful to provide financial security for women”, p. 536), complementary gender differentiation 
(e.g., “Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies than women are”, p. 536), and heterosexual 
intimacy (e.g., “Women are incomplete without men”, p. 536). This measure was rescaled from a 
6-point to a 7-point Likert scale with the addition of a ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ option. Subscale 
scores are derived separately for each of these subscales by averaging the scores on each 10-item 
subscale, with response options ranging from 1 (low hostility and benevolence) to 7 (high hostility 
and benevolence).  
 Glick & Fiske (1999) report alphas between .81 and .86 for the hostility towards men 
subscale and between .79 and .83 for the benevolence towards men subscale. The present study 
found alphas of .86 (95% CI: .82 - .89) and .87 (95% CI: .85 - .90) for the hostile and benevolent 
subscales, respectively. Research using this measure in England has shown positive correlations 
between the hostile and benevolent subscales for men (r = .55) and women (r = .78), 
demonstrating its validity as a measure of ambivalence, though the strength of this association 
differs cross-culturally; for instance, women’s benevolence and hostility towards men are less 
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strongly correlated in Peru (r = .19; Glick et al., 2004). Ambivalence towards men is correlated 
with gender inequality indices in 16 nations, including the United Kingdom (Glick et al., 2004), 
because such attitudes position men as naturally and rightfully dominant. 
 6.2.2.2 The Altruism Scale (AS; Rushton, Chrisjon, & Fekken, 1981) is a 20-item measure 
of the tendency to perform altruistic acts and help others (e.g., “I have given directions to a 
stranger”, p. 297). One item, “I have made change for a stranger” (p. 297) was omitted, due to its 
unclear wording, resulting in a 19-item measure. In the present study, 27 men and 58 women 
between the ages of 18 and 69 (M = 31.01, SD = 11.75) completed this measure. Responses were 
coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Very often’ and item scores were averaged, 
with item response options ranging from 1 (low frequency of altruistic behaviours) to 5 (high 
frequency of altruistic behaviours). Rushton et al. (1981) report alpha coefficients between .78 and 
.87, and the present study reports a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 (95% CI: .81, .90). Furthermore, 
Rushton et al. (1981) report that high scores on the AS predict signing up for organ donation, and 
other real-world altruistic behaviours.  
 6.2.2.3 The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a 22-item 
multidimensional measure of hostile and benevolent attitudes towards women. In the present 
study, 84 men completed this measure; no women completed this measure. The hostile sexism 
subscale (ASI-H) comprises eleven items measuring adversarial attitudes towards women (e.g., 
“Women seek to gain power by getting control over men”, p. 512) and the remaining eleven items 
tap benevolent sexism (ASI-B) comprising protective paternalism, the belief that women should 
be protected and lauded by men (e.g., “A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man”, 
p. 512); complementary gender differentiation, the belief that men and women have separate yet 
complementary characteristics (e.g., “Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess”, 
p. 512); and heterosexual intimacy, the desire for men to be romantically intimate with women 
(e.g., “Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores”, p. 512). Subscale scores are derived 
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separately for each of these subscales. This measure was rescaled from a 6-point to a 7-point Likert 
scale with the addition of a ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ option. Subscale scores are derived 
separately for each of these subscales by averaging the scores on each 11-item subscale, with item 
response options ranging from 1 (low hostility and benevolence) to 7 (high hostility and 
benevolence). 
Glick and Fiske (1996) report acceptable Cronbach’s alpha levels between α = .80 and α = 
.92 for the hostile sexism subscale and between α = .73 and α = .85 for the benevolent sexism 
subscale. The present study found alphas of .93 (95% CI: .90, .95) and .86 (95% CI: .81, .90) for 
the hostile and benevolent sexism subscales, respectively. Research using the ASI in England has 
shown the two subscales to be moderately positively correlated for men (.31), yet negatively 
correlated for women (-.51), demonstrating its validity as a measure of men’s ambivalent sexism, 
though the strength and direction of these correlations differ substantially cross-culturally (Glick 
et al., 2000). Despite the ostensibly positive attitude content of benevolent sexism, the ASI has 
been found to be associated with rape myth acceptance (Chapleau, Oswald, & Russell, 2007) and 
disparaging attitudes towards rape survivors (Sakallı-Uğurlu, Yalçın, & Glick, 2007). 
 6.2.2.4 The Attitudes towards Gay Men Scale (ATG; Herek, 1984) is a 38-item 
unidimensional measure of condemning (e.g., “Homosexual behaviour between two men is just 
plain wrong”, p. 51) and tolerant (e.g., “It would be very easy for men to have a conversation with 
a man I know to be gay”, p. 51) attitudes towards gay men. In the present study, 22 men and 60 
women between the ages of 18 and 63 (M = 31.60, SD = 11.27) completed the ATG. This measure 
was rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with 
item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of sexual prejudice) to 7 (high levels of sexual 
prejudice). One item, “The growing number of gay men indicates a decline in American morals” 
(p. 51) was reworded to reflect the British research context. Herek (1984) does not report reliability 
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of the 38-item iteration of this scale, although the 10-item version obtained an acceptable alpha of 
.89 in Herek (1988). The present analysis yielded an acceptable alpha of .90 (95% CI: .86, .93). 
 The ATG correlates positively (r = .57) with the ‘Hate’ subscale of the lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual knowledge and attitudes scale for heterosexuals (LGB-KASH; R. Worthington, Dillon, & 
Becker-Schutte, 2005). Inversely, the ATG is negatively correlated (rs = -.35 to -.45) with positive 
contact with gay men (Herek, 1988). 
 6.2.2.5 The Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality Scale (EBHS; Haslam & Levy, 
2006) is a 15-item multidimensional measure of the belief in: 1) The defining features of 
homosexuality (seven items; e.g., “Knowing that someone is homosexual or heterosexual tells you 
a lot about them”, p. 483); 2) The biological bases of homosexuality (five items; e.g., 
“Homosexuality and heterosexuality are innate, genetically based tendencies”, p. 483); and 3) The 
historical and cultural universality of homosexuality (two items; e.g., “Homosexuals have probably 
existed throughout human history”, p. 483). One item, “Bisexual people are fooling themselves 
and should make up their minds” (p. 483) was omitted, due to its reference to bisexuality, which 
was not immediately relevant to the present study. In the present study, 26 men and 34 women 
between the ages of 18 and 59 (M = 28.80, SD = 10.74) completed the EBHS. Items was rescaled 
from a 9-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response 
options ranging from 1 (low endorsement of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality) to 7 (high 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality). 
The authors do not cite any measures of reliability in their paper, however, the present data 
suggests that the first and third subscales evidence poor reliability (α = .01 & Spearman-Brown 
coefficient = .30; 95% CI: .09, .68) respectively). This is potentially due to two reasons. Firstly, the 
first subscale is derived from a number of unusually low factor loadings (as low as .48, explaining 
as little as 23% the variance in its latent factor; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2014). Secondly, the third 
subscale is composed of only two items, making inconsistent response patterns far more salient 
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than in scales with larger numbers of items. As such, the present study will only analyse data in the 
second 5-item subscale, which evidenced acceptable internal consistency (α = .81; 95% CI: .71, 
.87) and best represents current biological determinist arguments about the aetiology of human 
sexuality (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Greater scores reflect greater endorsement of biological 
essentialist beliefs about nonheterosexuality. 
 6.2.2.6 The Homopositivity Scale (HPS; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) is a 9-item 
measure of positive stereotypical beliefs about gay men (e.g., “Most gay men have a flawless sense 
of taste”, p. 89). In the present study, 33 men and 49 women between the ages of 18 and 65 (M = 
29.48, SD = 10.90) completed the HPS. Items were rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-
point Likert scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low 
homopositivity) to 7 (high homopositivity). The authors report alpha coefficients between .72 and 
.85, indicating acceptable internal consistency and the present study demonstrates a similarly 
acceptable Cronbach’s alpha (α = .94; 95% CI: .91, .96). The scale’s convergent validity is also 
demonstrated inasmuch as homopositivity correlates moderately positively with benevolent sexism 
but not with hostile sexism. Greater endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men is also 
associated with greater exposure to gay men in the media (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). 
 6.2.2.7 The Global Just World Scale (JWS; Lipkus, 1991) is a 7-item scale measuring the 
belief that the world is, generally, a fair and just place (e.g., “I feel that people get what they are 
entitled to have”, p. 1173).  In the present study, 29 men and 46 women between the ages of 18 
and 63 (M = 29.12, SD = 10.66) completed this measure. The JWS was rescaled from a 6-point 
Likert scale to a 7-point scale and items scores were averaged, with item response options ranging 
from 1 (strong belief that the world is unjust) to 7 (strong belief that the world is just). Lipkus 
(1991) cites an acceptable alpha coefficient of .83, indicating a psychometrically sound scale, and 
the present analysis yields an alpha of .83 (95% CI: .77, .88) in support of this. Greater endorsement 
in the belief in a just world is associated with greater internal locus of control – the belief that the 
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self is agentic and can control its own fate (i.e., that the world is just) – suggesting favourable 
convergent validity (Lipkus, 1991). 
 6.2.2.8 The Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPRS; Dunton & 
Fazio, 1997) is a unidimensional 17-item measure of the extent to which individuals are concerned 
by being perceived as prejudiced (e.g., “In today’s society it is important that one not be perceived 
as prejudiced in any manner”, p. 319) and the exercising of restraint to avoid disputes (e.g., “I 
always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they might be”, p. 319). 
One item, “If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion 
with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint” (p. 319) was reworded 
to refer to ‘a gay man’ instead. In the present study, 31 men and 74 women between the ages of 
19 and 63 (M = 33.36, SD = 12.67) completed the MCPRS. This measure was rescaled from a 6-
point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options 
ranging from 1 (low motivation to control prejudice reactions) to 7 (high motivation to control 
prejudice reactions). The authors cite an acceptable internal consistency of .81, and the present 
analysis yields an alpha of .75 (95% CI: .68, .82), corroborating this. Elsewhere, Akrami and 
Ekehammar (2005) found that the relationship between explicit and implicit measures of prejudice 
can only be detected once the motivation to control prejudiced reactions is controlled for. 
 6.2.2.9 The Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS; Morrison & Morrison, 2003) is a 
unidimensional 12-item measure of the belief that: 1) gay men and lesbian women make illegitimate 
demands for change (e.g., “Many gay men use their sexual orientation so that they can obtain 
special privileges”, p. 25); 2) discrimination towards gay men and lesbian women no longer occurs 
(e.g., “Gay men do not have all the rights they need” (reverse-coded, p. 25); and 3) gay men and 
lesbian women exaggerate the significance of their sexuality and prevent themselves from being 
accepted by wider society as a result (e.g., “Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down other 
people’s throats”, p. 25). In the present study, 27 men and 58 women between the ages of 18 and 
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79 (M = 29.14, SD = 12.75) completed the MHS. This measure was rescaled from a 5-point Likert 
scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 
(low modern homonegativity) to 7 (high homonegativity). The authors demonstrate a good level 
of internal consistency, citing alphas ranging between .90 and .91, and the present analyses yields 
an acceptable alpha level of .90 (95% CI: .86, .93). 
 The MHS evidences a moderate to strong positive correlation with measures of old-
fashioned anti-gay prejudice, yet scores on the MHS are consistently higher than those on measures 
of old-fashioned prejudice, suggesting that modern prejudice is more societally acceptable than 
old-fashioned prejudice (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). Furthermore, men evidence significantly 
higher levels of modern homonegativity than do women, as is also the case with old-fashioned 
homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003; McDermott & Blair, 2012). Higher levels of modern 
homonegativity has also been found to predict seating preference with or away from a visibly gay 
person (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). 
 6.2.2.10 The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI; Walls, 2008a) is a 
multidimensional 23-item measure of heterosexuals’ positive and negative attitudes towards gay 
men and lesbian women with four subscales: 1) Paternalistic heterosexism (MHI-Pa), the 
preference for heterosexual children out of concern for the child’s wellbeing (e.g., “I would prefer 
my son not be homosexual because it would be unfairly harder for him to adopt or have children”, 
p. 48); 2) Aversive heterosexism (MHI-Av), akin to modern homonegativity (e.g., “Gay men 
should stop shoving their lifestyle down everyone’s throat”, p. 48); 3) Amnestic heterosexism 
(MHI-Am), the denial of continued prejudice and discrimination towards gay men and lesbian 
women (e.g., “Gay men are treated as fairly as everyone else in today’s society”, p. 49); and 4) 
Positive-stereotypic heterosexism (MHI-Po), the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay 
men and lesbian women (e.g., “Gay men are more compassionate than heterosexual men”, p. 49). 
For the purposes of the present study, items pertaining to lesbians were either reworded where 
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possible or omitted entirely where rewording would not have been consistent with prevailing 
stereotypes about gay men (e.g., “Lesbians (gay men) are better than heterosexual women (men) 
at auto maintenance and repair”, p. 49). One further item was reworded to refer to the United 
Kingdom rather than North America. Based on these criteria, 16 items (4 paternalistic, 6 aversive, 
4 amnestic, and 2 positive-stereotypic) pertaining to gay men were used. In the present study, 35 
men and 50 women between the ages of 18 and 72 (M = 30.35, SD = 11.72) completed the MHI. 
This measure was rescaled from a 6-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item responses were 
averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of heterosexism) to 7 (high levels 
of heterosexism). 
All of the subscales evidence acceptable levels of internal consistency in Walls (2008a), 
with alpha coefficients ranging from .79 to .94. In the present analysis, the paternalistic, aversive, 
and amnestic, subscales produced acceptable Cronbach’s alpha levels of .86 (95% CI: .82, .91), .92 
(95% CI: .89, .94), .73 (95% CI: .62, .81). The 2-item measure of positive-stereotypic heterosexism 
towards gay men also demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Spearman-Brown coefficient 
= .74, 95% CI: .59, .83). Aversive and amnestic heterosexism have been found to be positively 
correlated with political conservativism, and heterosexual women appear more likely to endorse 
positive stereotypes about gay men than are heterosexual men (Walls, 2008a), which has been 
echoed elsewhere with regards to the homopositivity scale (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). The 
paternalistic heterosexism subscale behaved inconsistently in the series of studies conducted by 
Walls (2008a) and limited evidence for its validity exists. For the sake of completeness, and to 
compare the construct of paternalistic heterosexism with the construct of paternalistic 
homoprejudice forwarded in this thesis, it was included nonetheless. 
 6.2.2.11 The Polymorphous Prejudice Scale (PPS; Massey, 2009) is a 70-item measure 
of a range of positive and negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women. Given that some 
of these constructs were already captured exhaustively by other scales, such as the MHS and the 
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ATG, only a selection of 6 of the PPS items from the positive beliefs subscale (e.g., “Straight men 
have a lot to learn from gay men about being friends to women”, p. 159) were retained. In the 
present study, 27 men and 55 women between the ages of 18 and 58 (M = 31.20, SD = 11.56) 
completed the PSS. Massey (2009) does not clarify how the PPS is scaled, so they were scaled here 
as a 7-point Likert scale. Item scores were averaged, resulting in total scores ranging from 1 (low 
endorsement of positive beliefs about gay men) to 7 (high endorsement of positive beliefs about 
gay men). One of the items, “The plight of lesbians and gay men will only improve when they are 
in important positions within the system” (Massey, 2009, p. 159) was reworded to omit the 
reference to lesbian women, as it was outside the scope of this investigation. Massey (2009) cites 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for this subscale and a test-retest reliability of .67. The present analysis 
yielded an alpha coefficient of .87 (95% CI: .82, .91). The positive beliefs subscale correlates 
negatively with the ATG, and positively with the valuing of gay rights progress and resistance of 
heteronormativity (Massey, 2009). 
6.2.2.12 The Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI; E. Worthington et al., 2003) is a 
10-item measure of the importance attached to one’s religious beliefs and communities (e.g., “my 
religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life”, p. 87). In the present study, 62 men and 
148 women between the ages of 18 and 79 (M = 33.10, SD = 12.70) completed the RCI, which 
was administered to approximately half of the participants who did not respond ‘Never’ to the 
demographic question ‘How often do you attend religious services?’. Responses were coded on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Not at all true of me’ to ‘Totally true of me’ and were averaged, 
with item response options ranging from 1 (low religious commitment) to 7 (high religious 
commitment).  
E. Worthington et al. (2003) cites acceptable internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .93, and good convergent and discriminant validity. In the present study, an alpha coefficient of 
.97 (95% CI: .96, .97) was found, corroborating that of E. Worthington et al. (2003). Furthermore, 
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the RCI correlates with a number of other measures of religious commitment (E. Worthington et 
al., 2003), but this measure possesses additional utility because it does not implicitly allude to 
exclusively Judeo-Christian beliefs and practices. 
 6.2.2.13 The Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA-short version; Zakrisson, 2005) 
is a unidimensional 15-item measure of conventionalism (e.g., “The “old-fashioned ways” and 
“old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live”, p. 870), authoritarian aggression (e.g., “Our 
country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in 
society today”, p. 870), and authoritarian submission (e.g., “Our forefathers ought to be honoured 
more for the way they have built our society, at the same time we ought to put an end to those 
forces destroying it”, p. 870). In the present study, 22 men and 58 women between the ages of 18 
and 69 (M = 32.56, SD = 13.04) completed this measure. Responses were scored on a 7-point 
Likert scale and then averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of RWA) to 
7 (high levels of RWA). 
Zakrisson (2005) reports that the RWA demonstrates acceptable internal consistency, with 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .72 and it an acceptable level of internal consistency is reported herein (α = 
.89; 95% CI: .85, .92). Right-wing authoritarianism has been found elsewhere to predict anti-gay 
prejudice (Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001).   
6.2.2.14 The Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, 
& Malle, 1994) is a 16-item measure of the preference for inequality among social groups (e.g., “If 
certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems”, p. 763). In the present study, 
28 men and 51 women between the ages of 18 and 63 (M = 33.42, SD = 13.11) completed this 
measure. Responses were scored on a 7-point Likert scale and then average, with item response 
options ranging from 1 (low levels of SDO) to 7 (high levels of SDO). 
Those with a high SDO tend to 1) be men; 2) seek professional roles that enhance unequal 
hierarchies; and 3) be more prejudiced and support ideologies that reaffirm hierarchical inequality 
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(Levin et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994; Whitley, Jr., 1999). Furthermore, Pratto et al. (1994) 
demonstrate that the scale has acceptable internal consistency (α = .83), which has also been 
demonstrated in the present analysis (α = .91; 95% CI: .87, .93). More recently, SDO has been 
delineated into SDO-dominance – the preference for groups to dominate others – and SDO-
egalitarianism – the preference for unequal intergroup relations – which have both been associated 
with ideologies and aggression that legitimise inequality (Ho et al., 2012). 
6.2.2.15 The Social Desirability Scale (SDS-short form; Reynolds, 1982) is a 13-item 
measure of the tendency to present oneself in a favourable manner by over-reporting desirable 
qualities (e.g., “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable”, p. 122) and by under-
reporting undesirable qualities (e.g., “I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me”, 
p.122). In the present study, 38 men and 59 women between the ages of 18 and 63 (M = 33.03, 
SD = 12.03) completed the SDS. 
 The 13-item short form of the scale demonstrates acceptable reliability (Kuder-Richardson 
Formula 20 = .76). Although the SDS typically utilises dichotomous (i.e., yes/no) responses, the 
present study used the same 7-point strongly agree to strongly disagree continuum in order to 
mitigate against some of the undesirable statistical properties of dichotomous response scales (see 
Preston & Colman, 2000). This adjustment did not undermine the reliability of the scale (α = .78, 
95% CI: .71, .84). Items were then averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low social 
desirability) to 7 (high social desirability). 
 The SDS has traditionally been used as a measure of impression management, but a more 
recent perspective suggests that the SDS may tap interpersonally oriented self-control, whereby 
those scoring highly demonstrate high levels of self-control in social contexts (Uziel, 2010). Based 
on this interpretation the SDS may be seen as a similar measure to the MCPRS, but measuring a 
more macro-level of interpersonal control. 
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 6.2.2.16 The Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Scale (SLGHRS; Ellis et 
al., 2003) is a multidimensional 25-item measure of support for: 1) social and political rights of 
sexual minorities (e.g., “Gay male couples should be legally permitted to marry, just as heterosexual 
couples are”, p. 130); 2) freedom of expression by sexual minorities (e.g., “A person’s sexual 
orientation should not block that person’s access to basic rights and freedoms”, p. 131); and 3) 
privacy of identity for sexual minorities (e.g., “A man’s homosexuality should not be raised as an 
issue in a court of law, unless the case under consideration directly relates to homosexual acts”, p. 
131). In the present study, 31 men and 50 women between the aged of 19 and 58 (M = 31.09, SD 
= 10.96) completed the SLGHRS. Many of the items were adapted to refer specifically to gay men 
and omit references to lesbian women.  
 The authors do not report any reliability statistics, and subsequent research has refuted the 
tripartite factor structure, arguing in favour of a unidimensional 14-item scale of global SLGHRS 
instead, which demonstrates acceptable reliability (α  = .86; Morrison & McDermott, 2009). The 
present study reports a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 (95% CI; .90, .95) for this 14-item iteration of the 
SLGHRS and the results reported here are based on this alternative scale. The SLHRS was rescaled 
from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response 
options ranging from 1 (low support for gay men’s human rights) to 7 (high support for gay men’s 
human rights). 
6.2.3 Parametric vs. Nonparametric Data Analysis 
The analysis of non-parametric data with parametric tests violates the theory of admissible 
statistics (Stevens, 1946) stating that the measurement level of the data should inform the choice 
of statistical test. Yet, parametric statistical analyses are routinely used to analyse ordinal Likert 
scales based on three justifications. The first justification is that – while individual items measure 
a latent variable at the ordinal level – the averaging of multiple related items produces a 
measurement scale that is interval and, thus, suitable for Pearson correlations (Carifo & Perla, 
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2008). The second justification is that – when treating Pearson and Spearman coefficients of the 
same variables as raw data and correlating them – both coefficients correlate almost perfectly, 
indicating that Pearson’s may be the more advantageous choice for its greater statistical power 
(Norman, 2010). The third and final justification is that Pearson correlations have been found to 
be robust even when measurement level and distribution assumptions are violated (Havlicek & 
Peterson, 1976).  
However, this is disputed in O’Brien (1979), who demonstrates how skew and the number 
of rank categories have compounding implications on the robustness of Pearson correlations. In 
a normally distributed sample of ordinal data, average Pearson coefficients and number of rank 
categories demonstrate a curvilinear relationship, with the lowest average coefficients being found 
at four categories. On the other hand, when the data are positively skewed (as is the case in the 
present data), average Pearson coefficients decrease as the number of rank categories increases. To 
reiterate, in positively skewed ordinal data sets, Pearson correlations become less sensitive to ‘true’ 
relationships as the number of rank categories increases. Given that the present study used 5- and 
7-point Likert scales and the data are positively skewed, O’Brien’s (1979) findings suggest that a 
Pearson correlation could underestimate the true correlations by approximately .06. Abdullah 
(1990) also suggests that Spearman’s Rho is more robust to outliers (of which there are many in 
these data) than is Pearson. As such, Spearman was used for the correlational analyses between 
the AHS and the aforementioned measures assessing convergent and divergent validity, and 
between the AHS subscales. For similar distributional reasons (see Knapp, 1990), non-parametric 
tests of difference will also be used in the known-groups analyses. For transparency, equivalent 
analyses using parametric alternatives are included in Appendix 5. 
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6.2.4 Hypotheses 
 6.2.4.1 Repellent Homoprejudice 
 Because both are measures of old-fashioned homoprejudice, the repellent homoprejudice 
subscale is hypothesised to correlate positively with the ATG. Given that the ATG correlates 
positively with the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), repellent homoprejudice is also 
hypothesised to correlate with the MHS. Further, repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to 
correlate positively MHI-Am, MHI-Av, and adversarial homoprejudice, which resemble the MHS 
in their modern homonegative item contents. The ATG has been found to correlate negatively 
with the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men (M. Brown & Groscup, 2009) As 
such, repellent is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with measures of positive stereotypes 
about gay men – namely, the HPS, PPS, MHI-Po, and the romanticised homoprejudice subscale. 
Given that MHI-Pa and paternalistic homoprejudice convey concern for sexual minorities’ 
wellbeing, they are hypothesised to correlate negatively with repellent homoprejudice. 
 The repellent homoprejudice subscale is also hypothesised to correlate positively with 
ideologies (SDO, RWA, and JW) that have been associated with higher-levels of anti-gay prejudice 
elsewhere (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014; Stones, 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). Religiosity has also 
been found to be positively correlated with anti-gay attitudes (for a meta-analysis, see Whitley, Jr., 
2009), so the RCI is hypothesised to be positively correlated with repellent homoprejudice. 
Inversely, repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with views that 
affirm and support gay men (the EBHS and SLGHRS), as has been found by Ellis et al. (2003), 
and Haslam and Levy (2006). Right-wing political ideology also appears to predict lower levels of 
altruism (Zettler & Hilbig, 2010), so repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively 
correlated with altruism. Researchers have also documented associations between anti-gay 
attitudes and ambivalent sexism (Nagoshi et al., 2008) and ambivalence towards men (Sakallı-
Uğurlu & Uğurlu, 2016), and similar positive correlations are hypothesised between repellent 
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homoprejudice and the ASI and AMI. The SDS and MCPRS should ideally be unrelated to any of 
the subscales because such a null-relationship indicates that the measure is not susceptible to 
respondents’ positive self-presentation concerns. 
Heterosexual men are routinely found to endorse more hostile attitudes towards gay men 
than do heterosexual women (Herek, 1988; Herek, 2000; LaMar & Kite, 1998; Petersen & Hyde, 
2010). As such, heterosexual men are hypothesised to evidence significantly higher levels of 
repellent homoprejudice than heterosexual women. Greater levels of hostility towards gay men 
have also been linked to lower levels of formal education (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & 
Tsang, 2009; Simoni, 1996), so repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be significantly higher 
among participants with less formal educational experience than participants with more formal 
educational experience. Given that nonheterosexuals are the targets of homoprejudice, the 
nonheterosexual sample are hypothesised to score significantly lower than the heterosexual 
participants on all of the AHS subscales. 
6.2.4.2 Romanticised Homoprejudice 
Because the HPS, PPS, and MHI-Po are all measures of positive stereotypes about gay 
men, the romanticised homoprejudice subscale is hypothesised to correlate positively with these 
measures. Romanticised homoprejudice is also hypothesised to correlate positively with the MHI-
Pa and paternalistic homoprejudice due to their similar positive valence. Given the aforementioned 
negative correlation between the ATG and the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men 
(M. Brown & Groscup, 2009), romanticised homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate negatively 
with the ATG and the repellent homoprejudice subscale. In light of research suggesting that those 
who endorse high levels of homopositivity endorse low levels of modern homonegativity 
(Morrison & A. Bearden, 2008), romanticised homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate 
negatively with the MHS, and other similar measures (MHI-Av and the adversarial homoprejudice 
subscale). Walls (2008b) has shown that the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men is 
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positively correlated with the denial of continued prejudice and discrimination against sexual 
minorities. As such, just world beliefs and amnestic heterosexism should also be positively 
correlated with romanticised homoprejudice, because such romanticisation minimises and denies 
the oppressive experience of nonheterosexuals.  
Furthermore, Walls (2005) also found that positive-stereotypic heterosexism is positively 
correlated with social dominance orientation, and reasoned that this reflected the maintenance of 
sexual orientation stratification and hierarchy legitimising beliefs. However, the previously 
reported qualitative findings showed no indication that such oppressive motivations underlie the 
romanticised homoprejudice. As such, SDO was hypothesised to be unrelated to romanticised 
homoprejudice. No research has explored the relationship between RWA and the endorsement of 
positive stereotypes about gay men and there are no compelling justifications for believing that 
they should be related. As such, romanticised homoprejudice and RWA are also hypothesised to 
be unrelated. Religiosity – as measured by quest and fundamentalism – has been found to be 
unrelated to homopositivity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), so religious commitment is 
hypothesised to be unrelated to romanticised homoprejudice. Walls (2005) also found that 
positive-stereotypic heterosexism is unrelated to support for lesbian and gay human rights, and a 
similar non-significant correlation between romanticised homoprejudice and the SLGHRS is 
hypothesised also.  
Although no research has studied the relationship between the endorsement of positive 
stereotypes about gay men and essentialist beliefs about sexuality, a positive correlation is 
hypothesised on the basis that the former reifies the latter (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Based on the 
hypothesised negative relationship between repellent homoprejudice and altruism, altruism is 
hypothesised to be positively correlated with romanticised homoprejudice. Morrison and A. 
Bearden (2007) found that homopositivity is also positively correlated with ambivalent sexism, and 
a similar positive correlation between the ASI and romanticised homoprejudice is also 
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hypothesised. Finally, given that gay men are men nonetheless, romanticised homoprejudice is 
hypothesised to correlate positively with the AMI. 
Women have been found to endorse more positive stereotypes about gay men than do 
men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). As such, women are hypothesised to score significantly 
higher on the romanticised homoprejudice scale than will men. Research on heterosexuals who 
ally themselves with LGBT causes and groups suggests that such individuals tend to be more 
highly educated, endorse a range of positive – but astereoptyic – attitudes towards sexual minorities 
(Fingerhut, 2011), and are more critical of stereotypical portrayals of gay men than those who do 
not identify themselves as allies (Goldstein & Davis, 2010; Stotzer, 2009). As such, more formally 
educated respondents in the present sample are hypothesised to evidence significantly lower levels 
of romanticised homoprejudice than will less formally educated respondents. 
6.2.4.3 Paternalistic Homoprejudice 
Little research has explored the relatively new concept of paternalism towards gay men. 
Walls (2008a) found that paternalistic heterosexism is negatively correlated with political 
conservativism. On this basis, paternalistic homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively 
correlated with prejudicial views typically associated with conservativism (i.e., ATG, MHS, MHI-
Am, MHI-Av, and repellent and adversarial homoprejudice). Paternalistic homoprejudice is also 
hypothesised to be positively correlated with other measures that transmit ostensibly positive 
sentiment towards gay men (the HPS, PPS, MHI-Pa, MHI-Po, and the romanticised 
homoprejudice subscale). Walls (2005) also found that paternalistic heterosexism was positively 
correlated with social dominance orientation. However, social dominance did not emerge in the 
theme of paternalistic homoprejudice during the qualitative analysis. As such, the two are 
hypothesised to be unrelated.  
No research has studied the relationship between paternalism towards gay men and right-
wing authoritarianism and there is no reason to hypothesise that the two would be related. 
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Likewise, there is no research evidence to suggest that paternalistic homoprejudice should be 
related to the EBHS, so no relationship is hypothesised between the two. There is also no research 
studying the relationship between paternalism towards gay men and ambivalence towards men or 
ambivalent sexism. Because paternalistic homoprejudice is conceptualised differently to the 
concepts of paternalism and maternalism in ambivalent sexism theory, no relationship is 
hypothesised between paternalistic homoprejudice and either measure of ambivalent sexism.  
Given that just world beliefs contend that the world is fair, they are hypothesised to be negatively 
correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice because the latter emphasises that the world is not fair 
to gay men. Likewise, if paternalistic homoprejudice is associated with facilitating behaviours in 
order to redress such inequality, it may be linked to altruism on a more general scale. As such, a 
positive correlation is hypothesised between paternalistic homoprejudice and the AS. 
The potential relationship between religiosity and paternalism towards gay men in unclear. 
Because religiosity appears to be related to higher levels of anti-gay prejudice, one might expect 
religiosity to be negatively correlated with paternalistic attitudes towards gay men. However, 
religiosity could equally engender a ‘love they neighbour’ response in particularly committed 
individuals, leading to a positive correlation between religious commitment and paternalistic 
homoprejudice. Research has also indicated that religious individuals delineate their negative 
attitudes towards the ‘sin’ (i.e., homosexual behaviour) and their positive attitudes towards the 
‘sinner’ (i.e., the homosexual person; Mak & Tsang, 2008; Rosik, Griffith, & Cruz, 2007). Given 
that paternalistic homoprejudice taps perceptions of societal disadvantage among gay men, rather 
than the behaviours associate with being gay, a positive correlation is hypothesised between 
religious commitment and paternalistic homoprejudice. Likewise, because paternalistic 
homoprejudice is concerned with the disadvantage experienced by gay men, this is hypothesised 
to be positively correlated with the SGLHRS. 
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Given that paternalistic homoprejudice conveys sympathetic attitudes towards gay men 
and that women appear to endorse more tolerant attitudes towards gay men than do heterosexual 
men, women are hypothesised to score significantly higher than men on the paternalistic 
homoprejudice subscale. Likewise, more formally educated respondents are hypothesised to 
endorse greater levels of paternalistic homoprejudice than those who are less formally educated 
due to a greater awareness of societal inequality. 
6.2.4.4 Adversarial Homoprejudice 
Given the similarities between the adversarial homoprejudice subscale and the MHS,  
MHI-Am, and MHI-Av, these measures are hypothesised to be positively correlated. Given the 
aforementioned positive correlation between the ATG and the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 
2003), adversarial homoprejudice is also hypothesised to correlate positively with the ATG and 
with repellent homoprejudice. Considering adversarial homoprejudice consists of claims that gay 
men use their sexuality to get special treatment, it is hypothesised to be correlated negatively with 
paternalistic homoprejudice and MHI-Pa because the latter perspectives refute that gay men get 
special treatment. Also, given the aforementioned negative relationship between homopositivity 
and modern homonegativity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), adversarial homoprejudice is 
hypothesised to correlate negatively with the HPS, PPS, MHI-Po, and romanticised 
homoprejudice. 
Research has found that the belief in a just world is negatively correlated with support for 
gay rights (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014). As such, adversarial homoprejudice is hypotheisised to 
correlate positively with the JWS, because the contention that gay men do not need more rights 
may hinge on the perception that the world is a just place. Similarly, the aforementioned research 
on the relationship between ambivalent sexism, ambivalence towards men, religiosity, social 
dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and anti-gay prejudice informs the hypotheses 
that adversarial homoprejudice will be positively correlated with the ASI, AMI, RCI, SDO and 
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RWA, respectively. Inversely, adversarial homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively 
correlated with the SGLHRS, AS, and with the EBHS, based on the aforementioned research 
associating political conservativism and hostility towards gay men with less support for gay rights, 
less altruistic behaviour, and rejection of sexuality essentialism. 
Finally, based on the aforementioned research noting gender and educational differences 
in the endorsement of hostility towards gay men, women and more formally educated respondents 
are hypothesised to score significantly lower than men and less formally educated respondents on 
the adversarial homoprejudice subscale. Given the large number of convergent and discriminant 
validity hypotheses (90 in total), they have been tabulated in Table 6.3 for clarity’s sake. 
Measure Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial 
Repellent  - - + 
Romanticised   + - 
Paternalistic    - 
Adversarial     
AMI-B + + x + 
AMI-H + + x + 
AS - + + - 
ASI-B + + x + 
ASI-H + + x + 
ATG + - - + 
EBHS - + x - 
HPS - + + - 
JWS + + - + 
MCPRS x x x x 
MHS + - - + 
MHI-Am + - - + 
MHI-Av + - - + 
MHI-Pa - + + - 
MHI-Po - + + - 
PPS - + + - 
RCI + x + + 
RWA + x x + 
SDO + x x + 
SDS x x x x 
SLGHRS - x + - 
Table 6.3: Convergent and discriminant validity hypotheses. + = positive correlation, - = negative correlation, x = 
no correlation. 
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6.3 Study 2c Results 
6.3.1 Correlations between AHS Subscales 
 Based on the research suggesting that attitudes towards gay men are particularly gendered, 
the subscale correlations were analysed separately for men and women. Spearman’s Rho with 1000 
bootstrap samples was used to analyse the data because of the widespread violations of normality. 
 As hypothesised, repellent and adversarial homoprejudice correlated positively for both 
men and women. Adversarial and paternalistic homoprejudice correlated negatively, as 
hypothesised, but this relationship was weaker among women and the confidence interval for this 
correlation (-.188 - .009) suggests a possible type-I error being made here, due to the confidence 
interval containing zero12. Paternalistic and repellent homoprejudice did correlate negatively as 
hypothesised, but this did not reach significance for either group (though the confidence intervals 
in both groups only marginally contain zero). Romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice 
correlated positively for both groups, as hypothesised. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that romanticised homoprejudice would be negatively 
correlated with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice, the analysis showed these constructs were 
actually correlated positively (see Table 6.4). 
 Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial 
Repellent - 
.172** 
[.051, .295] 
-.111 
[-.239, .020] 
.569** 
[.469, .655] 
Romanticised 
.232** 
[.154, .303] 
- 
.374** 
[.256, .481] 
.140* 
[.001, .271] 
Paternalistic 
-.073 
[-.154, .004] 
.308** 
[.227, .390] 
- 
-.251** 
[-.382, -.114] 
Adversarial 
.582** 
[.522, .635] 
.282** 
[.198, .366] 
-.091* 
[-.188, .009]† 
- 
Table 6.4: Correlational analyses between the AHS subscales. Zeroes precede all decimal points. Brackets contain 
bias-corrected accelerated 95% CI. *p<.05, **p<.01, † confidence interval suggests false positive. Men’s results are 
shown above the diagonal; women’s results are shown below the diagonal. 
                                                          
12 A type-I error (alternatively known as a false positive) may be indicated by a significant result with a confidence 
interval that contains zero. This pattern of results suggests that the null hypothesis has been incorrectly rejected. 
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These findings suggest the endorsement of potential ambivalence towards gay men and 
that the content of this ambivalence is a combination of romanticised homoprejudice and either 
repellent or adversarial homoprejudice (or, indeed, both of these hostile subdomains of 
homoprejudice). However, a problem with this interpretation is that a positive correlation may 
also found when participants disagree with both constructs, possibly suggesting indifference or 
even outright rejection of these attitudes, given the negative inferences that can be drawn from 
them. 
In order to test which combination of romanticised, repellent, and adversarial subscales 
tapped potential ambivalence, an index of ambivalence proposed by Thompson et al. (2014) was 
used:  
((
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒P + 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑁
2
) − | 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑃 − 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑁 |) + 3 
Where AttitudeP is the average score on the positive attitudinal measure (romanticised 
homoprejudice) and AttitudeN is the average score on the negative attitudinal measure (repellent 
or adversarial homoprejudice). 
This formula computes the difference between attitude intensity (derived from the mean 
of AttitudeP and AttitudeN) and attitude polarity (derived from the absolute difference between 
AttitudeP and AttitudeN), and then finally adds a constant of 3 to eliminate negative values. The 
scores on this index thus range from 1 (not at all ambivalent) to 10 (extremely ambivalent). This 
formula evidences the three desirable properties of an ambivalence index (Breckler, 1994; as 
discussed in Chapter 2). Thompson et al. (2014) also demonstrate the construct validity of this 
index; with regards to ambivalent attitudes towards euthanasia, AIDS, capital punishment, 
abortion, and punitive drink-driving laws, those with a high personal fear of invalidity (a personality 
trait positively associated with ambivalence) score higher on this index whereas those with a high 
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need for cognition (a personality trait negatively associated with ambivalence) score lower on this 
index. 
First, this formula was applied to romanticised (AttitudeP) and repellent (AttitudeN) 
homoprejudice. This index was not normally distributed (Skewness = 1.18, Kurtosis = 2.62) and 
only 64 (7.99%) of the participants scored above the midpoint of 5 (Mdn = 3.5, Rng = 1.26 – 8.34). 
On this basis, it was concluded that the positive correlation between romanticised and repellent 
homoprejudice was due to participants being likely to disagree with both rather than agreeing with 
both. Repellent homoprejudice was then substituted with adversarial homoprejudice and the index 
was computed again. This time, the index was normally distributed (Skewness = -.05, Kurtosis = 
.01) despite neither constituent subscale being normally distributed and 369 (46.07%) of the 
participants scored the scale midpoint or higher (Mdn = 4.84, Rng = 1 - 8.34). 
In order to investigate this further, the ambivalent homoprejudice index was correlated 
with the validation measures using Spearman’s Rho with 1000 bootstrap samples. Ambivalent 
homoprejudice was found to be positively correlated with benevolence towards men (rs [179] = 
.34, p ≤ .01, 95% CI: .18 - .48), hostility towards men (rs [179] = .32, p ≤ .01, 95% CI: .18 - .45), 
benevolent sexism (rs [84] = .49, p ≤ .01, 95% CI: .31 - .63), homopositivity (rs [82] = .52, p ≤ .01, 
95% CI: .33 - .68), just world beliefs (rs [75] = .24, p ≤ .05, 95% CI: .01 - .46), modern 
homonegativity (rs [86] = .22, p ≤ .05, 95% CI: -.00 - .45), paternalistic heterosexism (rs [85] = .23, 
p ≤ .05, 95% CI: .01 - .44), aversive heterosexism (rs [85] = .48, p ≤ .01, 95% CI: .26 - .64), the 
polymorphous prejudice positive beliefs subscale (rs [82] = .40, p ≤ .01, 95% CI: .20 - .56), and 
social dominance orientation (rs [79] = .26, p ≤ .05, 95% CI: .02 - .46). Importantly, this index was 
also uncorrelated with the motivation to control prejudice reactions (rs [105] = .00, p = n.s.) and 
social desirability (rs [98] = .03, p = n.s.). These findings will be considered further in the discussion 
section. 
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6.3.2 Subscale and Validation Measure Correlations 
Spearman’s Rho with 1000 bootstrap samples was used to analyse the relationships 
between the AHS subscales and the aforementioned validation measures. For reference, these 
results are tabulated in Table 6.5. 
Scale N Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial 
AMI-B 179 
.549** 
[.432, .651] 
.348** 
[.206, .475] 
.005 
[-.148, .162] 
.487** 
[.362, .601] 
AMI-H 179 
.419** 
[.288, .546] 
.383** 
[.241, .515] 
.149* 
[.006, .282] 
.431** 
[.279, .570] 
AS 87 
-.129 
[-.328, .090] 
.217* 
[.007, .415] 
.200 
[.009, .374]†† 
-.203 
[-.445, .052] 
ASI-B 84 
.582** 
[.413, .729] 
.608** 
[.447, .733] 
.207 
[-.044, .457] 
.234* 
[-.023, .438]† 
ASI-H 84 
.392** 
[.184, .566] 
.260* 
[.031, .489] 
-.348** 
[-.539, -.131] 
.549** 
[.394, .744] 
ATG 82 
.558** 
[.384, .699] 
-.116 
[-.335, .119] 
-.238* 
[-.429, -.040] 
.512** 
[.324, .665] 
EBHS 60 
-.422** 
[-.634, -.168] 
-.220 
[-.428, .026] 
-.162 
[-.421, .132] 
-.420** 
[-.596, -.163] 
HPS 82 
.197 
[-.020, .405] 
.622** 
[.457, .747] 
.305** 
[.080, .505] 
.222* 
[.002, .431] 
JW 75 
.285* 
[.064, .493] 
.224 
[.008, .445]†† 
.052 
[-.181, .296] 
.328** 
[.089, .547] 
MCPRS 105 
-.131 
[-.337, .090] 
.068 
[-.133, .258] 
.283** 
[.096, .453] 
-.328** 
[-.504, .125] 
MHS 86 
.628** 
[.471, .763] 
.018 
[-.177, .227] 
-.342** 
[-.528, -.135] 
.765** 
[.633, .837] 
MHI-Am 85 
.355** 
[.143, .542] 
.018 
[-.172, .196] 
-.183 
[-.377, .016] 
.444** 
[.266, .593] 
MHI-Av 85 
.648** 
[.492, .771] 
.163 
[-.057, .348] 
-.193 
[-.371, -.012]†† 
.815** 
[.717, .876] 
MHI-Pa 85 
.374** 
[.160, .554] 
.131 
[-.076, .341] 
.151 
[-.067, .370] 
.412** 
[.225, .568] 
MHI-Po 85 
.014 
[-.225, .235] 
.514** 
[.322, .673] 
.312** 
[.069, .517] 
.141 
[-.089, .356] 
PPS 82 
.014 
[-.223, .249] 
.431** 
[.214, .624] 
.458** 
[.253, .640] 
.283* 
[.028, .502] 
PPS-Adj 82 
.097 
[-.109, .293] 
.435** 
[.230, .618] 
.362** 
[.152, .542] 
.379** 
[.163, .560] 
RCI 210 
.345** 
[.226, .462] 
.110 
[-.034, .247] 
.118 
[-.025, .233] 
.270** 
[.141, .405] 
RWA 80 
.610** 
[.442, .732] 
.112 
[-.140, .363] 
-.295** 
[-.511, -.037] 
.637** 
[.472, .769] 
SDO 79 
.630** 
[.478, .759] 
.031 
[-.188, .248] 
-.105 
[-.313, .112] 
.517** 
[.338, .656] 
SDS 98 
.039 
[-.171, .252] 
.207* 
[-.035, .438]† 
.010 
[-.189, .216] 
-.176 
[-.375, .046] 
SLGHRS 82 
-.690** 
[-.806, .518] 
-.057 
[-.301, .211] 
.274* 
[.032, .489] 
-.718** 
[-.823, -.564] 
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Table 6.5: AHS subscale correlations with validation measures. Zeroes precede all decimal points. 
Brackets contain bias-corrected accelerated 95% CI. *p≤.05, **p≤.01, † confidence interval indicates a false 
positive, †† confidence interval indicates a false negative. 
6.3.2.1 Ambivalence towards Men 
As predicted, benevolent attitudes towards men were positively correlated with repellent 
(rs [179] = .55, p ≤ .01), romanticised (rs [179] = .348, p ≤ .01), and adversarial homoprejudice (rs 
[179] = .49, p ≤ .01), and were uncorrelated with paternalistic homoprejudice. Likewise, hostility 
towards men was also positively correlated with repellent (rs [179] = .419, p ≤ .01), romanticised 
(rs [179] = .38, p ≤ .01), and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [179] = .43, p ≤ .01), but was also 
unexpectedly correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [179] = .15, p ≤ .05). 
6.3.2.2 Altruism 
As predicted, altruism was negatively correlated with repellent and adversarial 
homoprejudice, but did not reach significance in either instance. Also as predicted, altruism was 
positively correlated with romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice, but this relationship was 
only significant in the former instance (rs [87] = .22, p ≤ .05). However, an inspection of the 
confidence interval for the latter correlation shows that both upper and lower bounds are positive, 
suggesting that rejecting this marginally non-significant result (rs [87] = .20, p = .06) may result in 
a type-II error being made13. 
6.3.2.3 Ambivalent Sexism 
As predicted, benevolent sexism was positively correlated with repellent (rs [84] = .58, p ≤ 
.01), romanticised (rs [84] = .61, p ≤ .01), and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [84] = .234, p ≤ .05), 
and was unrelated to paternalistic homoprejudice. Hostile sexism was also positively correlated 
                                                          
13 A type-II error (alternatively known as a false negative) may be indicated by a non-significant result with a 
confidence interval that does not contain zero. This pattern of results suggests that the experimental hypothesis has 
been incorrectly rejected. 
 
 
176 
 
with repellent (rs [84] = .392, p ≤ .01), romanticised (rs [84] = .26, p ≤ .05), and adversarial 
homoprejudice (rs [84] = .55, p ≤ .01) as predicted. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, hostile sexism 
was negatively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [84] = -.35, p ≤ .01). 
6.3.2.4 Attitudes towards Gay Men 
As predicted, the ATG was positively correlated with repellent (rs [82] = .56, p ≤ .01) and 
adversarial homoprejudice (rs [82] = .51, p ≤ .01) and negatively correlated with paternalistic 
homoprejudice (rs [82] = -.24, p ≤ .05). Unexpectedly, the ATG was not significantly correlated 
with romanticised homoprejudice. 
6.3.2.5 Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality 
As predicted, the EBHS was negatively correlated with repellent (rs [60] = -.42, p ≤ .01) 
and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [60] = -.42, p ≤ .01) and was uncorrelated with paternalistic 
homoprejudice. Contrary to the predicted positive correlation between essentialist beliefs about 
homosexuality and romanticised homoprejudice, the results instead indicated a nonsignificant 
negative correlation between the two constructs. 
6.3.2.6 Homopositivity 
As predicted, homopositivity was positively correlated with romanticised (rs [82] = .62, p 
≤ .01) and paternalistic (rs [82] = .31, p ≤ .01) homoprejudice. Unexpectedly, the HPS and the 
adversarial homoprejudice subscale were positively correlated (rs [82] = .22, p ≤ .05), though this 
is consistent with the positive correlation between adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice 
discussed earlier. The hypothesised negative correlation between the HPS and repellent 
homoprejudice was refuted, and a marginally nonsignificant positive correlation between the two 
was found instead. 
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6.3.2.7 Just World Beliefs 
As predicted, the belief in a just world was positively correlated with repellent (rs [75] = 
.29, p ≤ .05), adversarial (rs [75] = .33, p ≤ .01), and romanticised homoprejudice, but this was 
marginally nonsignificant in the latter instance. Subsequent inspection of the confidence interval 
of the latter correlation (.01 - .45) indicate that rejecting this result may result in a type-II error. 
Finally, contrary to the hypothesised negative correlation between just world beliefs and 
paternalistic homoprejudice, the two constructs appear to be unrelated. 
6.3.2.8 Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions 
As hypothesised, the MCPRS was unrelated to repellent and romanticised homoprejudice. 
However, it was positively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [105] = .28, p ≤ .01) and 
negatively correlated with adversarial homoprejudice (rs [105] = -.33, p ≤ .01). 
6.3.2.9 Modern Homonegativity 
As predicted, modern homonegativity was positively correlated with repellent (rs [86] = 
.63, p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [86] = .77, p ≤ .01), and negatively correlated with 
paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [86] = -.34, p ≤ .01). Modern homonegativity and romanticised 
homoprejudice were negatively correlated as initially hypothesised but this was nonsignificant. 
6.3.2.10 Multidimensional Heterosexism 
As predicted, amnestic heterosexism was positively correlated with repellent (rs [85] = .36, 
p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [85] = .44, p ≤ .01). The predicted negative correlation 
between amnestic heterosexism and romanticised homoprejudice was not supported, and the 
predicted negative correlation with paternalistic homoprejudice was in the right direction but was 
marginally nonsignificant.  
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Aversive heterosexism also correlated positively with repellent (rs [85] = .65, p ≤ .01) and 
adversarial homoprejudice (rs [85] = .82, p ≤ .01), as predicted. The predicted negative correlation 
between aversive heterosexism and paternalistic homoprejudice was found, but it did not reach 
significance. However, further inspection of the confidence interval (-.37 - -.01) suggests that 
rejecting this finding may result in a type-II error being made. The hypothesised negative 
correlation between aversive heterosexism and romanticised homoprejudice was not support and 
a marginally positive correlation was found instead. 
Paternalistic heterosexism did not behave as expected in many ways. It correlated positively 
with repellent (rs [85] = .37, p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [85] = .41, p ≤ .01) and was 
uncorrelated with romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice. 
Finally, positive-stereotypic heterosexism correlated positively with romanticised (rs [85] = 
.51, p ≤ .01) and paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [85] = .32, p ≤ .01) as hypothesised. However, the 
hypotheses that positive-stereotypic heterosexism would be negatively correlated with repellent 
and adversarial homoprejudice were not supported. 
6.3.2.11 Polymorphous Prejudice 
The positive beliefs polymorphous prejudice subscale was positively correlated with 
romanticised (rs [82] = .43, p ≤ .01), paternalistic (rs [82] = .46, p ≤ .01) as hypothesised. Contrary 
to the predicted negative correlation between the PPS and adversarial homoprejudice, the two 
were actually positively correlated (rs [82] = 28, p ≤ .05). This is consistent with the earlier findings 
indicating positive correlations between the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men 
and modern hostile attitudes towards gay men.  
However, it is unusual that the PPS should correlate more highly with paternalism than 
with romanticisation, given the highly stereotypical content of the PPS’s items. Further 
examination of the PPS showed that one item, “The plight of gay men will only improve when 
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they are in important positions in the system” (Massey, 2009, p. 159), on the face of it, does not 
tap prevailing stereotypes about gay men. Indeed, this item’s reported factor loading by Massey 
(2009) is only .49, as compared to the other items used in the PSS with reported factor loadings 
between .73 and .58. 
To explore this further, the aforementioned item was removed to form an adjusted PPS 
(PPS-Adj). This adjustment attenuated the correlations between the PPS and AHS to the extent 
that: 1) the adjusted PPS was more strongly associated with romanticised homoprejudice (rs [82] = 
.44, p ≤ .01) than with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [82] = .36, p ≤ .01), as should be expected; 
and 2) the strength of the positive correlation between the PPS and adversarial homoprejudice 
became stronger (rs [82] = .38, p ≤ .01). 
6.3.2.12 Religious Commitment and Attendance 
As hypothesised, religious commitment correlated positively with repellent (rs [210] = .35, 
p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [210] = .27, p ≤ .01) and was uncorrelated with 
romanticised homoprejudice. Religious commitment correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice 
in the predicted direction, but this was marginally non-significant. Similarly, attendance at religious 
services was positively correlated with repellent (rs [801] = .27, p ≤ .01) and adversarial 
homoprejudice (rs [801] = .19, p ≤ .01), but not with romanticised or paternalistic homoprejudice. 
6.3.2.13 Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
As predicted, right-wing authoritarianism correlated positively with repellent (rs [80] = .61, 
p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [80] = .64, p ≤ .01), and was unrelated to romanticised 
homoprejudice. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, right-wing authoritarianism was negatively 
correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [80] = -.30, p ≤ .01). 
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6.3.2.14 Social Dominance Orientation 
As predicted, social dominance orientation correlated positively with repellent (rs [79] = 
.63, p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [79] = .52, p ≤ .01) and was not correlated with 
romanticised or paternalistic homoprejudice. 
6.3.2.15 Social Desirability 
As predicted, the motivation to present oneself in socially desirable ways was not correlated 
with repellent, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice. Social desirability was found to be 
positively correlated with romanticised homoprejudice (rs [98] = .21, p ≤ .05), however, an 
inspection of the confidence interval (-.04 - .44) suggests that this accepting this result may result 
in a type-I error. 
6.3.2.16 Support for Gay Men’s Human Rights 
As predicted, support for gay men’s human rights was negatively correlated with repellent 
(rs [82] = -.69, p ≤ .01) and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [82] = -.72, p ≤ .01), positively correlated 
with paternalistic homoprejudice (rs [82] = .27, p ≤ .05), and was uncorrelated with romanticised 
homoprejudice. 
6.3.3 Known Groups Validity 
Another method of assessing construct validity is by way of known groups validity; an 
assessment of the extent to which different groups known to differ in levels of a construct do, in 
fact, differ. 
6.3.3.1 Gender and Homoprejudice 
Mann Whitney tests were used to compare differences across gender. As hypothesised, 
men (Mdn = 1.17) endorsed significantly greater levels of repellent homoprejudice than did women 
(Mdn = 1.00; U = 57,046, p ≤ .01, r = -.17). Men (Mdn = 3.33) also endorsed significantly greater 
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levels of adversarial homoprejudice than women (Mdn = 2.83) as predicted (U = 54,917.50, p ≤ 
.01, r = -.18). Inversely, women (Mdn = 3.00) endorsed significantly greater levels of romanticised 
homoprejudice than did men (Mdn = 3.00; U = 61,537, p ≤ .01, r = -.11), also as predicted. There 
was no significant difference in the endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice between men 
(Mdn = 3.50) and women (Mdn = 3.67; U = 67,876, p = n.s.), disconfirming the hypothesis that 
women would be more paternalistic than men. 
6.3.3.2 Education and Homoprejudice 
Four one-way Kruskall-Wallis tests with post hoc Dunn’s tests were used to explore 
attitudinal differences between different levels of educational attainment. Only two participants 
reported having no formal educational attainment and were excluded from these analyses. The 
first analysis comparing endorsement of repellent homoprejudice across different levels of 
educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups (χ2[4] = 27.00, p ≤ .01). 
Post hoc analyses found that those educated at doctoral level (Mdn = 1.00) scored significantly 
lower on the repellent homoprejudice subscale than those educated at GCSE/O-level (Mdn = 1.33, 
Dunn’s test = 197.49, p ≤ .01), A/AS-level (Mdn = 1.17, Dunn’s test = 146.77, p ≤ .01), bachelor’s 
level (Mdn = 1.00, Dunn’s test = 109.30, p ≤ .01, and master’s level (Mdn = 1.00, Dunn’s test = 
101.38, p ≤ .01). 
The second analysis comparing endorsement of romanticised homoprejudice across 
different levels of educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups (χ2[4] 
= 20.21, p ≤ .01). Post hoc analyses found that those educated at GCSE/O-level (Mdn = 3.50) 
scored significantly higher than those educated at AS/A-level (Mdn = 3.00, Dunn’s test = 144.37, 
p ≤ .05), bachelor’s level (Mdn = 2.83, Dunn’s test = 159.09, p ≤ .01), master’s level (Mdn = 3.00, 
Dunn’s test = 138.49, p ≤ .05), and doctoral level (Mdn = 2.50, Dunn’s test = 235.62, p ≤ .01). 
Those educated at master’s level also scored significantly higher than those educated at doctoral 
level (Dunn’s test = 97.14, p ≤ .05). 
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The third analysis comparing endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice across different 
levels of educational attainment also revealed a significant difference between the groups (χ2[4] = 
13.23, p ≤ .01). Post hoc analyses revealed that those educated at master’s level (Mdn = 3.83) scored 
significantly higher than those educated at AS/A-level (Mdn = 3.33, Dunn’s test = -63.23, p ≤ .05). 
The final analysis comparing endorsement of adversarial homoprejudice across different 
levels of educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups (χ2[4] = 37.81, 
p ≤ .01). Post hoc analyses found that the respondents qualified at doctoral level (Mdn = 2.17) 
scored significantly lower than those qualified at GCSE/O-level (Mdn = 3.50, Dunn’s test = 
205.20, p ≤ .01), AS/A-level (Mdn = 3.17, Dunn’s test = 180.02, p ≤ .01), bachelor’s level (Mdn = 
3.17, Dunn’s test = 146.34, p ≤ .01), and master’s level (Mdn = 2.67, Dunn’s test = 97.07, p ≤ .05). 
Those educated at master’s level also scored significantly lower than those educated at AS/A-level 
(Dunn’s test = 82.95, p ≤ .01).  
6.3.3.3 Sexuality and Homoprejudice 
Mann Whitney tests were used to compare differences across sexuality (heterosexual vs 
nonheterosexual). As hypothesised, heterosexuals (Mdn = 1.00) endorsed significantly greater 
levels of repellent homoprejudice than did nonheterosexuals (Mdn = 1.00; U = 22,797, p ≤ .01, r 
= -.13). Heterosexuals (Mdn = 3.00) also endorsed significantly greater levels of romanticised 
homoprejudice than nonheterosexuals (Mdn = 2.33) as predicted (U = 25,250, p ≤ .05, r = -.08). 
As was also predicted, heterosexuals (Mdn = 3.00) endorsed significantly greater levels of 
adversarial homoprejudice than did nonheterosexuals (Mdn = 2.33; U = 22,521, p ≤ .01, r = -.12). 
However, there was no significant difference in the endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice 
between heterosexuals (Mdn = 3.67) and nonheterosexuals (Mdn = 3.50; U = 29,448.50, p = n.s.), 
disconfirming the hypothesis that heterosexuals would score higher than nonheterosexuals. 
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6.4 Study 2c Discussion 
 These analyses aimed to assess the AHS’s convergent, discriminant, and known-groups 
validity, and the findings suggest that the AHS, for the most part, behaves as one would expect in 
relation to other personality and attitudinal measures. Repellent and adversarial homoprejudice 
correlate positively with measures of both old-fashioned and modern homoprejudice and with 
measures of ambivalent sexism, as expected, as well as with ideologies commonly implicated in 
anti-gay prejudice (i.e., RWA, SDO, JW, and religiosity). Inversely, they correlated negatively with 
support for gay rights and with the biological essentialist beliefs that typically underpin this support 
(Jang, & Lee, 2014).  
 Romanticised homoprejudice also correlates positively with similar measures of the 
subscription to positive stereotypes about gay men (i.e., the HPS, PPS, and positive-stereotypic 
heterosexism), as well as with ambivalent sexism measures, as has been found elsewhere (Morrison 
& A. Bearden, 2007). Importantly, romanticised homoprejudice did not correlate with social 
dominance orientation, contrary to Walls’s (2008) assertion that such positive stereotypes serve 
social dominative purposes. Indeed, Walls’s (2008) multidimensional heterosexism scale also 
behaved unexpectly inasmuch as paternalistic heterosexism correlated positively with repellent and 
adversarial homoprejudice, but not with paternalistic homoprejudice. Because all of the 
paternalistic heterosexism items voice the reluctance to parent a gay child due to the disadvantage 
he would experience, it may be that these items are unintentionally tapping the general aversion to 
having a gay child rather than the concerns about inequality. By comparison, paternalistic 
homoprejudice correlates negatively with measures of hostile prejudice towards gay men (i.e., the 
ATG & MoHS), suggesting that the item wording does not obscure the intended sympathetic 
meaning of this subscale. As well as this, all four of the AHS subscales behave as expected among 
different participant demographics, as was demonstrated in the known-groups analyses of gender, 
educational attainment, and sexuality. 
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Furthermore, none of the AHS subscales correlate with social desirability, suggesting that 
the AHS is not confounded by positive self-presentation concerns. On the other hand, adversarial 
homoprejudice is positively correlated with the motivation to control prejudiced reactions. 
However, given that those who take on such adversarial views may believe that gay men use 
accusations of prejudice to gain unfair advantages and special privileges, this is not entirely 
unexpected. Nonetheless, such attitudes may be elucidated via the use of indirect attitude measures 
such as the IAT. The motivation to control prejudiced responses also correlated positively with 
paternalistic homoprejudice, though this is also unsurprising given that paternalistic individuals 
may seek to shield gay men from the prejudice expressed by others. 
Finally, adversarial homoprejudice correlated positively with measures of positive 
stereotypes about gay men, with the exception of positive-stereotypic heterosexism, which may be 
due to the latter measure only containing two items. Given the consistent relationship between 
adversarial homoprejudice and romanticised homoprejudice, prejudice towards gay men can be 
reasonably described as ambivalent. This was investigated further using an ambivalence index 
proposed by Thompson et al. (2014) and the findings suggested that this index was a useful 
measure of individual differences in ambivalent homoprejudice inasmuch as it could discern 
between ambivalent and univalent individuals, was normally distributed, and was uncorrelated with 
measures of self-presentational concerns (i.e., the MCPRS and SDS).  
The positive correlation between positive and negative attitudinal substrates (with regards 
to gay men) is a novel finding that is inconsistent with previous literature. For instance, Walls 
(2008a) found no correlation between positive-stereotypic and apathetic (a single-factor iteration 
of amnestic and aversive) heterosexism. A possible explanation for this is that ambivalent 
homoprejudice may be culture-bound. To date, all of the research exploring attitudinal 
ambivalence towards gay men has been conducted in a North American or Canadian context, with 
research in the latter context also revealing signs of subjective ambivalence towards gay men 
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(Hoffarth & Hodson, 2014). As compared to North America, the United Kingdom and Canada 
currently have superior gay rights records (Carroll, 2016) and are more secular countries (Norris 
& Inglehart, 2011). Given that adversarial homoprejudice consists of envious beliefs that gay men 
use their sexuality to get undue advantages, the emergence of attitudinal ambivalence towards gay 
men may be necessitated by significant gay rights progress in a particular cultural context in order 
for perceptions of reverse inequality to develop. Similarly, conflict between adversarial and 
romanticised homoprejudice may also be contingent upon stereotypical portrayals of gay men in 
mass media, given that such depictions appear to inform positive stereotypes about gay men 
(Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). A future direction, then, is to perform a cross-cultural validation 
of the AHS in order to ascertain whether these findings hold within different sociopolitical 
contexts. 
Nonetheless, the ambivalence index offers a novel and indirect way of assessing attitudinal 
ambivalence towards gay men – at least with regards to the United Kingdom. A similar 
mathematical approach to measuring ambivalence towards gay men has been attempted elsewhere 
(Hoffarth, 2013), but was not successful because the index used only correlated positively with its 
negative attitudinal substrates and did not correlate positively with its positive attitudinal substrates 
(derived from the PPS; Massey, 2009). As was evidenced in Studies 2c and 3, the index of 
ambivalence advanced in this thesis is positively correlated with both positive and negative attitudes 
towards gay men, suggesting that it is indeed sensitive to ambivalent homoprejudice. The success 
in this instance is likely due to the selective approach taken when choosing which measures the 
index should be derived from. Whereas Hoffarth’s (2013) index was derived from three of the 
negative PPS subscales (aversion toward gay men, traditional heterosexism, and aversion toward 
lesbians) and two of the positive PPS subscales (positive beliefs and resist heteronormativity), the 
index used herein was derived from adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice.  
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The selectivity employed in Study 2c was both empirically and theoretically justified. The 
index derived from romanticised and repellent homoprejudice performed poorly, despite the two 
subscales being positively correlated. Given that Hoffarth’s (2013) index was similarly derived 
from old-fashioned anti-gay attitude measures in the PPS, this is possibly why the index did not 
perform as expected. By comparison, the index derived from romanticised and adversarial 
homoprejudice performed well and this is arguably because the two are both modern aspects of 
homoprejudice that arise from contiguous sociocultural factors (e.g., significant gay rights progress 
and enhanced media visibility). 
The ambivalence index advanced in Study 2c further suggested that almost half of the 
heterosexual sample endorsed ambivalent attitudes towards gay men and that this ambivalence was 
associated with ambivalence towards men at large. This relationship hints that ambivalence 
towards gay men may be a theoretical extension of ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) 
– at least, with regards to women’s attitudes towards gay men. Because gay men are members of a 
group that have traditionally subordinated women, this may evoke feelings of resentment. On the 
other hand, given that ambivalent sexism revolves around heterosexual intimacy, women may also 
associate gay men with safety, given their lack of sexual threat and competition (Russell et al., 
2015). 
These studies are not without their limitations. Most notably – and much the same as in 
the previous qualitative study (Study 1) – there was a distinct lack of racial diversity among the 
participants. This made attitudinal comparisons across different racial categories impossible and 
ruled out a further opportunity to validate the scale in light of research detailing racial differences 
in the endorsement of homoprejudice (Lewis, 2003). Future use of the AHS should seek to attain 
a more ethnically diverse sample so that further known-groups validity can be established. Given 
the large number of validation scales included in the survey, it was also not possible to include 
additional scales measuring other potentially related measures such as the personal fear of invalidity 
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scale (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001) without also necessitating an 
increasingly large and harder to obtain sample size. As such, future research assessing the 
psychometric properties of the AHS should include these measures in order to provide a more 
holistic view of the AHS’s construct validity. 
Given that ambivalent attitudes have been found to be less stable than univalent attitudes 
and that attitude measures only take a ‘snapshot’ of a respondent’s opinions at that time, it is 
unknown whether ambivalent homoprejudice is a stable construct over time. Test-retest reliability 
for the AHS has also not been reported yet. As such, study 3 aimed to collect a second measure 
of the AHS from the same heterosexual participants in Study 2a-c and use this data to assess the 
AHS’s temporal consistency. 
6.5 Study 3 Methods 
6.5.1 Participants 
Of the 801 participants in the previous study, 378 of them agreed to be contacted at a later 
date to take part in the survey again. Of these, 131 participants (37 men and 94 women), ranging 
in age from 18 to 79 (M = 33.33, SD = 13.03) completed the survey between 10.20 days and 233.64 
days after initially completing it. Their demographics resemble that of the broader sample 
inasmuch as this sample was also well-educated, primarily identified as exclusively heterosexual, 
and were almost exclusively white. Participants were offered an entry into a £15 shopping voucher 
prize draw as thanks for taking part. 
6.5.2 Measures 
 The participants once again completed the 96-item AHS (only the 24-item AHS was 
analysed, however) and the MCPRS as a measure of self-presentation bias. 
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6.6 Study 3 Results 
6.6.1 Test-Retest Reliability 
 Intra-class correlations (ICC) estimates were calculated using SPSS based on an average-
rating (k = 6), absolute-agreement, 2-way mixed-effects model. 
 A high degree of consistency was found between the time 1 and time 2 measures of 
repellent homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .96 (95% CI: .95 - .97), F (2, 130) = 
28.175, p ≤ .01. A high degree of consistency was also found between the time 1 and time 2 
measures of romanticised homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .83 (95% CI: .76 - .88), 
F (2, 130) = 5.31, p ≤ .01. A high degree of consistency was similarly found between the time 1 
and time 2 measures of paternalistic homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .80 (95% CI: 
.71 - .86), F (2, 130) = 4.88, p ≤ .01). A high degree of consistency was similarly found between 
the time 1 and time 2 measures of adversarial homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .92 
(95% CI: .88 - .94), F (2, 130) = 11.88, p ≤ .01. Finally, an acceptable degree of consistency was 
found between the time 1 and time 2 ambivalence indices derived from romanticised and 
adversarial homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .78 (95% CI = .68 - .84), F (2, 130) = 
4.44, p ≤ .01. 
Based on naming conventions outlined by Koo and Li (2016), which uses the 95% 
confidence interval as a reference point, the repellent homoprejudice subscale demonstrates 
excellent (ICC >.90) test-retest reliability, the romanticised homoprejudice subscale demonstrates 
good test-retest reliability (ICC >.75), the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale demonstrates 
moderate (ICC >.50) to good test-retest reliability, the adversarial homoprejudice subscale 
demonstrates good to excellent test-retest reliability, and the ambivalence index demonstrates 
moderate to good test-retest reliability. 
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6.6.2 Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions 
 Spearman rank correlations with 1000 bootstrap samples were used to analyse the 
relationship between the AHS subscales and the MCPRS. The MCPRS was not correlated with 
any of the AHS subscales or the index of ambivalent homoprejudice (see table 6.6). 
 Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial Ambivalence 
MCPRS -.09 
[-.25 - .08] 
.11 
[-.08 - .30] 
1.03 
[-.11 - .29] 
-.04 
[-.22 - .13] 
.06 
[-.10 - .21] 
Table 6.6: Correlations between the motivation to control prejudiced reactions scale and the AHS. Brackets contain 
95% bias-corrected accelerated confidence intervals 
 
6.6.3 Ambivalent Homoprejudice Index 
 The ambivalence index provided by Thompson et al. (2014) was once again used to 
calculate potential ambivalence derived from average scores on the romanticised and adversarial 
homoprejudice subscales. As was found in Study 2c, this index was normally distributed (Mdn = 
4.75, Rng = 2.12 – 7.83, Skewness = .02, Kurtosis = =.13). 
 Spearman rank correlations with 1000 bootstrap samples were used to analyse the 
relationship between the ambivalent homoprejudice index and the AHS subscales. The index was 
positively correlated with repellent (rs [127] = .32, 95% CI: .14 - .49, p ≤ .01), romanticised (rs [127] 
= .41, 95% CI: .24 - .56, p ≤ .01), and adversarial homoprejudice (rs [127] = .53, 95% CI: .34 - .72, 
p ≤ .01), but was unrelated to paternalistic homoprejudice. 
6.7 Study 3 Discussion 
 This study aimed to evaluate the temporal stability of ambivalent homoprejudice using 
intra-class correlations and to further assess the measure’s robustness to positive self-presentation 
concerns. These findings suggest that the AHS evidences between moderate and excellent test-
retest reliability and that it is not biased by respondents’ desire to inhibit prejudice reactions. Taken 
together with the findings of study 2c, the AHS demonstrates a range of desirable psychometric 
properties; there is a high degree of internal consistency between the items, equivalent halves of 
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each subscale correlate well, the subscales behave consistent with ambivalent homoprejudice 
theory and logically in relation to other attitude measures, are (largely) robust to self-presentation 
concerns, and measures constructs that appear to be stable over time. 
 Research elsewhere has found that ambivalent attitudes towards healthy eating are no less 
stable over time than univalent attitudes towards healthy eating (Armitage & Conner, 2000), and 
these findings suggest that the index of ambivalent homoprejudice is also stable over time. Based 
on these findings, it appears that ambivalent homoprejudice is not a transient affective state as is 
felt ambivalence. Instead, ambivalent homoprejudice appears to be a chronic tendency. Further 
research should thus investigate whether such ambivalence represents a long-term transition from 
prejudicial to affirmative attitudes, or whether it is linked to stable, long-term personality traits that 
predispose attitudinal ambivalence toward a diverse range of targets. 
6.8 Conclusion 
 Studies 2c and 3 provide further evidence in support of the favourable psychometric utility 
of the AHS. The subscales are positively correlated with similar subscales and behave logically in 
relation to theoretically (ir)relevant attitudinal and ideological constructs. For instance, the 
assertion advanced in this thesis that benevolence towards gay men does not serve social 
dominative functions (contrary to Walls’s, 2008 claim that it does) was supported because social 
dominance orientation was unrelated to the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice 
subscales. Finally, the AHS also demonstrates good internal consistency (as measured by 
Cronbach’s alpha) and temporal stability (as measured by ICCs). Altogether, the AHS is a measure 
that is grounded in extent theory and primary data, demonstrates a stable factor structure that 
demonstrates good fit in different samples, behaves as expected in relation to other attitudinal and 
personality measures, and does so reliably. 
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7. Chapter Seven 
General Discussion 
7.1 Overview of Thesis 
 Prejudice towards sexual minorities has almost exclusively been conceptualised in terms of 
hostility. Key terms in the literature such as ‘sexual prejudice’ (Herek, 2000) and ‘homonegativity’ 
(Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) refer solely to the range of negative attitudes towards gay men and it is 
only more recently that positive stereotypes about and paternalistic attitudes towards gay men have 
emerged in the literature (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Massey, 2009; Walls, 2008a). As such, the 
term ‘homoprejudice’ was advanced in order to explain this shifting attitudinal tendency. Although 
this term valence-free, it nonetheless maintains that such attitudes are prejudicial (i.e., that they are 
aimed at individuals because of their group membership and that it disadvantages those 
individuals). Thus far, the consequences of such benevolent attitudes have been largely 
overlooked, with isolated studies in the microaggression literature pointing towards their 
exoticising and infantilising messages (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et al., 2011). However, there was 
little other available evidence to suggest that such ‘positive’ attitudes are damaging in a similar 
manner to how benevolent sexism and ageism has been found to legitimise inequality (Glick & 
Fiske, 1996; Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016). 
 There were also conflicting theoretical viewpoints vis-à-vis the nature of ambivalence 
towards gay men. Whereas Walls (2008a) argues that positive-stereotypic and paternalistic 
heterosexism serve social dominative purposes because they legitimise gay men’s lesser societal 
status relative to heterosexuals, Massey (2009) argues that positive stereotypes about gay men are 
valued outgroup differences and indicate greater societal acceptance of gay men. The former 
perspective relied upon the assumption that heterosexuals’ motivations for endorsing benevolent 
attitudes towards gay men were malicious; little evidence was found in support of this in the 
present corpus of work. Likewise, the latter perspective relied upon the assumption that 
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benevolence had no ill effects on gay men, yet evidence suggesting just the opposite has been 
presented in this thesis. Arguably, both of these perspectives were disadvantaged because the 
former privileged theory over data and the latter privileged heterosexuals’ self-reported attitudes 
towards gay men over gay men’s lived experiences of prejudice. These problems then persisted 
with regards to their respective scale development; because content validity was compromised, 
items with low factor loadings were included in the polymorphous prejudice scale and the 
paternalistic heterosexism scale’s item wording obscures their intended meaning. 
 For these reasons, the aims of this thesis were to: 1) Develop a theoretical explanation of 
ambivalence towards gay men that draws on the present literature on positive and negative 
attitudes towards gay men; 2) test and nuance this model using qualitative enquiry; and 3) develop 
a psychometrically-sound scale with which to measure this construct. Each stage of this process 
will be summarised in turn. 
7.1.1 Theory Development 
 In Chapter 2, the research literature on attitudes and attitudinal ambivalence was presented, 
with a particular focus on the antecedents, consequence, models, and functions of ambivalence. 
Attitudinal ambivalence is sometimes an uncomfortable attitudinal position comprising both 
positive and negative evaluations of the attitude object. It is associated with stable personality traits 
such as the personal fear of invalidity (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) as well situational factors such 
as personal involvement with the issues (Thompson & Zanna, 1995). In the face of persuasive 
communication, ambivalent attitudes become unstable but, without such intervention, they remain 
as stable over time as univalent attitudes (Armitage & Conner, 2000). However, compared to 
univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are less predictive of behaviour (Conner et al., 2003). 
 Chapter 3 provided an overview of prejudice, how attitudinal ambivalence has been 
conceptualised in the prejudice literature, and advanced ambivalent homoprejudice as a means of 
explaining seemingly conflicted attitudes towards gay men. Specifically, the chapter explored racial 
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ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988), ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), ambivalent ableism 
(Söder, 1990), ambivalent ageism (Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016), the ontological similarities 
and differences between these groups and gay men, and how these ontological factors may 
motivate ambivalent homoprejudice. One important factor are the intersecting identities of ‘gay’ 
and ‘man’ and how they influence experiences of prejudice (Bowleg, 2013). Another potential 
cause of ambivalent homoprejudice is the diverse range of gay ‘subtypes’, which are stereotyped 
and evaluated in both positive and negative ways (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). A desexualised 
reconceptualization of heterosexual intimacy (normally a sexualised aspect of ambivalent sexism) 
between gay men and heterosexual women was also identified, which may particularly motivate 
women’s benevolence towards gay men. Societal factors such as media representation were also 
conceptualised as vehicles for benevolent stereotypes about gay men. 
 Ambivalent homoprejudice was further characterised using the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) 
and the BIAS map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), and four attitudinal tendencies were delineated: 
1) Repellent homoprejudice, comprising cold and incompetent stereotypes (i.e., contempt), and 
active and passive harm; 2) Romanticised homoprejudice, comprising warm and competent 
stereotypes (i.e., admiration), and active and passive facilitation; 3) Paternalistic homoprejudice, 
comprising warm and incompetent stereotypes (i.e., pity), and active facilitation and passive harm; 
and 4) Adversarial homoprejudice, comprising cold and competent stereotypes (i.e., envy), and 
passive facilitation and active harm. 
 7.1.2 Study 1 
 In Study 1, a qualitative investigation of the proposed model of ambivalent homoprejudice 
was conducted in order to provide primary evidence in support of it, as well as to add necessary 
nuance as the data dictated. Homogenous focus groups were conducted with gay men and 
heterosexual men and women. During the thematic analysis, four themes were identified, which 
resembled the patterns of contempt, envy, pity, and admiration towards gay men documented in 
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Chapter 3. Repellent homoprejudice was characterised by the belief that gay men were cold (i.e., 
that they had negative intentions towards heterosexuals), such as the belief that gay men preyed 
on children for sex, and that they were incompetent (i.e., that they lacked the resources or character 
to actions those intentions), such as the belief that gay men are physically weak. These stereotypes 
were associated with harmful behaviours towards gay men such as social exclusion (i.e., passive 
harm) and verbal and physical abuse (i.e., active harm).  
 Inversely, romanticised homoprejudice was couched in the belief that gay men were warm 
(e.g., that they were empathetic) and competent (e.g., that they possessed certain skillsets, such as 
fashion taste). These qualities appeared to motivate the desire for a ‘gay best friend’ (i.e., passive 
facilitation) – particularly by women. However, the consequences of this was that those who did 
not live up to the aforementioned positive stereotypes embodied ‘the failed gay’, who are derided 
and excluded (i.e., passive harm). This unexpected divergence from the BIAS map, which posits 
active and passive facilitation towards admired outgroups, was reasoned to be because the BIAS 
map only takes into account how the ingroup interpret their behaviours and not how those 
behaviours might be differently interpreted by the outgroup. This alludes to the importance of 
shifting towards an understanding of homoprejudice as ambivalent because it moves away from 
interpreting the intentions underlying a given attitude or behaviour and instead privileges the 
target’s experience of those phenomena. 
Paternalistic homoprejudice was not found to be associated with warmth stereotypes, but 
nor was it associated with coldness stereotypes. However, paternalistic homoprejudice was 
associated with the belief that gay men experienced disadvantage and suffering (i.e., incompetence), 
and paternalistic individuals wished to redress this by way of active facilitation (e.g., defending gay 
men from prejudicial comments). On the other hand, reports from gay men suggested that these 
could be interpreted as demeaning and patronising (i.e., passive harm) and that these facilitating 
behaviours appeared to undermine the agency of the person being defended. Finally, adversarial 
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homoprejudice was associated with the belief that gay men were cold (e.g., aggressive in pursuing 
their perceived agenda) and competent (e.g., they received preferential treatment because of their 
sexuality), and this was associated with passive facilitation (e.g., associating with or tolerating gay 
men) and active harm (e.g., scapegoating). As well as this, adversarial homoprejudice was also 
associated with passive harm, such as gossiping, and it was argued that adversarial individuals may 
seek to suppress their prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) to stop gay men from using 
accusations of prejudice as ‘weapons’. Overall, the qualitative findings largely corroborated the 
prior theoretical development, filled a gap in the literature regarding paternalism towards gay men, 
and offered some important theoretical nuances that had not been covered elsewhere in the 
literature. 
7.1.3 Studies 2a and 2b 
 In study 2a, a measure of ambivalent homoprejudice was constructed using EFA and its 
dimensionality was assured using CFA in Study 2b. Based on the findings in Study 1, a panel of 
experts generated 562 potential scale items, which were collaboratively reduced to 96 items that 
captured the domains of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice. This 
measure was disseminated to prospective research participants via Qualtrics and participation was 
solicited from 801 respondents. These data were randomly split with 500 respondents being 
reserved for the exploratory analysis and the other 301 respondents being reserved for the 
confirmatory analysis. 
 The results of Study 2a suggested that a four-factor solution comprising repellent, 
romanticised, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice with 24 items – 6 on each factor – and 
each subscale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α = .93 - .84). This model was then 
subjected to CFA in Study 2b in order to assess its good fit in a separate sample and to compare 
its fit with three other possible models: 1) A unidimensional factor structure with all 24 items 
loading onto a single ‘ambivalence’ factor; 2) A two-factor model tapping the agentic axis of the 
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SCM, with the repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto an ‘incompetence’ 
factor and the adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘competence’ 
factor; and 3) A two-factor model tapping the communal axis of the SCM, with the repellent and 
adversarial homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘coldness’ factor and the romanticised and 
paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘warmth’ factor. The four-factor model 
derived from the EFA demonstrated excellent model fit, whereas the other three did not meet any 
of the goodness-of-fit thresholds, suggesting that ambivalent homoprejudice is best characterised 
as contemptuous, envious, pitying, and admiring attitudes towards gay men, and not in terms of 
benevolence and hostility as has been employed elsewhere with regards to ambivalent sexism 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996) and ambivalent ageism (Cary et al., 2016). Overall, the EFA corroborated 
the initial theory development and previous qualitative analysis delineating repellent, adversarial, 
romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice, and the CFA confirmed the good fit of this factor 
structure in a separate sample, attesting to the stability of this theoretical and factorial framework. 
7.1.4 Studies 2c and 3 
 In Study 2c, the convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity of the AHS was 
assessed, and the test-retest reliability of the AHS was examined in Study 3. The AHS was 
correlated with a wide array of personality, attitudinal, and behavioural measures, and the subscales 
performed as expected for the most part. Repellent and adversarial homoprejudice correlated with 
similar measures of anti-gay prejudice and with other measures associated with anti-gay prejudice. 
Likewise, romanticised homoprejudice correlated with similar measures of positive stereotypes 
about gay men and, importantly, not with markers of hostile prejudice, supporting the theoretical 
claim from the outset that such attitudes do not have oppressive intentions. Similarly, paternalistic 
homoprejudice correlated negatively with markers of prejudice and positively with support for 
lesbian and gay human rights. Again, these attitudes do not intend to be demeaning or patronising, 
but they have the potential to be interpreted as such. 
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 A positive correlation was found between repellent and romanticised homoprejudice and 
adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice, and the latter relationship was echoed in the positive 
correlation between adversarial homoprejudice and other measures of positive stereotypes about 
gay men, supporting the central thesis that attitudes towards gay men are ambivalent. This was 
investigated further by calculating an ambivalence index from these positive and negative AHS 
subscales. This investigation suggested that potential ambivalence computed from average scores 
on the romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice subscales – but not between the romanticised 
and repellent homoprejudice subscales – produces an index that discerns between ambivalent and 
univalent participants, correlates positively with both positive and negative attitudes towards gay 
men, and is insensitive to social desirability and the motivation to control prejudiced reactions. 
The AHS also behaves logically among different groups known to endorse differing levels of 
homoprejudice. For example, men endorsed higher levels of repellent and adversarial 
homoprejudice than women, but women endorsed higher levels of romanticised homoprejudice 
than men. 
 In Study 3, a subset of the participants from Study 2a and 2c completed the AHS a second 
time and also completed the MCPRS as a follow-up measure of self-presentation concerns. The 
95% confidence intervals for ICCs used to assess test-retest reliability indicated that the AHS 
demonstrates between moderate and excellent temporal consistency, providing further evidence 
that the AHS is a psychometrically sound instrument. The results further suggested that MCPRS 
was uncorrelated with the AHS subscales and the ambivalence index derived from romanticised 
and adversarial homoprejudice, further suggesting that the AHS is robust to participants’ 
motivation to present themselves in a favourable manner. 
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7.2 Overall Implications 
 7.2.1 Theoretical Reconceptualisation of Prejudice towards Gay Men 
 The present findings necessitate a reconceptualisation of prejudice towards gay men as a 
multidimensional construct comprising both negative and positive attitudes. Research findings 
suggest that ‘homophobia’ is on the wane in the Western world (Clements & Field, 2014; Twenge 
et al., 2016), leading some scholars to claim that it is of declining significance to sexual minorities 
(McCormack, 2013). Therein lies the risk of labelling prejudice towards gay men as ‘homophobia’; 
this term captures the old-fashioned construct of repellent homoprejudice, which the present 
research findings do indeed suggest is in decline. However, the findings presented in this thesis 
suggest that other subdomains of homoprejudice – adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic – 
still persist in the United Kingdom. Academics must be reactive to the changing nature of 
homoprejudice – as have they have achieved with regards to sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) 
and ageism (Cary et al., 2016) – or we risk blinding ourselves to the realities of the communities 
psychologists seek to help. 
 Although other scholars have attempted to characterise attitudes towards gay men as a 
multifaceted construct (Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009), myriad flaws in their theoretical interpretation 
of ambivalence were presented in Chapter 3. Ambivalent homoprejudice is advanced as an 
alternative theoretical framework that aligns well with current theorising on the microaggressive 
contents of privileged groups’ behaviours towards oppressed groups (Sue, 2010). While 
heterosexuals’ motivations towards gay men may be becoming increasingly benign, the ways in 
which they display their good intentions by way of exoticising stereotypes and demeaning 
accommodation are nonetheless perceived as negative (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et al., 2011; Sue, 
2010). Furthermore, the everyday occurrence of subtle prejudice means that sexual minorities may 
not be able to find respite from it, which may have an additive impact on their wellbeing (Jewell, 
McCutcheon, Harriman, & Morrison, 2012). 
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While the deleterious consequences of hostile homoprejudice detailed in Chapter 3 have 
been well documented and are relatively obvious, the consequences (intended or otherwise) of 
romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice have been under-researched and are relatively more 
nebulous. The available literature documents sexual minorities’ feelings of distress upon exposure 
to microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2011) and frustration in response to being positively stereotyped 
or patronised (Conley et al., 2002). However, the vast majority of research in the area has focused 
on data provided by heterosexuals (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009) 
and, as a result, provides limited insight into the effect these events have on sexual minorities. The 
qualitative findings discussed in Chapter 4 build upon those of Nadal et al (2011). The positive 
stereotyping of gay men can result in self-exclusion by gay men who are uncomfortable with such 
stereotyping and the derision of gay men who do not live up to such these stereotypes. Likewise, 
paternalistic homoprejudice – while well-meaning – undermines gay men’s autonomy and agency, 
particularly with regards to the important personal choice to disclose their sexual orientation or to 
remain ‘in the closet’.  
Not only is a theoretical advancement such as this important in an academic context, but 
it is also be enlightening in a lay context; if an individual who endorses positive stereotypes about 
gay men could ‘tune in’ to its more negative interpretation, then such perspective-taking could be 
an effective empathetic prejudice-reduction technique (Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Like 
ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999), ambivalent homoprejudice has the potential 
to transform the academic landscape of LGBTQ psychology. 
7.2.2 The Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale 
Along with a novel and necessary reconceptualisation of prejudice towards gay men, this 
thesis also offers a new tool with which to measure the multifaceted nature of homoprejudice: the 
ambivalent homoprejudice scale. Alongside hostile prejudice towards gay men, which is captured 
by many of the extant scales used to investigate homoprejudice such as the ATG (Herek, 1984) 
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and the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), the AHS also measures benevolent homoprejudice, 
which is relatively less well-captured by existing attitude measures.  
The series of studies documented in this thesis evidenced the factor structure of the AHS, 
which corresponds with the conceptual distinction between repellent, adversarial, romanticised, 
and paternalistic homoprejudice advanced in Chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, each of the subscales 
demonstrate acceptable levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability, suggesting that the 
AHS subscales reliably measure their underlying constructs. Likewise, the AHS subscales are 
positively correlated with similar and conceptually related measures, and different groups that have 
been found to score differently on similar measures also score differently on the AHS subscales. 
The AHS’s most novel property, however, is its use of an ambivalence index that is easily 
interpretable, normally distributed, reliable, and valid. Unlike other measures of ambivalent 
prejudice, which infer ambivalence from a positive correlation between hostile and benevolent 
subscales (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999; Cary et al., 2016), the ambivalence index employed herein 
can discern between individuals who are ambivalent or not ambivalent. Respondents score low 
(below the midpoint of 5) on the index when they endorse one valence but not the other or they 
endorse neither hostility nor benevolence (i.e., not ambivalent) whereas they score higher (5 or 
more) as they endorse increasing levels of both hostility and benevolence (i.e., ambivalent). This 
index is also useful because it allows the researcher to investigate the intensity of a given 
respondent’s ambivalent homoprejudice because scores closer to 10 represent greater levels of 
ambivalence than scores closer to 5. The utility of this is that future researchers have a 
psychometrically validated tool with which to stratify their samples and draw comparisons between 
groups who are highly ambivalent towards gay men and groups who are not. Within a UK context, 
the findings presented in this thesis suggest that almost half of the participants endorsed 
ambivalent attitudes towards gay men to some degree, suggesting a major avenue for further 
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research on ambivalent homoprejudice. The AHS thus provides interested scholars with the tools 
necessary to investigate this. 
 7.2.3 Scale Development Best-Practice 
 The present scale development consisted of a number of stages: 1) Initial theory 
development; 2) Qualitative enquiry and theoretical adaptation; 3) Item generation and exploratory 
factor analysis; 4) Confirmatory factor analysis; and 5) Validity and reliability testing. As compared 
to two similar measures – the multidimensional heterosexism scale (Walls, 2008a) and the 
polymorphous prejudice scale (Massey, 2009) – the development of the AHS has arguably been 
more rigorous at every stage and offers some guidance with regards to scale development best 
practice. 
 From the inception of this thesis, it was clear that there were few academic resources 
available because homoprejudice is predominantly characterised in terms of hostility. At the time 
of Walls’s (2008) and Massey’s (2009) conceptualisations of their respective theories, there were 
even fewer resources; the sexual orientation microaggressions literature – which this thesis draws 
extensively on – did not emerge until 2009 in the form of an unpublished doctoral thesis on sexual 
orientation microaggressions in psychotherapy, which was later published in 2011 (Shelton & 
Delgado-Romero, 2011). Voids in academic knowledge such as this must not be overlooked when 
conducting scale development because, as was discussed in Chapter 5, content validity becomes 
compromised. In this context, theory development alone is also not adequate because it privileges 
educated (and thus, empowered) narratives over others, nullifying others’ lived experiences. The 
qualitative methods employed in Study 1 demonstrated this; the heterosexual participants’ 
endorsement of positive stereotypes were not motivated by social dominance, as Walls (2008a) 
argues, and were not interpreted as appreciative by the gay participants as Massey (2009) argues. 
In both cases, social dominative and queer accounts of these phenomena were incompatible with 
the data collected and, as a result, each author’s respective interpretations of their scale scores are 
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potentially flawed. Future scale development researchers should take care that they have adequately 
conceptualised their latent variables before embarking upon measuring them (DeVellis, 2012), as 
has been done here. 
 Another issue concerns the item generation and factor analytic procedures used in the 
creation of Walls’s (2008) and Massey’s (2009) scales. In the former’s scale development, the factor 
analysis was conducted on a rather small pool of 23 items whereas, in the latter instance, many of 
the items were iterations of items from other scales – some of which were extrapolated from 
tangential scales measuring sexism and racism. Procedures such as these simply compound the 
content validity issues discussed earlier and result in poorly-sampled item pools. Poorly-loading 
items are indicative of such a problem, as can be seen in Massey’s (2009) inclusion of a number of 
items “due to theoretical interest” (p. 155) that loaded less than the recommended .50 (R. 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The paternalistic heterosexism subscale’s unexpected positive 
correlation with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice is also indicative of content validity 
issues; because Walls (2008a) did not investigate this construct adequately, they were thus unable 
to sample adequately from the infinite ways in which it could be expressed (Yaghmaie, 2003). The 
scale development procedure adopted herein further emphasises the necessity for theoretical 
clarity; scale developers and their collaborators engaged in the item generation process should 
know enough about the theorised latent variables to evaluate the item pool’s content validity before 
subjecting them to exploratory analyses. 
 The final scale development issue illuminated by this thesis, which future scholars must 
improve upon is the confident and competent use of confirmatory factor analysis. Walls (2008a) 
did not include this important step in their scale development, opting for two exploratory factor 
analyses instead. Although DeVillis (2012) notes that obtaining the same factor structures from 
exploratory analyses on different samples indicates that the factor structure is probably more than 
just a “recurring quirk” (p. 153), Walls’s (2008) two exploratory factor analyses resulted in two 
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different factor structures. Subsequent confirmatory analyses could have indicated which factor 
structure demonstrated better fit and which scale items were undermining goodness of fit. 
Fortunately, Massey (2009) did conduct a confirmatory factor analysis. However, their use of 
maximum likelihood estimation on ordinal data – as compared to the WLSMV estimation used in 
this thesis – can lead to less precise loading estimates and over-rejection of correctly-specified 
models (Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006).  
As a caveat to this latter point, factor analysis is not an exact science. For example, multiple 
oblique rotations may have been appropriate for the EFA conducted in Study 2a; while the present 
investigation employed geomin rotation, other oblique rotations such as target rotation would have 
also been appropriate (Browne, 2001). The critique here is not that Walls (2008a) and Massey 
(2009) are not adhering to strict structural equation modelling rules but, rather, that their respective 
justifications for their analytic decisions are unconvincing. Future scale developers must consult 
the available literature when deciding upon the parameters of their EFA and CFA because the 
results potentially attest to the veracity of the factor structure and, by extension, the theory 
informing it.  
7.3 Limitations 
Although limitations were covered in each individual chapter, several limitations common 
to all of the studies will be reiterated here. 
First, all the samples were primarily white and well-educated, and there were more women 
than men. Given that prejudice towards gay men is tempered by racial identification (Lewis, 2003), 
educational attainment (Rowaat, LaBougg, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009), and gender (Herek, 
2000), the lack of diversity within these samples limits the generalisability of the findings beyond 
the scope of this research. It can be concluded that attitudes towards gay men were ambivalent 
among the respondents based on the index of ambivalence derived from the romanticised and 
adversarial homoprejudice subscales, but the lack of diversity in the survey sample limited the 
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degree to which levels of ambivalence could be compared between different demographics – 
particularly with regards to ethnicity. Future usage of the AHS should solicit participation from a 
more diverse sample in order to provide a more holistic account of the demographics of those 
who endorse conflicted attitudes towards gay men. Similarly, further qualitative research on 
ambivalent homoprejudice should seek a more ethnically diverse sample and challenge the notion 
that “’gay’ equals ‘white’” (Han, 2007) so that the effect of intersectionality on ambivalent 
homoprejudice can be more thoroughly investigated (Bowleg, 2013). Because of this lack of 
diversity in the focus groups, the construction of the scale items may only reflect concerns by 
White gay men and overlook other groups, such as Asian gay men, who are noted to face unique 
stigmas that White gay men do not (Han, 2009).  
As well as this, the cross-sectional nature of these data mean that the correlations between 
the AHS and the validation measures do not tell us anything about causality. For example, does 
greater endorsement of romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice cause one to perform more 
altruistic behaviours, or is the opposite true? What factors mediate this relationship? If the 
attitudinal and behavioural measures were collected at different time points, structural equation 
modelling could be used to explore this relationship. On the other hand, longitudinal methods 
increase the likelihood of participant drop-out and, thus, measurement error (Wolke et al., 2009). 
The random assignment of validation scales also largely limits the ability to perform other 
predictive analyses such as multiple regression. A future direction would thus be to perform 
predictive analyses to further explore the potential antecedents and consequences of ambivalent 
homoprejudice. 
A further limitation is the omission of some important validation measures. Although the 
present research used 16 validation measures – a great deal more than is typical in scale validation 
research – this necessitated an increasingly large sample size in order to maintain statistical power 
while also mitigating against participant fatigue. As such, personality traits associated with 
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ambivalence – as measured by scales such as the personal fear of invalidity scale (Thompson, 
Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001) – could not be included without also having to source 
greater numbers of participants, limiting insight into other potential factors that lead to ambivalent 
homoprejudice. Media contact with gay men, which has been shown to correlate with positive 
stereotypes about gay men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) was also not measured, and future 
research should study this relationship further. 
Finally, it is prudent to acknowledge the disadvantages of the nonparametric statistical 
analyses used in this programme of research. As discussed in Chapter 6, the use of parametric tests 
on Likert (i.e., ordinal) data is a contentious issue among academics. For the sake of transparency, 
both parametric and nonparametric correlational analyses were conducted, though the 
nonparametric analyses have only been referred to up until this point. A comparison of the two 
sets of analyses does indeed reveal that the nonparametric tests produced more false negatives 
than did the parametric tests, as was argued by Norman (2010). However, the parametric tests 
produced more false positives than did the nonparametric tests. Clearly, the issue of power in 
(non)parametric testing is not quite as clear-cut as has been represented in the literature to date. 
While the false negative results created by nonparametric testing may make aspects of this work a 
casualty of the publication bias against null findings (Ferguson, & Heene, 2012), equally, the false 
positive results created by parametric testing risks adding to the replication crisis currently 
undermining the field of social psychology (Earp & Trafimow, 2015). A resolution to this issue is 
beyond the remit of this thesis (and, as forecasted by Norman, 2010, a long way off), but it suffices 
to say that the use of parametric testing in this thesis was both correct and (paradoxically) 
inadvisable. 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
 This thesis illuminates an under-researched area in the literature and the findings point 
towards a number of interesting research directions and improvements for future scholars. The 
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first direction concerns the broader application of attitudinal ambivalence principles to ambivalent 
homoprejudice as it manifests on a behavioural level. Secondly, researchers should seek to validate 
the AHS cross-culturally and explore cultural differences in the endorsement of ambivalent 
homoprejudice. Finally, the potential to measure ambivalent homoprejudice implicitly is discussed. 
7.4.1 Behavioural Research 
 With the development of new measures come opportunities to use these measures in 
studies exploring the behavioural consequences of ambivalence towards gay men. Given that 
attitudinal ambivalence can induce discomfort (Clark et al., 2002), future research should 
investigate whether ambivalent homoprejudice – as measured by the innovative ambivalence index 
provided in this thesis – induces similar feelings of discomfort and whether ambivalent individuals 
engage in similar self-soothing strategies, such as biased information processing of gay rights issues 
and response amplification towards gay individuals. 
 If ambivalent homoprejudice is as pliable as other ambivalent attitudes, then these findings 
could be used to develop interventions to steer ambivalent individuals towards more uniformly 
affirmative attitudinal positions. Given the diminished relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour among ambivalent individuals (Armitage & Conner, 2000), this could also help mobilise 
greater political advocacy for sexual minorities. This may be particularly fruitful with regards to 
religious individuals who often have difficulty reconciling their religious beliefs and attitudes 
towards homosexuality (Bean & Martinez, 2014). 
7.4.2 Scale Validation 
 Scale validation is an iterative process requiring replications using different participants, 
different measures of construct validity, and different cultural contexts. The United Kingdom has 
made significant advances with regards to gay rights, feeding the perception that gay men no longer 
experience discrimination and that they get special treatment over heterosexuals (YouGov, 2014). 
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Likewise, gay men are widely portrayed in the media consumed in the United Kingdom, and many 
of these portrayals utilise positive stereotyping in their characterisation. Within this cultural 
context, it is logical that residents of the United Kingdom may endorse ambivalent attitudes 
towards gay men based on these sociocultural factors. However, it is not yet known how the AHS 
performs in other countries. Future research using the AHS cross-culturally should: 1) Translate it 
for use in other countries where necessary; 2) conduct confirmatory factor analysis to assess its 
goodness-of-fit among different populations; 3) measure subscale correlations and compare 
ambivalence cross-culturally; and 4) situate interpretations within each country’s unique 
sociocultural context. 
7.4.3 Implicit Measurement of Ambivalent Homoprejudice 
 Another direction for further research is exploring the feasibility of measuring ambivalence 
towards gay men using implicit methods. As discussed in Chapter 2, one implicit measurement 
tool that could be able to access ambivalence is the IAT (Greenwald & McGhee, 1998), which has 
been used to detect the latent influence of an old attitude after a new attitude has been primed 
(Petty et al., 2006). The IAT could be used in tandem with the AHS in order to further study 
ambivalence towards gay men using self-report and implicit measures. 
 Schneider et al. (2015) document another novel method of assessing ambivalence implicitly 
by measuring computer cursor trajectories. When participants rated ambivalent targets, such as 
abortion and euthanasia as either positive (on one side of the computer screen) or negative (on the 
opposing side), there was greater cursor ‘pull’ towards the unchosen response option. By 
comparison, when univalent targets such as happiness were evaluated, there was no cursor ‘pull’ 
towards the unchosen response option (Schneider et al., 2015). Presenting participants with images 
of different subtypes of gay men and measuring cursor trajectory in relation to positive and 
negative response options could provide researchers with another route into tapping ambivalence 
towards gay men. 
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7.4.4 Further Qualitative Inquiry 
 A final direction for future scholars to take would be to further investigate ambivalent 
homoprejudice as it arises in everyday speech from alternative epistemic stances. The qualitative 
methodology herein adopted a realist stance to understanding the phenomena, in line with the 
large body of social-cognitive literature drawn upon in Chapters 2 and 3. However, these 
constructs are also readily investigable from a range of other paradigms. For example, repellent 
and adversarial homoprejudice capture aspects of mundane heterosexism (Peel, 2001), which was 
explored from a discursive perspective that rejects the essentialism of attitudes endorsed in this 
thesis. Likewise, positive stereotypes about gay men have been critiqued from a social 
constructionist stance by Cover (2004), who argues that even self-stereotyping by sexual minorities 
can serve only to reinforce the discourses (and, by consequence, realities) constructed by 
heterosexuals. 
 Absent in the literature, however, is a substantive investigation of paternalism towards gay 
men. Although some research has explored sexual minorities’ paternalistic interpretations 
heterosexuals’ speech (Conley et al., 2003; Nadal et al., 2011), no research to date has empirically 
investigated how that paternalism manifests in speech. Given the potential disjunct between the 
expression and experience of paternalistic homoprejudice, this construct in particular appears to 
be worthy of specific investigation – particularly from more critical discursive and social 
constructionist stances.     
7.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has presented a novel and holistic interpretation of prejudice towards gay men, 
which was necessary because ostensibly positive attitudes towards gay men have been overlooked 
in the literature in favour of research on negative attitudes towards gay men. A theory of 
ambivalent homoprejudice was developed, which detailed the ontological and sociocultural factors 
contributing to it and its potential content, and this theorising was corroborated in a subsequent 
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qualitative study. From this, a measure of ambivalent homoprejudice tapping repellent, 
romanticised, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice was developed, and this measure 
demonstrated a range of useful psychometric properties. The limitations of competing theories 
outlined earlier in the thesis were supported by these findings and directions that scholars can take 
this research in have been discussed, including the cross-cultural validation of the AHS and the 
use of the AHS in behavioural studies. Such research will be fundamental in further understanding 
the phenomena of ambivalent homoprejudice and the factors that have motivated the transition 
from old-fashioned to modern hostile and benevolent attitudes towards gay men. 
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Appendix 1 
Heterosexual Focus Group Topic Guide 
1) Rapport: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s focus group. Firstly, I’m inviting you to be as 
open and honest as possible. I’m not here to make judgements about you as individuals 
based on your contribution here and, likewise, I would encourage you all to be respectful of 
each other’s contributions – one of the best and most helpful ways you can do this is by 
talking with each other about the points you all raise over the course of the focus group. 
Everything you say here – I won’t disclose what you say to anyone outside of my research 
team, except in the form of anonymised quotes that will not make you identifiable. In the 
interest of getting open and honest discussion from you, please respect this confidentiality 
also. Is this okay with everyone? 
Before we go on to the actual discussion, I think it would be a good idea to break the ice a 
bit and get everybody more comfortable speaking among the group so I would like you to 
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say your name (or use a pseudonym) and tell us all about why you wanted to take part in this 
study. 
2) Orienting: 
Thank you for sharing a little bit about yourselves. We’ll be discussing a few different things 
during this focus group. We’re going to start off by looking at two vignettes – short stories 
involving some interactions between straight people and gay people – and we’ll discuss them 
as a group. After that we’ll then look at some data collected recently from the general public 
looking at how they think gay people are treated nowadays. Lastly, we’ll be talking a bit about 
things called ‘microaggressions’, which I will define later. 
3) Vignettes: 
We’ll be discussing two vignettes together and each will be looking at some interactions 
between gay people and straight people and then we’ll be discussing what happened, and 
taking different perspectives in discussing the interaction and what it may mean for different 
people. 
Vignette 1: 
James is an 18 year old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his 
first year of university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new 
neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be open with everyone from the outset, he drops into 
conversation that he’s gay and Diane reacts enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I’ve 
always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally cute together!” 
James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make 
him feel uncomfortable. 
a) Why might James feel uncomfortable about Diane’s comments? 
b) Is James’s discomfort justified? Why? 
c) If you were Diane and James challenged what you said, how would you react? 
d) Why might Diane specifically want a gay friend? 
e) Have you heard or made these kinds of comments in real life? How do you feel about 
these kinds of comments? 
Vignette 2: 
Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating 
each other. After a month of dating, they decide that things are going so well that they 
should be introduced to each other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and 
his friends get along with Yotam very well. As James’s friends drink more, they become 
bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one friend, Yasmin, asks them 
“Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean” 
Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and 
Yasmin later remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “moody” 
a) Why might Yotam have reacted in the way he did? 
b) Was Yotam’s reaction justified? Why? 
c) If you had asked Yasmin’s question to a gay couple and had been told to mind your own 
business, how would you react? 
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d) Have you heard or asked these kinds of questions in real life? How do you feel about 
these kinds of questions? 
e) Should gay people be more laid back about these kinds of questions? Why? 
 
4) Data Discussion 
Now we’ll talk about some data that was collected by YouGov shortly after the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) came into force in March 2014. 1,958 British adults were 
asked ‘Do you think that gay people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse 
than straight people?’ 
a) Before we look at how these respondents answered, how do you think gay people are 
treated in relation to straight people and why? Can you provide some examples? 
Now we’ll take a look at how the 1,958 respondents answered: in the UK, 42% said that gay 
people were treated equally to straight people, 33% said that gay people were treated worse 
than straight people, 11% said that gay people were treated better than straight people, and 
14% said that they didn’t know. 
a) Let’s first look at the 42% of people who said that gay people were treated equally to 
straight people in the UK. What does sexual orientation equality look like to you? 
b) If you believe gay people do not yet have equality, how far do we have to go before 
reaching equality? How many more rights do gay people need? 
c) Now let’s look at the 33% of people who said that gay people were treated worse than 
straight people in the UK. In what ways are gay people treated worse than straight 
people? 
d) Do you feel a degree of pity for gay men because of their mistreatment by others? In 
what ways? 
e) Now we’ll turn to the 11% of people who said that gay people were treated better than 
straight people in the UK. Have you ever felt that a gay man has been treated better than 
you on the basis of his sexuality? Why? 
f) Do you sometimes think that gay men have it easier than straight people? Why? Can you 
give any examples? 
g) Do you feel a degree of envy towards gay men because of these examples? In what ways? 
 
5) Microaggressions 
Finally, we’ll talk about things called ‘microaggressions’. Before I provide a definition, does 
anybody want to try and guess what a ‘microaggression’ is? 
Definition: “Brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, or environmental indignities, 
whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative 
slights and insults towards members of oppressed groups” (Nadal, 2008, p. 23) 
a) Microaggressions are directed towards members of oppressed groups. Do you believe 
that gay men are oppressed in society? Why? 
b) Returning briefly to the vignettes we looked at earlier, do you believe that Diane’s and 
Yasmin’s comments were microaggressive? Why? 
c) I’ll provide you with some examples of things that some researchers consider to be 
microaggressive. For each one, I’d like to know whether you agree or disagree that it is 
microaggressive and why 
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- Using phrases such as “that’s so gay” 
- Asking a gay man, if you find him too flamboyant, to “tone it down” 
- Assuming that gay men have some qualities (e.g. fashionable) and lack others (e.g. 
sporty) 
- Treating gay men as if they are ‘exotic’ and being in awe of how they differ to you 
- Expressing discomfort at talking about male homosexuality 
- Downplaying how significant anti-gay sentiment is to gay men 
- Being preoccupied with the sexual aspects of gay men 
d) Can you recall any examples of when you have used microaggressions towards gay men – 
intentionally or unintentionally – perhaps similar to the examples you have in front of 
you? Elaborate. Were you challenged about your comments? 
e) Do you feel that people should be excused when they accidentally use microaggressions 
that upset gay men? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Gay Focus Group Topic Guide 
 
1) Rapport: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s focus group. Firstly, I’m inviting you to be as 
open and honest as possible. I’m not here to make judgements about you as individuals 
based on your contribution here and, likewise, I would encourage you all to be respectful of 
each other’s contributions – one of the best and most helpful ways you can do this is by 
talking with each other about the points you all raise over the course of the focus group. 
Everything you say here – I won’t disclose what you say to anyone outside of my research 
team, except in the form of anonymised quotes that will not make you identifiable. In the 
interest of getting open and honest discussion from you, please respect this confidentiality 
also. Is this okay with everyone? 
Before we go on to the actual discussion, I think it would be a good idea to break the ice a 
bit and get everybody more comfortable speaking among the group so I would like you to 
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say your name (or use a pseudonym) and tell us all about why you wanted to take part in this 
study. 
2) Orienting 
 
Thank you for sharing a little bit about yourselves. We’ll be discussing a few different things 
during the focus group. We’re going to start off by talking about some data collected recently 
from the general public looking at how they think gay people are treated nowadays. I’ll also 
have you respond to their opinions and share how you believe that you are treated in relation 
to heterosexuals and lesbian women. We’ll then explore your views on ‘benevolent’ attitudes 
towards gay men, which I’ll explain to you. 
3) Vignettes: 
We’ll be discussing two vignettes together and each will be looking at some interactions 
between gay people and straight people and then we’ll be discussing what happened, and 
taking different perspectives in discussing the interaction and what it may mean for different 
people. 
Vignette 1: 
James is an 18 year old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his 
first year of university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new 
neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be open with everyone from the outset, he drops into 
conversation that he’s gay and Diane reacts enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I’ve 
always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally cute together!” 
James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make 
him feel uncomfortable. 
a) How often do you encounter reactions like Diane’s? 
b) How do reactions like Diane’s make you feel about yourself? (Separate into gay 
friend/gay cousin components) Why? 
c) Have you ever challenged somebody who reacted in this way? Why? How was this 
received? 
d) In your opinion, are gay people seen to have qualities that makes them better ‘friend 
material’ than straight people? What qualities? How do you feel about these assumptions? 
e) Is Diane’s reaction okay because she was just trying to be nice, despite making James feel 
uncomfortable? Why? 
Vignette 2: 
Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating 
each other. After a month of dating, they decide that things are going so well that they 
should be introduced to each other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and 
his friends get along with Yotam very well. As James’s friends drink more, they become 
bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one friend, Yasmin, asks them 
“Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean” 
Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and 
Yasmin later remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “moody” 
 
 
267 
 
a) How often do you encounter comments like Yasmin’s? 
b) How do questions like Yasmin’s make you feel about yourself and your sex life? 
c) Have you ever challenged questions like Yasmin’s (like Yotam did)? Why? How was this 
received? 
d) Do you believe that straight people are often preoccupied with the sex lives of gay men? 
Why? Examples? 
e) What do you believe is the intent behind these kinds of questions? Are straight people 
just trying to be nice or are they simply being insensitive? 
 
4) Data Discussion 
Now we’ll talk about some data that was collected by YouGov shortly after the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) came into force in March 2014. 1,958 British adults were 
asked ‘Do you think that gay people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse 
than straight people?’ 
a) Before we look at how these respondents answered, do you believe that your sexuality 
means that you are treated worse than, better than, or the same as heterosexuals? Why? 
Can you provide some examples? 
Now we’ll take a look at how the 1,958 respondents answered: 42% said that gay people 
were treated equally to straight people, 33% said that gay people were treated worse than 
straight people, 11% said that gay people were treated better than straight people, and 14% 
said that they didn’t know. 
a) Let’s look first at the 42% of people who said that gay people were treated equally to 
straight people in the UK. What does sexual orientation equality look like to you? 
b) If you believe gay people do not yet have equality, how far do we have to go before 
reaching equality? How many more rights do gay people need? 
c) Now let’s look at the 33% of people who said that gay people were treated worse than 
straight people in the UK. In what ways do you feel you are treated worse than straight 
people on the basis of your sexuality? 
d) Do you feel pitied by straight people? Can you provide any examples of times where this 
pity has made you feel inferior or lesser? Prompts: babied? Undermined? Dehumanised? 
e) Now we’ll turn to the 11% of people who said that gay people were treated better than 
straight people in the UK. Have you ever felt that you are treated better than straight 
people on the basis of your sexuality? Why? How do you respond to the suggestion that 
you are treated better than straight people because of your sexuality? 
f) Do you sometimes feel envied by straight people? Can you provide any examples of 
times where this envy has been unrealistic? 
 
5) Benevolent Prejudice towards Gay Men 
Now we’ll be looking at so-called ‘benevolent’ prejudice. I’ll assume you all have an idea 
about what prejudice is but does anybody here know what benevolence is and what, 
together, benevolent prejudice might be? 
Whereas ‘benevolence’ is usually associated with kindness and other positive emotions, some 
researchers have put forward the idea that benevolent attitudes towards certain minority 
 
 
268 
 
groups can be prejudicial. Here is a quote from them that I have adapted for our talk about 
benevolent attitudes towards gay men: 
“[Benevolent homoprejudice is] a set of interrelated attitudes towards [gay men] that are 
[prejudicial] in terms of viewing [gay men] stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are 
subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver)… We do not consider benevolent 
[homoprejudice] a good thing, for despite the positive feelings it may indicate for the 
perceiver, its underpinnings lie in traditional stereotyping and [heterosexual] dominance 
[(e.g., heterosexuality being the ‘gold standard’)], and its consequences are often damaging.” 
 Adapted from Glick and Fiske (1996) 
To give you an idea of the kinds of things I’m interested to hear about, I’ll give you an 
example from my own personal experience: I once stayed at my best friend’s house and 
closed the curtains (which were tied up in a very tidy and ornamental way) in the bedroom to 
go to bed. The next day my best friend’s Mum noted that I’d left the curtain closed and, 
when I offered to fix it, she said not to worry because she had a certain tidy and symmetrical 
way she liked to do it. She then suddenly changed her mind and said “actually, you’re gay, 
you’ll know what to do with them”. 
a) Can you think of any occasions when straight people make these kinds of ‘nice’ 
assumptions about you because of your sexuality? How do these kinds of assumptions 
make you feel? 
b) Can you think of any occasions when straight people come across as overprotective, 
overbearingly nice to you, or overly helpful towards you because of your sexuality? 
Prompt: people saying “I’ve always wanted a gay friend!” or trying to set you up with 
someone. How do these behaviours make you feel? 
c) Can you think of any occasions when straight people impose themselves on spaces which 
are typically meant for gay men such as gay bars, clubs, groups, meetings, or job posts 
meant for gay men? How does this make you feel? 
d) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have seemingly been in awe of your 
sexuality, as if you’re an ‘exotic’ outsider? Prompt: people ‘taking an interest’ by asking 
invasive, intimate, or inappropriate questions about your sex life or suggesting that they 
are like an ‘honourary gay’. How does this make you feel? 
e) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have said that you have it easier or 
receive special benefits because of your sexuality? How does this make you feel? 
f) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have been overwhelmed you with 
assurances that they are not prejudiced, that they consider gay people equal to straight 
people, or that your sexuality is ‘fine’ with them? How does this make you feel? 
g) When straight people make unrealistic assumptions about you (e.g. that you’re highly 
fashionable), do you feel that your self-esteem takes a hit or that you feel negative about 
yourself? In what ways? 
h) When these comments and behaviours are directed at you, do you feel as if you are a 
target of prejudice or do you think the person is just trying to be nice? Why? Are good 
intentions an excuse? 
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Appendix 3 
The AHS-96 
1. Gay men need to stop shoving their sexuality down everyone's throats 
2. Gay men need to stop making such a fuss about their sexuality 
3. Gay men would be accepted if they complained less about their rights 
4. Prejudice towards gay men is a thing of the past 
5. Gay men have all the rights they need 
6. Discrimination towards gay men no longer exists 
7. Gay men exaggerate the amount of prejudice they experience 
8. Gay men have achieved equality 
9. One cannot say anything about gay men without being accused of prejudice 
10. Many people are afraid of criticising gay men for fear of being accused of being prejudiced 
11. Most employers are too scared to reprimand gay men for fear of reprisal 
12. Gay men readily perceive criticism as prejudice 
13. Gay men use their sexuality to obtain special privileges 
14. Gay men get too much attention nowadays 
15. It's unfair to have gay pride when there is no such thing as straight pride 
16. Upstanding people are being held hostage by gay men's political correctness 
17. Gay men should be satisfied with all the rights they’ve got 
18. Gay men are like broken records when it comes to complaining about their rights 
19. Gay men complain too much about how they are treated 
20. Give gay men an inch and they'll take a mile 
21. It seems gay men always find some new issue to complain about 
22. Gay men use their sexuality as a weapon to get what they want 
23. Gay people use their sexuality to get undue advantages 
24. Gay men make claims of prejudice to work the system 
25. Gay men need someone to speak up for them 
26. It’s important to help gay men because they’ve been through so much 
27. Gay men often need a shoulder to cry on 
28. Gay men should be helped by those stronger than them 
29. Gay men need help standing up for themselves 
30. People should be nice to gay men because of the tough time they have 
31. Gay men have it rough, so everyone needs to do what they can to make up for it 
32. It's important to be kind to gay men because of all the pain they go through 
33. There are many areas in life that gay men are simply ill-equipped to handle 
34. Gay men are emotionally fragile 
35. Gay men are not suited to working in business because it’s too cut-throat 
36. Gay men are oblivious to their susceptibility to sexually-transmitted infections 
37. Many gay men would make reckless life choices without the guidance of others 
38. Gay men lack the maturity that other people possess 
39. Gay men need saving from themselves 
40. It’s important that straight people stand up for gay men 
41. Gay men need defending from comments about their sexuality 
42. Gay men need reassuring that they are accepted by others 
43. Gay men need to be taken care of in social settings 
44. People should feel sorry for gay men because of their struggles 
45. Gay men deserve sympathy for all that they go through 
46. It's hard to imagine how gay men cope with everything they have to go through 
47. Being gay is a heavy burden for a man 
48. It's upsetting to think about how difficult gay men's lives are 
49. Gay men are great at giving relationship advice 
50. Gay men have a lot to teach others about being sexually adventurous 
51. Straight men could learn a thing or two about personal grooming from gay men 
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52. Its easy to talk to a gay man about personal problems 
53. A gay man should be able to advise their friends on what to wear 
54. Gay men are a great source of gift ideas 
55. A gay man who does not like clothes shopping is not 'good' at being gay 
56. Gay men who aren't fashionable havent succeeded as a gay person 
57. There is little point in having a gay friend if he can't help you with fashion 
58. Some gay men are terrible at being gay 
59. Gay men make great friends 
60. Gay men bring unecessary drama to friendship circles 
61. Every friendship circle needs a sassy gay friend 
62. Gay men are likely to bitch about you behind your back 
63. Everyone needs a gay best friend 
64. Compared to most men, gay men have a better understanding of women 
65. Behind every great woman is a fabulous gay best friend 
66. Gay men know what turns a good night into a great night out 
67. There's little point in having a gay friend if he doesn't enjoy partying 
68. A gay man will never fail to make their friends laugh 
69. Few people have quicker wits than a gay man 
70. Gay men are generally more entertaining than straight people 
71. Gay men are more in touch with their emotions than other men 
72. Gay men are often like 'one of the girls' 
73. The thought of close contact with a gay man is unsettling 
74. Gay men are predatory 
75. Gay men should be banned from working with children 
76. Children are corrupted by gay men’s lifestyles 
77. Gay men should not be allowed to give blood because they will spread disease 
78. Sex between two men is gross 
79. Gay men are repulsive 
80. Gay men are revolting 
81. Gay men are disgusting 
82. Gay men are immoral 
83. It's wrong to be a gay man 
84. Society should be more tolerant of gay men 
85. It should be illegal to be a gay man 
86. Being gay is a choice 
87. Many gay men just haven’t met the right woman yet 
88. Gay men should seek therapy to treat their condition 
89. Gay men are perverted 
90. Gay men are sinful 
91. Sex between two men is an affront to religious teachings 
92. Physical intimacy between two men is against nature 
93. Being gay involves dirty sexual practices 
94. The thought of two men having sex is disgusting 
95. Gay men are a blight on society 
96. Gay men deserve the violence they experience 
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Appendix 4 
96-Item Rotated EFA and Deletion Order 
Question Number Factor 
 1 2 3 4 
1† .68 -.10 .19 -.03 
2** .55 .07 .32 .03 
3 .88 -.02 .05 -.03 
4† .82 -.05 .12 .03 
5† .65 -.09 .12 -.02 
6† .81 -.21 .11 .08 
7† .85 -.09 .12 .01 
8 .86 -.05 .11 -.02 
9† .80 -.14 .21 -.07 
10 .91 -.13 .04 .11 
11† .85 -.07 .00 .01 
12† -.59 .12 -.05 .21 
13† .89 -.01 -.00 -.16 
14† .60 .15 .07 -.03 
15† .84 .07 .01 -.03 
16 1.0 .00 -.06 .04 
17† .74 -.08 .24 .04 
18† .90 -.13 .02 .08 
19† .59 -.13 .16 .10 
20 .82 -.06 .10 .05 
21† .78 -.01 .10 .06 
22† .81 -.20 .08 .05 
23 .85 .00 -.00 .05 
24† .86 .03 -.01 -.13 
25* .14 .56 .15 .16 
26* -.00 .39 -.00 .21 
27* -.15 .52 .27 .07 
28* -.29 .54 .16 .06 
29* .10 .34 .05 .10 
30 -.12 .64 .23 .07 
31** .73 .44 -.10 -.02 
32** .82 .43 -.17 -.05 
33** .72 .48 -.13 -.14 
34* .48 .21 .11 .08 
35* .41 .44 .15 .03 
36* .38 .15 .39 .02 
37 .12 .76 -.06 .04 
38* .26 .14 .40 .04 
39 -.02 .78 -.03 .01 
40* .12 .50 .31 .11 
41 .30 .72 -.09 .01 
42 -.05 .60 .17 .14 
43** .62 .48 -.13 -.09 
44 .07 .61 .03 .20 
45* .11 .52 .04 .13 
46† -.04 .61 .19 .07 
47* .06 .45 .28 .19 
48* .19 .40 .30 .01 
49† -.01 .12 -.03 .51 
50 -.04 .10 -.08 .76 
51* .22 .21 .09 .35 
52* .14 .23 .10 .40 
53† -.08 .16 .20 .50 
54 .08 .12 -.05 .80 
55 .05 .04 -.13 .71 
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56† .05 .05 -.03 .77 
57** .56 .09 .30 .14 
58* .33 .12 .40 .25 
59† .66 .18 .11 -.02 
60* .44 .03 .31 .04 
61† .60 .13 .20 .09 
62 .54 .09 .26 .04 
63† .87 .08 .03 .07 
64* .47 .04 .03 .37 
65† -.26 .05 .11 .50 
66* .16 .12 .19 .42 
67* .15 .17 .20 .45 
68 .06 .02 -.02 .73 
69 -.04 .02 -.10 .71 
70 -.02 .02 -.06 .72 
71* .05 -.06 .20 .40 
72† -.12 -.03 -.06 .70 
73† .15 -.05 .72 -.09 
74 .02 -.05 .82 -.18 
75† .27 -.01 .59 -.05 
76* .25 .29 .18 -.34 
77* .30 .11 .36 .34 
78* .40 .25 .14 .42 
79 .19 -.01 .68 -.13 
80* .25 .25 .30 .30 
81 .11 -.05 .69 .05 
82 -.01 -.17 .67 .10 
83† .15 -.07 .57 .13 
84 .01 -.02 .81 .02 
85† .26 .04 .64 -.05 
86† .24 -.04 .63 -.03 
87† .29 .05 .52 -.12 
88** .38 .04 .51 -.06 
89* .35 .08 .39 -.25 
90† .22 .01 .69 -.09 
91† .17 -.02 .75 -.05 
92* .41 .07 .46 .04 
93† .29 .01 .63 -.05 
94 .23 .00 .65 -.08 
95† .25 -.01 .66 -.01 
96† .26 -.01 .62 .01 
Rotated factor loadings of the initial 96-item exploratory factor analysis. Zeroes precede all decimals. * indicates 
items deleted for low factor loadings (27 items), ** indicates items deleted for high cross-loadings (7 items), and † 
indicates items deleted for redundancy. Note that this does not reflect the changing model parameters as each item is 
individually deleted. 
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Appendix 5 
Alternative Paramatric Analyses 
 Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial 
Repellent - 
.080 
[-.069, .233] 
-.184** 
[-.333, .012]† 
.597** 
[.502, .677] 
Romanticised 
.148** 
[.051, .239] 
- 
.400** 
[.269, .514] 
.131* 
[-.028, .267]† 
Paternalistic 
-.046 
[-.149, .05] 
.310** 
[.227, .401] 
- 
-.280** 
[-.421, -.136] 
Adversarial 
.549** 
[.483, .614] 
.239** 
[.149, .323] 
-.099* 
[-.207, .012]† 
- 
Scale N Repellent Romanticised Paternalistic Adversarial 
AMI-B 
179 
.636** 
[.483, .746] 
.322** 
[.201, .440] 
.017 
[-.121, .159] 
.534** 
[.408, .637] 
AMI-H 
179 
.457** 
[.354, .565] 
.388** 
[.263, .508] 
.121 
[-.028, .281] 
.436** 
[.310, .544] 
AS 
87 
-.099 
[-.264, .090] 
.235* 
[-.062, .466]† 
.162 
[-.057, .359] 
-.208 
[-.404, .013] 
ASI-B 
84 
.540** 
[.372, .728] 
.564** 
[.414, .710] 
.184 
[-.051, .413] 
.256* 
[.019, .474] 
ASI-H 
84 
.327** 
[.172, .467] 
.252* 
[-.003, .481]† 
-.407** 
[-.567, -.227] 
.619** 
[.449, .760] 
ATG 
82 
.845** 
[.644, .918] 
-.028 
[-.259, .180] 
-.195 
[-.389, -.015]†† 
.487** 
[.335, .642] 
EBHS 
60 
-.322* 
[-.569, -.077] 
-.194 
[-.398, .044] 
-.166 
[-.386, .096] 
-.404** 
[-.571, -.189] 
HPS 
82 
.248* 
[.003, .429] 
.642** 
[.488, .765] 
.330** 
[.124, .531] 
.233* 
[-.005, .470]† 
JW 
75 
.218 
[.037, .421]†† 
.214 
[-.029, .450] 
-.026 
[-.273, .221] 
.293* 
[.050, .505] 
MCPRS 
105 
-.238* 
[-.405, -.042] 
.060 
[-.130, .251] 
.235* 
[.012, .441] 
-.303** 
[-.491, -.078] 
MoHS 
86 
.695** 
[.531, .803] 
-.075 
[-.323, .165] 
-.411** 
[-.569, -.224] 
.793** 
[.690, .865] 
MuHS-Am 
85 
.308** 
[.113, .475] 
.021 
[-.167, .197] 
-.199 
[-.424, .009] 
.452** 
[.299, .581] 
MuHS-Av 
85 
.606** 
[.466, .720] 
.159 
[-.057, .359] 
-.186 
[-.405, .048] 
.821** 
[.736, .888] 
MuHS-Pa 
85 
.369** 
[.178, .541] 
.149 
[-.078, .366] 
.215* 
[.008, .412] 
.390** 
[.159, .578] 
MuHS-Po 
85 
.080 
[-.144, .245] 
.600** 
[.423, .746] 
.312** 
[.092, .501] 
.197 
[-.049, .436] 
PPS 
82 
-.086 
[-.257, .088] 
.446** 
[.238, .614] 
.446** 
[.224, .615] 
.230* 
[.003, .449] 
PPS-Adj 
82 
-.026 
[-.190, .135] 
.469** 
[.263, .663] 
.386** 
[.178, .578] 
.309** 
[.078, .527] 
RCI 
210 
.364** 
[.220, .496] 
.112 
[-.031, .253] 
.052 
[-.090, .188] 
.241** 
[.109, .365] 
RWA 
80 
.685** 
[.518, .96] 
.053 
[-.200, .301] 
-.382** 
[-.573, -.130] 
.693** 
[.487, .823] 
SDO 
79 
.669** 
[.527, .790] 
.060 
[-.154, .258] 
.164 
[-.324, .110] 
.472** 
[.294, .619] 
SDS 
98 
.056 
[-.092, .193] 
.197 
[-.001, .394] 
.004 
[-.171, .193] 
-.176 
[-.333, -.038]†† 
SLGHRS 
82 
-.752** 
[-.884, -.456] 
.088 
[-.189, .300] 
.354** 
[.105, .532] 
-.781** 
[-.869, -.639] 
 
